Patristic and medieval authors based their interpretation of ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου on the Greek (or Latin) form of the expression. With the flourishing of Semitic studies after the Reformation, scholars recognized that Jesus would have spoken Aramaic or Hebrew rather than Greek. They searched behind the Greek expression for the underlying Semitic original. Lying close at hand they found the Hebrew idiom ben adam (Aramaic bar enash or bar enasha). Taking a step that has determined the course of “Son of Man” research ever since, they assumed that this idiom underlay the Greek expression.

As patristic authors recognized, the natural sense of the Greek expression is “son of the man” or “son of the human.” It would express a filial relationship between Jesus and a specific parent. The Semitic ben adam or bar enasha, on the other hand, translates literally as “son of man.” In this idiom, “son of ” designates an individual as a member of a group, and “man” specifies the group to which he belongs. The idiom therefore simply means “man.” With this recognition, scholars began to assume that the New Testament phrase expressed Jesus' humanity without referring to a parent.

As a designation for Jesus' humanity, the expression “ the Son of Man” might emphasize that which he had in common with humanity, either human nature per se or human nature in its lowliness and weakness. On the other hand, the definite article before the phrase might point to Jesus as the Son of Man par excellence, emphasizing that which set him apart as an extraordinary human being. These different possibilities gave rise to three varieties of interpretation: the Son of Man as the simply human, the lowly human, or the superior (ideal) human.

Chapters 1 and 2 focused on theories which derive the significance of “Son of Man” from the expression itself, either in its Greek form or its presumed Semitic original. A second type of theory finds the significance of the expression in its use in some particular passage of scripture or other literature. In the history of debate on the subject, no proposal has gained wider acceptance than that which derives the expression from apocalyptic literature, especially Daniel 7.13. In this passage “one like a son of man (bar enash)” comes to the Ancient of Days on the clouds of heaven to receive sovereignty, glory, and a kingdom. Since the Son of Man in the Gospels is also depicted as coming with the clouds (Mark 13.26; 14.62), many scholars have inferred that Daniel 7.13 is the source of the Gospel expression.

Two Jewish apocalypses in the tradition of Daniel – 1 Enoch and 4 Ezra – have likewise been cited as possible sources for the Gospel Son of Man. In the Similitudes (or Parables) of 1 Enoch (chapters 37–71), Enoch sees a human figure in heaven who is identified as “the son of man to whom belongs righteousness” (1 Enoch 46.3). He is “the Elect One,” concealed with God before creation, anointed by God's Spirit with wisdom, and appointed to sit on God's throne to judge the wicked. Similarly, in 4 Ezra 13, Ezra has a dream in which he sees the figure of a man come up out of the sea and fly with the clouds of heaven. In the interpretation of the dream, God identifies him as “my Son,” who will destroy the wicked and gather Israel.

The earliest interpreters of ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου took υἱὸς (“son”) in a literal genealogical sense: for them it identified Jesus as the son of some particular parent. On the one hand, Gnostics interpreted the phrase as “the son of Anthropos (ἀνθρώπου)”, Anthropos being a Gnostic god. On the other hand, early orthodox writers interpreted the phrase as “the son of the human,” identifying “the human” as Mary or Adam. After the Reformation, a few interpreters identified “the human” as Joseph.

The son of Anthropos

In certain Gnostic sects, such as the Ophites and Valentinians, “Anthropos” (“Man”) was the name of an “aeon” or god. This designation apparently developed from speculation on Genesis 1.26: if “man” is made in the image of God, then God must in some sense be a primal “Man.” In various Gnostic writings, a second god emanated from this first Man. This second god is identified as Christ and designated “son of Man” (υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου), i.e. son of the god Anthropos. Some texts even refer to a third aeon called “son of son of Man”:

Thus the Gnostics took “son” in a genealogical sense, identifying “Man” as a god rather than a human being.

The son of the human

While the Gnostic interpretation emphasized Christ's divine sonship, the orthodox interpretation emphasized his descent from a human parent.

In the first half of the twentieth century, scholars had reached a consensus that Jewish sources presented a unified conception of an apocalyptic “Son of Man.” One of Norman Perrin's contributions to the Son of Man debate was to challenge this view (Perrin 1974: 23–40). He argued that the Similitudes of Enoch, 4 Ezra 13, and the midrashic literature reflect independent exegeses of Daniel 7.13, not a common tradition concerning an eschatological Redeemer with well-defined attributes and functions. These sources interpreted the manlike figure in Daniel 7.13 as the Messiah, but developed the figure in various ways.

