At the end of the last hegemonic struggle in 1945, the United States stood at the apex of the international hierarchy of power and prestige. American economic and military power was supreme, and it provided the basis for an American-centered world economic and political order. By the 1980s this Pax Americana was in a state of disarray because of the differential growth of power among states over the previous few decades. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, the rise or reemergence of other centers of economic power, and especially the massive growth in Soviet military strength had weakened the political foundations of the international system established at the end of World War II. Events in Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere signaled that world politics were entering on a new and uncertain phase.

Sensing the ominous portents of this changed situation, numerous commentators and statesmen have reflected and written on its meaning. Parallels have been drawn between our own age and the periods preceding other great wars, particularly World War I. Contrasting unhappily with the seemingly halcyon days of the early 1960s, an uneasiness has settled over world affairs. The Middle East in 1980 has been compared to the pre-1914 Balkans, and a former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, spoke of a period of maximum danger ahead when Soviet military power reaches its zenith. A book entitled The Third World War–August 1985 (Hackett et al., 1978) became a best seller, and evidence mounted that the general public had begun to take seriously the possibility of a war between the superpowers.