The “general” dependent variable of this study was very broad: the success or failure of an intervention as defined by the intervener's own goals – that is, whether the West achieved what it set out to do in each case. The second dependent variable was much more specific: the variation in provocations and tactics listed in the lower left box of Figure 1.1, repeated as Figure B.1. To review, my claim was that by adding emotions to the analysis, we can explain when opponents of intervention use bombings versus boycotts, indiscriminate killing versus discriminate killing, when they do nothing, and so on. The specific dependent variable is related to the larger one. The more success an opponent has in launching effective provocations against the intervener, the greater the chances that the intervener's mission will fail. Certainly, the overall success or failure of an intervention is determined by a combination of factors. As the case studies in this book have shown, there is no simple answer to the success and failure of intervention; there is no magic explanatory bullet.

In this note, I address how the emotions-based approach developed here challenges or complements major alternative explanations. These alternative approaches can be discussed in terms of the elements of the basic framework outlined in Figure B.1.