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Chapter 2 provides a historical account of the development of tactical air power during the interwar period and World War II in Germany, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. Air and ground force coordination has largely been ignored in peacetime, and only in combat has a sense of urgency arisen for developing and refining joint doctrine. Even then, the focus has been on defining air and ground command relationships and improving the coordination between an air force’s tactical air control systems (TACS) and the army’s air–ground systems (AAGS). These doctrinal efforts increased the efficiency of allocating and controlling air power to support ground operations. However, largely left unspoken and unwritten has been an understanding of why, how, and when tactical air power works. TAP theory answers these questions by asserting that air power’s asymmetric advantage is its ability to locate and attack massed and maneuvering armies. With air superiority secured, lethal air-to-ground forces threaten armies, causing them to disperse and hide. The enemy’s reaction, in turn, provides friendly ground forces an advantage in conducting both offensive and defensive operations. Unfortunately, a theory explaining the primary impact of air power in modern warfare has been absent until now.
Chapter 8 investigates several aspects of low-road market capitalism across regions of the United States. It tackles Black soldier protest and military discipline, the post-Civil War sale of guns and munitions, and the development of railroads as a physical and economic vehicle for the dispersal of violence in the United States. Labor strikes, the Panic of 1873, and the centrality of the federal governmment to the interests of industrial capitalism are prominent features of this chapter.
Chapter 10 engages the global and historical attributes of lynching and situates the practice within a North American environment of anti-Black terror. This chapter links national lawmakers who advocated for White supremacy to the increase and severity of violence against Black individuals (and others), surveying how violence and the construction of race served to create and uphold relationships of power and economy in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s. It centers on Congressional discussions in the Reconstruction era and the brutal death of Lee Walker, a Black man, at the hands of a White mob in 1893. The creation of a new racial order, one that harkened to earlier forms of racial intimidation, was intricately connected to work. Violence ensured that the linkages between low-status labor, poverty, and skin color remained unbroken.
Chapter 6 assesses the impact of US air power as the ARVN shifted its offensive into southern Laos in 1971. After the Cambodian incursion, a Democratic Party-led Congress voted the Cooper–Church amendment into law, forbidding US ground troops beyond South Vietnamese borders. The ARVN objective in Laos was to achieve what US air power alone during Commando Hunt was unable to do: close off the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Instead, the ill-fated Lam Son 719 raid revealed significant shortcomings in allied air–ground coordination. The South Vietnamese, minus their US military advisors and tactical air controllers, could not take advantage of the available air power to prevent the NVA from driving the ARVN from Laos. After the NVA’s victory, the North Vietnamese gambled with another general offensive.
Chapter 9 traces worker repression in and around the 1877 worker protests. The crucible of low-road capitalism delivered the Great Strikes of 1877, but the layers of enforcement - from citizens and local police to militia and national troops - reveal the exclusive nature of the new industrial order. Since the Panic of 1873, railroad corporations had maintained profitability by lowering the wages of their workers. By 1877, workers’ wages moved from unequal to unsustainable as many now earned half their 1872 pay. While social and political leaders spoke sympathetically of laborers and their low earnings at the start of the Great Strikes, soon, in response to violent acts of working-class resistance (usually against corporate property), such rhetoric disappeared. Instead, these leaders framed workers as vagabonds and criminals - persons in need of surveillance and control. The workers’ violence was used as a reason to attack workingmen’s bodies and labor mutualism. When mixed with the hostile differences of liberal society, differences intended to keep wages low and the working class divided, the laborers on the bottom endured the greatest physical and economic harm.
The Epilogue links the book to Black Lives Matter activism and engages the work of Richard Hofstatder to explain the importance of thinking through American violence in a systemic manner.
Chapter 5 studies the “problem of evil.” Violence is a learned behavior; peaceful interventions and de-escalation disrupt the learning cycles of violence. By 1859, Black and White abolitionists had been attempting to bring about peaceful interventions to stop slavery since the nation’s founding. But southern slaveholders were not going to give up their slave property. In the Civil War enslavers refused President Lincoln’s offer of compensated emancipation (being paid market price per slave in exchange for setting slaves free) time and again. This is the problem of evil. How does one disrupt a violent institution when, in this case, slaveholders refused peaceful means of abolishing it? John Brown understood this dynamic and he challenged the greatest enabler of slavery in the United States, the federal government. This chapter explores understandings of Black violence and Black authority (threats to the hostile differences of liberal society), the legal mechanisms used to deploy troops against slave uprisings, and interprets Brown’s interracial Virginia attack as an attempt to fashion a government that backs the enslaved over the slaveholder.
“Hollywood Signs” begins by observing a convergence in the fields of film and media studies and modernist studies that makes possible a novel synthesis that Classical Hollywood, American Modernism exemplifies. At the same time that scholars in cinema studies supplemented the concept of the “studio system” with attention to the industry’s social organization and an embrace of film interpretation, literary scholars undertook an analogous effort, finding in the institutional conditions in which literature is written and read the basis for a hermeneutics. This compatibility serves as the basis for this book’s approach of construing experiments in literary form as responses to conditions within the Hollywood studio system. The introduction concludes by briefly demonstrating the analytical payoff of this new synthesis in a reading of Ralph Barton and Anita Loos’s understudied film Camille; or, the Fate of a Coquette (1926).