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4 - Rule-Following and Charity

Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2017

By
Kathrin Glüer
Edited by
Claudine Verheggen
Claudine Verheggen
Affiliation:
York University, Toronto
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Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action , pp. 46 - 68
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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