This chapter examines the Constitution’s allocation of war powers, arguing that the President’s commander-in-chief authority permits only defensive actions or congressionally authorized military engagements, not unilateral offensive actions. Congress holds extensive war-related powers, including declaring war, raising armies, and regulating the military, while the President’s role is limited to directing forces in existing wars or repelling sudden attacks. The chapter introduces the concept of “imperfect war” and analyzes early military conflicts. It critiques modern executive claims, used to justify the Obama and Trump administrations’ Libya and Syria bombings, that the President can initiate military actions short of “war” in the “national interest,” finding no textual basis for such authority. It argues that unilateral acts risking war, like bombing foreign forces, encroach on Congress’s war powers under the law of nations. Rejecting functionalist expansions of presidential power, the chapter advocates a formalist, originalist approach, emphasizing that the President is not above the law. Such a framework ensures a restrained presidency, preserving Congress’s primacy in war-making and maintaining the Constitution’s separation of powers.

Contrary to many libertarian arguments, the Declaration does not manifest hostility to government. Many of its complaints are that the British had provided too little government, not too much. It also makes repeated arguments about how the king and parliament had violated the British constitution. The Declaration’s deepest commitment is to constitutional government and the rule of law. “Under Law” is a better description of the nation’s founding than the “Under God” that was later added to the Pledge of Allegiance.

This introduction outlines a comprehensive study of the U.S. Constitution’s structure, marking its 237th year as the oldest modern constitution. It aims to equip readers – from law students to everyday Americans – with tools to understand its framework of representation, separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and the Bill of Rights, addressing enduring questions like the legitimacy of secession, the scope of national powers, presidential authority in foreign affairs and war, judicial review’s origins, and Congress’s taxing and spending powers. The book challenges myths, such as the existence of a “general welfare clause,” and critiques both originalist and living constitutionalist views, arguing, for instance, that enumeration limited executive, not just national, power, and that functionalism fuels the imperial presidency. Organized into seven parts and eighteen chapters, the book explores the Constitution’s compound republic, the distribution of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and federal-state dynamics. By engaging recent scholarship, it seeks to clarify the Constitution’s original design while advocating its continued relevance today.

Although Thomas Jefferson claimed on his tombstone to be the author of the Declaration of Independence, this claim is significantly overstated. Jefferson drafted the initial document, but it was heavily edited by the Continental Congress. Moreover, Jefferson was not drafting the document in his own voice, and interpretations of the Declaration that rely on Jefferson’s intellectual peculiarities are strained. The voice of the document is best described, not as the voice of the states, or even of the delegates to the Continental Congress, but the voice of the American people.

This chapter turns back to the scope of national powers, and argues that the original meaning of the Commerce Clause limits Congress to regulating the exchange of goods across state lines, and critiques the Supreme Court’s modern, expansive interpretation of the clause. It demonstrates, however, that the national commerce power was understood to be exclusive, lending support to the modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that restricts states from interfering with interstate commerce and that many originalists have opposed. It argues that, as originally understood, States retain police powers to regulate the health, safety, morals, and welfare of their populations and can incidentally affect interstate commerce through police regulations, as long as they have a legitimate purpose and do not target interstate commerce. Congress, similarly, could incidentally affect the states’ police powers or private conduct beyond the enumeration of powers so long as it was genuinely exercising its power over interstate commerce, such as when it closed the channels of interstate commerce to goods produced with child labor. This formalist approach reveals a symmetry in the original distribution of power between Congress and the states.

The references to liberty and equality in the Declaration have been contested from the very beginning. Although some have argued that they had no application to slavery, many people in the late eighteenth century perceived them as clearly inconsistent with slavery. These references have triggered equally conflicting responses from courts, where judges have relied on them to abolish minimum wage laws and to strike down regulations of businesses. Other judges have invoked these references in support of more equal legislative chambers and same-sex marriage. Supporters of every conceivable position have relied on this part of the Declaration. These references have become in effect a national Rorhschach test – one sees in them what one is already inclined to see. Given this contested history, courts invoking this language should do so with caution.

Americans looking back at the Declaration did so through court cases, political debate, and celebrations in popular culture. Numerous judicial decisions beginning in the late eighteenth century and continuing through the twentieth century have upheld the view that the Declaration of Independence created one nation, the United States of America. This was also the view of some of the greatest lawyers of the mid nineteenth century: Joseph Story, Daniel Webster, and Abraham Lincoln. Even Andrew Jackson, largely seen as a proponent of states’ rights, embraced this view in the nullification dispute with South Carolina. And ordinary Americans have celebrated the Fourth of July as the birth of a nation from the very beginning. For the thirteen independent nations view to be correct, all of these decisions, statements, and celebrations would have to be wrong. (They are not.)