It was the great eighteenth-century classic and orientalist, Johann Jakob Reiske, who remarked that of all the authors he had read – and he had read many – the orations of Aelius Aristeides came second only to the speeches of Thucydides in difficulty of comprehension; and that their substance was of major importance for the understanding of the Roman empire in the second century, with the exception of the ‘Sacred Tales’, which he dismissed as woeful superstition and absurdity. Today it is the ‘Sacred Tales’ that are most fascinating and revealing, and in their turn the political discourses are left unread, with the regrettable consequence that despite the volume of ink outpoured on the speech ‘To Rome’ there is still no satisfactory study of Aristeides' political ideas in the context of other literature of the period. On the one hand, while individual snippets of information given by him have been subjected to the closest of scrutiny to discover their truth, his general themes and major ideas have been largely neglected: on the other hand, the frequent condemnation of him as a declaimer uttering commonplaces, even if it is acknowledged that in his day the main criterion of literary excellence was an ability to express in beautiful and striking language traditional themes and concepts, obscures the fact that for him and his audience the commonplaces themselves had some value. The general categories in which he and his contemporaries described the benefits of Roman rule, however vague they may be, can be used neutrally to define provincial attitudes to the Roman empire and to construct an ideology in which both orator and audience shared.

In any attempt to understand the attitudes of subject peoples to Roman rule, the Jewish evidence cannot be ignored. The surviving literature is ample, and spans the whole period of Roman rule. Its authors were literate and articulate, and many of them played a leading part in political events. The result is, for him who has eyes to see, a vivid and intimate picture of provincial life and attitudes. But it is not an easy picture to interpret. Much of the material is fragmentary in form. It has an esoteric character, being written for initiates. It tends to avoid the explicit, to prefer the hint, the allegory. There is little straightforward historical writing; instead we have snatches of dark prophecies, of homilies, of commentaries on ancient texts. The overall effect is frequently frustrating, and it is small wonder that the material has been so little exploited.

Perhaps the very inwardness of the Jewish literature militates against its use as a guide to provincial attitudes to Roman rule. The Jews are a peculiar people; they have never been able to keep religion out of politics. The combination is sometimes bizarre and often bewildering to the sober political historian. Yet in a sense every people is a peculiar people, and the ‘uniqueness’ of Jewish-Roman relations can be exaggerated. The history of the Jews under Roman rule presents special features, especially when viewed in the long perspective; but the Judaeans were also Roman provincials, and shared many problems with provincials everywhere.

Much of the information about the real property of the Roman aristocracy in the Late Republic has already been carefully collected and listed. This chapter does not aim at any sort of completeness; it attempts to make some points, hitherto insufficiently stressed or entirely neglected, about the attitudes which the senatorial class held to its estates, what types of property it preferred (or was permitted) to invest in, and how it assisted its dependants to invest; with the little that can be said about prices and their variations, and about dealers in real property.

From the corpus of Cicero's letters we get an impression of the Roman upper class as not only deeply concerned with real property, its main form of investment, but indeed feverishly engaged in property deals. This impression may not be wholly misleading, in spite of the fact that Cicero and his brother Quintus were, for most of the period covered by the letters, rising in the social and economic scale, and thus particularly prone to buying or considering buying property. One must recognize that there were a number of reasons for a hectic turnover: one, obviously, the civil wars and proscriptions of the 80s and 40s, with, in between, the comparative frequency with which senators succumbed to prosecutions leading to exile and, if not always to the confiscation of their estates, at any rate to the need to make new dispositions of their property (or at long last to pay their creditors).

As might be expected in the case of an army for which relatively little documentary evidence survives, it is possible to reconstruct the Seleucid military hierarchy only in its upper ranks, going no lower than the commanders of the independent contingents. Nothing apart from their ranks (which presumably were equivalent to those used in other Hellenistic armies) is known about officers of lower grades; no data are available on their identity, descent, nationality, and system of promotion. This is in contrast to the relatively abundant information on the Ptolemaic army supplied by Ptolemaic documents. Nevertheless, the little we do know about the cadre of the high-ranking commanders may contribute to our understanding of the reasons for the superiority of the Seleucid military organization over the Ptolemaic system.

