At the beginning of the book, I posed the question, why, or under what conditions, have minor powers attempted to resist or challenge others they know to be significantly more powerful by force of arms in the post-Cold War period? Having assessed all the empirical material, the simplified answer is that minor powers have done so when facing a more important domestic crisis, and when either foreign support or a window of opportunity have led the minor power to think that the opponent would be constrained in escalating what was expected to be a very limited war. However, this simplified answer is drawn from the empirical results that contain four important elaborations. The first point for elaboration reflects the productive application of concepts of complexity and problem-driven pragmatism since there are three answers to the research question, rather than one. The second point for elaboration reflects more in-depth how a seemingly asymmetric conflict faced by a minor power is a potentially lesser threat to the regime than a domestic crisis spiralling out of control. The third point for elaboration highlights the common pattern found in the book's case studies, namely, that minor powers’ expectations from war were far more modest than expected. The fourth point for elaboration concerns the Iraq case, where anomalous beliefs played a particularly critical role for a minor power to miscalculate. Each of these points is elaborated on below, before concluding by reflecting on the theoretical implications for understanding the conflict in Syria, as well as brief policy recommendations.

There is more than one way for a conflict to brew

This book has addressed a number of limitations found in previous studies on asymmetric conflict. First, studies on asymmetric conflict have largely focused on the perspective of major powers, according to which minor powers are identified as rebellious or characterised as largely irrational. Thus, it has placed the onus probandi on other scholars to make sense of minor powers’ strategies. Second, many past and current studies have investigated asymmetric conflict as a conflict involving non-state actors. Such a focus has left few studies addressing minor powers, that is, states (and state-like entities), and their role in asymmetric conflicts. Third, the study of asymmetric conflict, and IR in general, has suffered from a lack of engagement with multiple theories, multiple conditions and therefore more complex notions of causality.