Perrin's thesis has gained widespread acceptance. As Raymond Brown indicates,

While the majority of scholars may take this view, others have argued for a greater unity in the apocalyptic “Son of Man” material than Perrin found there. As Brown further notes:

Before examining the works of scholars seeking to revive this view, we will examine afresh the apocalyptic texts that allude to Daniel 7.13. These include 1 Enoch 37–70, 1 Enoch 71, and 4 Ezra 13, all of which are now generally dated to the first century CE.

(in chronological order)

Wolf [1725] 1739: 1.159; Köcher 1766: 191–93; Scholten 1809: 141–209; H. Holtzmann 1865; Appel 1896: 1–27; Lietzmann 1896: 1–29; Baldensperger 1900; Schmiedel 1901; Croskery 1901/1902; Driver 1902; Mouren 1903: 11–32; N. Schmidt 1903; Schweitzer [1906] 1968: 267–69, 277–86; Tillmann 1907a: 9–60; H. Holtzmann [1897] 1911: 1.313–35; Foakes Jackson and Lake 1920: 1.368–84; Roslaniec 1920: 4–33; Dupont 1924: 1–6; Peake 1924; Rawlinson 1926: 242–50; N. Schmidt 1926; Kraeling 1927: 6–16; Riesenfeld 1947: 307–13; McCown 1948; Preiss 1951: 11–14; Higgins 1959; Fuller 1962: 37–43; Black 1963; Perrin 1963: 90–129; Higgins 1964: 20–25; Marshall 1965/66; Haufe 1966; Hindley 1966; Marlow 1966; Jüngel 1967: 215–34; Vermes 1967: 311–15; Higgins 1969; Birdsall 1970; Marshall 1970; Van Cangh 1970; Maddox 1971; Boers 1972; Weist 1972; Coppens 1973; Legasse 1977; Black 1978; Vermes 1978a; 1978b; Coppens 1980; Higgins 1980: 1–53; Kümmel 1980; Colpe 1981; Tuckett 1981; Neirynck 1982: 69–72; Vögtle 1982; Walker 1983; M. Müller 1984a; Don Jackson 1985/86; Caragounis 1986: 9–33; Donahue 1986; P. Casey 1991b; Borsch 1992; Aufrecht 1993; Tuckett 1993; Burkett 1994.

Introduction

This chapter comprises an exegetical and rhetorical analysis of James 2.1–13. Our primary concern is the “inner texture” of this unit: its form, structure, and argumentative pattern. Utilizing basic strategies of rhetorical criticism, we shall approach the unit from the perspectives of invention, arrangement, and style. In the course of analyzing the unfolding argumentation in this unit we shall show that James 2.1–13 contains a form of the elaboration of a theme or proposition that approximates a complete argument as it is found and displayed in the progymnasmata and rhetorical handbooks.

James 2.1–13 is recognized by practically all commentators as a clearly defined rhetorical unit. It has a definite beginning, an admonition that states the theme of the unit (2.1); a middle, in which the theme is elaborated (2.2–11); and a conclusion, or summarizing exhortation (2.12–13). Most commentators have also accepted Dibelius' view that the unit exhibits the characteristics of a “treatise” (Abhandlung), a unit in which “the ideas are grouped together,” “closely connected,” and “centered around one theme” (Dibelius, 1975, pp. 124–25; cf. pp. 34–38).

The style of the unit reflects certain features that are common to the diatribe and the sermon (Dibelius, 1975, pp. 38, 125–30). Typical of diatribal style are apostrophe (2.1, 5), vivid and graphic examples (2.2–4), and rhetorical questions (2.7–8).

I could not have completed the history of research in the present work without the assistance of several persons and institutions. I wish especially to thank Sarah Nixon and her assistants in the Interlibrary Loan office at Appalachian State University. I have lost track of the number of books and articles that they obtained for me. I owe thanks also to the Southern Regional Education Board for a research travel grant that enabled me to visit the rare book collections at several major libraries. My appreciation goes to those libraries as well: the Library of Congress, the Folger Shakespeare Library, the John K. Mullen Denver Memorial Library of Catholic University of America, the Krauth Memorial Library of Lutheran Theological Seminary, the Van Pelt Library of the University of Pennsylvania, the Library Company of Philadelphia, the Burke Library of Union Theological Seminary, the New York Public Library, and the Divinity Library of Duke University. Finally I wish to thank Louisiana State University for a Summer Research Stipend that gave me the time to complete this book.