The supreme command in the main campaigns was usually held by the king himself: Seleucus I at Ipsus, Cyrrhestica, and Curupedion; Antiochus I against the Galatians; Antiochus III against Molon, in the Fourth Syrian War (Seleucia, Porphyrion, Rabatamana, Raphia), against Achaeus (Sardis), in the expedition to the upper satrapies, in the Fifth Syrian War (Gaza, Panion), and in the Roman war (Thermopylae and Magnesia); Antiochus IV in his expeditions to Egypt and to the east; Demetrius I against Alexander Balas and Antiochus VII Sidetes in his campaign against the Parthians. In exceptional cases, when the terrain prevented him from fighting among his cavalry Guard, we find the king content to direct operations from behind the front line, or on its periphery, as at Porphyrion, Seleucia, Rabatamana, Sardis, and the Elburz.

To limit disappointment the reader is asked to bear in mind the genesis of the contents of this chapter. The task set by the seminar was, in the context of discussions about the movement of land (or dispersal of land, or the ‘market in land’), to see whether anything in the classical Roman legal sources had any socio-economic interest or bearing on those discussions. What follows is the carrying out of that task. It therefore has no particular thesis or structure; whether it has much or any interest or bearing of the kind sought, the reader must decide. It is also sternly confined to the subject in hand: it is about classical Roman law and the sale of land. It does not deal with rules of conveyance except as related to sale, and it does not deal with rules of sale except as related to land. There is a rough division into two parts. Part I examines some sets of legal rules related to the sale of land: Part II examines the principal Titles about sale in the Digest and the Code, to see what part land plays in them.

The first rule worth a mention is one to whose economic significance attention was drawn long ago by Jonkers. It was a legal obligation upon guardians not to leave any spare capital of their wards unproductive: they had to do with it one of two things – either faenus exercere or fundos comparare.

Seleucid ambitions to occupy Coilē-Syria, which received a setback at Raphia, revived after the death of Ptolemy IV Philopator in 204 B.C. Under Ptolemy's infant son, the Egyptian court soon sank into an atmosphere of intrigue which facilitated the Seleucid invasion southwards in 202 B.C. (Polyb. 15.20; Hieron. In Dan. 11.13–14). Antiochus III failed to occupy Gaza, the last Ptolemaic stronghold in southern Palestine, during 201 B.C. (Polyb. 16.22a), and in winter of 201–200 B.C. he retired to Syria after setting up garrisons in key positions (see Map 10). The Ptolemies, however, did not give up: supported by new recruits from Greece (Polyb. 15.25.16; Livy 31.43.5–7), Scopas, the Aetolian officer serving as chief of staff in the Ptolemaic army, reoccupied Coilē-Syria in the winter of 200 B.C. (Jos. Ant. 12.131, 135; Hieron. loc.cit.). Antiochus' counterattack probably took place the following summer. The Egyptian army tried in vain to halt the enemy near the northern frontier, at Panion, and was defeated and scattered. Scopas himself, with 10,000 survivors, took refuge in Sidon (Hieron. op.cit. 15–16, based on Porphyrios), probably in the hope of being evacuated by sea, but the Egyptian navy seems to have been delayed, and Scopas had to surrender to Antiochus' besieging force. Thus the long struggle in Coilē-Syria was decided ultimately in favour of the Seleucids.

Unfortunately, the only extant account of the battle is an indirect report which has survived in the sixteenth book of Polybius (par. 18–19). Berating Zeno of Rhodes for what he calls his preference for rhetorical phraseology over historical accuracy, Polybius tries to illustrate his argument by criticizing the version presented by Zeno of the battle of Panion.

