Introduction

From the ‘Wapenhans Report’ (World Bank, 1992b) to the Strategic Compact of 1998, the World Bank has over the past decade closely examined how to achieve its development objectives more effectively. This is more difficult for the World Bank than for many private sector actors since the Bank is more than a development agency (see Hopkins et al. chapter 11 in this volume). It is also multilateral institution which must represent and implement the will of the governments who are its members. For this reason, the Bank's ability to undertake and fulfil its economic purposes depends on a number of political forces. The institution requires the ongoing support of its most powerful members, while yet satisfying ‘an increasingly vocal and demanding senior shareholder’, the Bank must also retain its status as a technical and multilateral agency which requires the support of all its other members (see Feinberg et al., 1986).

This chapter examines the relationship between political pressures exerted on the Bank and its independence. In particular, the chapter analyses the characteristics of the Bank which enhance its autonomy so as potentially to counter-balance the Bank's reliance on the support of its largest shareholder. The characteristics examined include the Bank's financial structure, its research and expertise and the rules governing its lending operations. The chapter notes that by the end of the 1980s all the above had become subject to political influences, thus challenging the Bank's status as a multilateral and technical agency.