Wittgenstein has two conceptual arguments against Frazer's introduction of empirical conjectures into his discussion of Nemi and the other practices he discusses. One is that they are out of reach of empirical explanation and the other that they can be made perspicuous without it. Neither of these arguments succeeds. This leaves the most novel of his arguments, that in human sacrifice (or ritual in general) we are confronted with a phenomenon which demands of us other than an empirical explanation even if such explanation is possible.

WITTGENSTEIN'S LIMIT THESIS: IS NEMI EXPLAINABLE?

Wittgenstein's thesis that the Nemi rite cannot be explained has won some acceptance but as it stands it is fallacious even if we accept the notion of unexplainability.

One argument for unexplainability is the idea of a phenomenon so basic and fundamental that we would be unable to say what it would be to explain it. What, for example, would explain our kissing the pictures of loved ones? Our puzzlement as to why someone is kissing a bit of paper is dissipated when we learn that it is a photograph of his children. It isn't clear what would answer the further question why he is kissing a picture of his children: people kiss images of those they love and the question why they do doesn't normally arise. Such practices owe their perspicuity – and their power to confer perspicuity on any practice which can be assimilated to them – to the fact that we don't have to ask why and not to the fact that asking why would make no sense.