In the following years Demetrius did not abandon his desire to unify the Hellenistic world, which had been smashed to pieces at Ipsus. The second battle of Seleucus I for which we have a relatively detailed record, the battle of Cyrrhestica in 285 B.C., brought this hope and Demetrius' career to an end.

After losing Macedon, which had been his base of power, to Lysimachus and Pyrrhus in 287 B.C. (Plut. Demetr. 44), Demetrius escaped to Asia Minor with a small army of mercenaries, determined to recover his father's Asian Empire. At first he tried to stir the Ionian cities to rebellion, but the appearance of Agathocles, son of Lysimachus, compelled him to turn eastwards. His plan was now to reach Media, then under Seleucus' control, and with the help of the soldiers settled there by his father reconquer the east. But the troubles and hardship he met on his flight from Agathocles and the soldiers' refusal to set off on the long expedition to Media forced him to try to come to terms with Seleucus and ask him for a small territory on the northern slopes of the Taurus. After being turned back, and after some preliminary skirmishes in Cilicia, Demetrius played his last card. He invaded Syria and arrived at Cyrrhestica with his small mercenary force (ibid. 46–8; Polyaenus 4.7.12).

Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus, the first Hellenistic rulers in the east, were faced with an unprecedented politico-military dilemma when they turned their attention to the administration of their realms. The territories at their disposal were together more or less equal in size to the enormous dimensions of the Persian realm, but the Macedonian generals, unlike the deposed oriental kings, were an alien element in the area. They therefore had no local power base which would permit them to mobilize the indigenous population in defence of their territorial achievements, nor any outside the area, since Macedon itself was occupied by their rivals.

It has long been established that a solution to this problem was found in the settling of soldiers, mostly European by descent, on allotments of land in the newly occupied territories in return for certain military obligations. The ingenious concept of military settlements achieved two advantages: on the one hand it established islands of Greco-Macedonian population among the oriental natives, thus spreading the influence of Greek culture among the upper classes of the subjugated nations, and, on the other, it provided a reservoir of trained and loyal manpower that served mainly in the phalanx and was always ready for any call to duty.

After the relative abundance of information about the battles of Antiochus III, references to expeditions and military operations of his Successors are vague and given in general terms. Only the campaigns against the Jews are described in any detail but, unfortunately, only in Jewish sources, most of which do not match up to the historiographical standard of those discussed so far. Of all the campaigns against the Jews, the most detailed and interesting from the tactical point of view is the second expedition of Lysias to Judaea and the battle of Beith-Zacharia in 162 B.C.

Judas Maccabaeus had in the past frustrated four Seleucid attempts to invade Judaea (I Mace. 3.10–26, 38–4.35), and when Lysias abandoned his first expedition Judas reoccupied Jerusalem, purified the temple, and evacuated the Jews who lived in the neighbourhood of the Hellenized cities (ibid. 4.34–5.68). Although a part of the army was still stationed in the eastern satrapies (ibid. 6,7.55–6), Lysias decided to try once more to subdue the revolt, perhaps in order to establish his position on the domestic front. Antiochus V Eupator, aged 9 or 12 (App. Syr. 66; Euseb. I p.254), also took part in the expedition (I Mace. 6.28ff.).

As he had already done on the previous expedition (I Mace. 4.29), Lysias avoided the dangerous passes to the Judaean plateau on the north and northwest, which were surrounded by a hostile Jewish population, and took a southwestern route, which passed through the territory of the Edomeans who supported the Seleucids against the Jews.

The delimitation of subject expressed in the title requires comment. There were many tenants on public land as well, some under legal and economic conditions comparable to those of tenants on private holdings. But the public hand introduced an additional element, at least de facto, that can only confuse the discussion, and on many imperial estates (which are examined in an earlier chapter) there were tenancy arrangements for which private parallels are unattested and, in the nature of the case, impossible. The most obvious example is the ‘Mancian tenure’ in North Africa, which, as it happens, constitutes the bulk of what we know today about tenancy on imperial estates, apart from Egypt. My concern is with one of the two ways that Roman owners of large landholdings exploited them – the other was of course ‘direct’ exploitation by slaves under a vilicus – and that can be studied only by exclusive concentration on private owners.