Chapter 8, a slightly modified form of “The Nontitular Son of Man: A History and Critique,” NTS 40 (1994) 504–21, has been used with permission.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to probe the social and cultural implications of the language in James 2.1–13 in order to determine the social function of the rhetoric in the unit. In particular, I want to determine the socio-rhetorical function of the allusion to a saying of Jesus in James 2.5.

Recalling the discussion of James as rhetorical discourse in chapter 1, I wish to reiterate several presuppositions that are integral to the purpose at hand. First and fundamental is the fact that rhetoric is social discourse that intends to evoke a social response in the thinking and/or behavior of the audience it addresses. Put differently, and with respect to the discourse of the letter of James, the epistle emerged within its culture as a social product and it functioned as a social tool. As rhetorical discourse the letter was inevitably concerned with interpersonal relations, and it intended to influence them. The Epistle of James was designed to have a social function.

Thus I emphasize again a conventional but fundamental rhetorical perspective; namely, that rhetorical discourse is always situational and always functional. It is situational because it is a response to the particular rhetorical situation that elicits and determines it; it is functional because it exists to alter the rhetorical situation it addresses “through the mediation of thought and action” (Bitzer, 1968, p. 4; see pp. 3–6). Consequently, rhetorical discourse is always pragmatic discourse. It does not exist for itself, nor is it an instrument of reflection.

Some theories about the Son of Man have gained less popularity than others. Some of the less widely held theories are those that derive the New Testament expression from Ezekiel, the Psalms, or Primal Man speculation. One theory equates the titles “Son of Man” and “Son of God.” While most scholars have focused on the expression in the Synoptics, others have examined the expression in the Fourth Gospel.

Son of man in Ezekiel

In the book of Ezekiel, God addresses the prophet on numerous occasions as “son of man” (ben adam). Since the Reformation, some scholars have argued that Jesus employed this term (or its Aramaic equivalent) in the same way that it is employed in Ezekiel. But how is it used in Ezekiel? Depending upon the interpreter, it expresses prophetic office, human lowliness, or ideal humanity.

Ezekiel's son of man as prophet

One of the earliest interpreters to appeal to Ezekiel as a source for the Gospel expression “Son of Man” was Martin Chemnitz (d. 1586). According to Chemnitz, Ezekiel was called “son of man” by God “because he had been sent by God into public office and ministry in the congregation” (Chemnitz 1600: 2.150 at John 3.13). Thus Jesus used “Son of Man” (among other reasons) because it expressed his office as a prophet. This interpretation reappears occasionally in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In the nineteenth century, Maurice Vernes (1874: 186–88) gave the same explanation: when Jesus called himself “the Son of Man,” it signified “the prophet,” as in Ezekiel. Like John the Baptist, Jesus was a prophet charged to announce the imminent coming of Yahweh.

The Greek expression ὁ υἱòς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, usually translated “the Son of Man,” plays a key role in the christology of all four canonical Gospels. While it appears in about fifty different sayings in the New Testament, all but one of these occur in the Gospels. There the expression almost always occurs on the lips of Jesus. Since Jesus always speaks of the Son of Man in the third person, one could infer that he is referring to someone other than himself. In most of the sayings, however, it is clear that Jesus uses the phrase to refer to himself.

This expression has been a central issue in New Testament studies since the beginning of modern scholarship. Because it is used almost exclusively by Jesus, many scholars have seen it as a key to Jesus' own self-consciousness. In the nineteenth century, for example, H. J. Holtzmann affirmed,

Today scholarship can no longer take for granted that Jesus actually used this expression in the way the Gospels describe. We know now that the Gospels often attribute to Jesus ideas and sayings that actually originated at a later time, in the life of the early Christian church. Even if Jesus did not use the expression, however, it remains important for understanding the origins of christology. Its frequent occurrence in the Gospel tradition shows that it represented an important strand of thought in the early Christian community.