Restriction to Italy has a double explanation. First, the conditions and the rules in various parts of the empire differed greatly, chiefly because the Roman conquerors did not normally overthrow existing institutions, so that Roman Egypt, for example, was in this respect more like Ptolemaic, or even Pharaonic, Egypt than like Italy. Egypt provides by far the fullest and most detailed documentation, but for extremely short leases, one to three years, within a legal system which, however one chooses to label it, was not Roman, and within an inexorable irrigation system wholly alien to Italian, or European, experience.

The breakthrough at the Porphyrion Pass opened the way for the invasion of Coilē-Syria by the Seleucid troops. After systematically winning control over the various regions, Antiochus retired to winter quarters at Acre (Polyb. 5.71.12). The Ptolemaic army, which had deteriorated through being idle for about a generation, was reassembled in 219 B.C. and subjected to intensive training (ibid. 63–5). When the preparations were completed, in June 217 B.C. (Gauthier–Sottas, pp.34. II.10–11), Ptolemy IV made a forced march of five days to southern Palestine and encamped 50 stadia to the southwest of Raphia. Antiochus, hearing of the enemies' advance, left Acre and proceeded with speed along the coastline via Gaza to Raphia (ibid. 80.3–4). The Ptolemaic victory in the battle settled the dispute over Coilē-Syria for another 17 years.

The sources for Polybius' detailed account of the battle (5.79–85) are uncertain. While Momigliano considers them to be pro-Ptolemaic and suggests Zeno of Rhodes as Polybius' direct source, Otto and others, who lay much stress on the recurrence of comments on Ptolemy's love of luxury and indifference to external affairs (5.87.3,7; cf. 34, 42.4, 62.7, 107; 14.12.2–3 et passim), prefer to regard Polybius' sources as pro-Seleucid. But it is doubtful whether Seleucid sources would have so described the king who in so decisive a manner defeated Antiochus III, given the appellation ‘the Great’ a few years later. On the other hand, the indications of a ‘Ptolemaic’ source are much more impressive: Ptolemy's secret military preparation are recorded in detail (5.65–8); Ptolemy's personal appearance in the ranks of the phalanx is credited with inspiring his troops and lowering the morale of the enemy (85.8).

With the settlement of the eastern problem and the occupation of Coilē-Syria, Antiochus III was now free to turn his attention to the Aegean world. His operations in the area soon brought him in conflict with Rome. Diplomatic negotiations failed to achieve an agreement, and Antiochus, disheartened by the toughening of the Roman policy, yielded to the promises and enticements of the Aetolians, incited by the overthrow of the pro-Roman faction at Demetrias, to ‘liberate’ Greece and thereby possibly improve his bargaining position. Antiochus had at his disposal in Asia Minor only about 18,000 troops (see p. 18 above), but he crossed the Aegean hastily at the beginning of the winter hoping to receive support, especially from the Aetolians and Philip V. In the first months of his stay in Greece he engaged in an exhaustive diplomatic and military campaign to make sure of allies for the expected confrontation with the Romans. But the Roman invasion came too soon: 20,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 15 elephants crossed to Greece from Brundisium in the early spring (Livy 36.14.1; App. Syr. 15(65)). Antiochus was caught unprepared: the bulk of the army, especially the cavalry, was stranded in Asia; part of his landing force was scattered over Greece in garrisons, and a number of them surrendered to the Romans. Worse, the expected local help did not materialize: Philip V sided with Rome and the Aetolian auxiliary numbered only 4,000 infantry. At this stage Antiochus had 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and six elephants of his own (Livy 36.15.3). In these circumstances he had to rule out a confrontation on the open field.