Chapter 1 treats Hesiod (early seventh century BCE), who envisioned the daimonification of the primal (golden) generation of humans. The golden generation was already close to the gods, the “model A” type of human. For Hesiod, it was important that the golden generation was righteous and good. After death, they became guardian daimones that granted gifts to humans. Hesiod also presented the daimonification of an individual, Phaethon. Phaethon represents a type of figure who obtained daimonic status owing to his beauty. Later, however, daimonification was linked with moral forms of excellence. Alcestis, a maiden from Thessaly, became a daimon by her supreme sacrifice, and Pythagoras was venerated as a daimon for his wisdom.

Chapter 7 turns to daimonification in the founder of Neoplatonism, Plotinus (205–270 CE). Porphyry presented Plotinus as already a daimon while on earth. This presentation partially depends on Plotinus’s own teachings: the one who becomes a daimon in heaven already was one on earth. This presentist focus was shaped by a reading of Empedocles and Plato – the daimon is one’s higher consciousness into which one lives. In his theory of daimonification, Plotinus emphasized ethical and contemplative practices. Purifying virtues disengaged the higher consciousness from the “conglomerate” of the body and the lower mind. When one’s higher mind is free from bodily images, one can live at the level of the daimon.

explores the phenomenon of disintegration, akrasia, in which the agent’s better judgment and appetite (classified as a feeling by Aristotle) come apart and the agent acts voluntarily simply on her appetite instead of her better judgment. Here again I rely on my account of indexical insight from , and I return to Sophocles’ Philoctetes to give a reading of the play that supports Aristotle’s claim that Neoptolemus is not akratic when he ceases to fall in with Odysseus’s plan to deceive Philoctetes, because he is not acting incorrectly. The upshot of my discussion, a detailed interpretation of the infamous EN VII 3, is that the akratic lacks the self-knowledge, the thoughtfulness, and virtue of character to act reliably in a correct manner. Contrary to the contention of modern philosophers, I argue that akrasia is primarily an ethical phenomenon.

In Chapter 6, I consider how much integration of thought and feeling is required for a good character, and how much integration or disintegration of thought and feeling exists in the psyche of the bad person. Both discussions raise the question whether the good person has a pleasanter life than the bad person. I attempt to answer this question by distinguishing two levels of pleasure (and pain), and by applying Aristotle’s view that virtue is the measure of pleasure. The beginning of the chapter clarifies my view and addresses an objection that my account of the interdependence of thought, desire, and feeling in the good person is too demanding. My answer relies on Aristotle’s threefold analysis of a feeling as a physiological reaction, an impression of a salient consideration in the here and now, and a motivating desire to do this now. The good person can have physiological reactions without having a full feeling – so, for example, a good person may still be hungry even if she does not want to eat another chocolate now. The end of this chapter discusses the thought in thoughtfulness, addressing the objection that my account of the good person is not demanding enough.

I have argued that according to Aristotle it is not possible to have the correct thought without the correct feelings and conversely. As he says, virtue of character and thoughtfulness are yoked together. One achieves the correct interdependence of thought and feeling by developing both at the same time, not one after the other. Metaphorically speaking, the culmination is a musical soul disposed to allow one to act in a thoughtfully ethical way. The motivation of such a soul is prohairetic. Contrary to Elizabeth Anscombe’s contention, “prohairetic” should be in our vocabulary after all.

Adapting certain features of Empedoclean daimonology, Plato formulated a more rigorous theory of daimonification through virtue. He daimonified the soldiers of his ideal republic for their courage, and daimonified rulers (“guardians”) for their wisdom. In his Cratylus, Plato vouched for the daimonification of all people who were noble and wise. Plato’s Timaeus introduced the ultimate democratic principle of daimonification by identifying one’s guardian daimon with humanity’s higher consciousness (or nous).

Empedocles (about 492–430 BCE) promoted himself as a daimon in flesh. He told a cosmic story about how daimones fell from their blessed state and the mode of their return. The pure daimon is a spherical being made up of the energy of Love. Owing to a moral fault, the individual daimon falls into flesh and enters a drawn-out cycle of moral and physical purification. The fallen daimon purifies itself by living the lives of different animals and plants and by not eating substances that contain the daimonic essence. Empedocles is historically significant for his focus on individual and present daimonification, and for his cosmic story of daimonic fall and redemption, a story moralized by Plato and his intellectual heirs.

addresses the question how one develops the correct (or incorrect) thought and feelings, a crux in Aristotelian scholarship, and how exactly thought and feeling become interdependent in the good person. When Aristotle says that thoughtfulness (phronēsis) comes mostly by teaching and that virtue of character comes by habituation, it may sound as if there are two processes taking place separately, one in relation to thinking and one in relation to feeling, with the process in relation to feeling coming first. I disagree, and show how virtues of thought like comprehension (sunesis) and consideration (gnōmē) emerge in habituation along with the correct feelings. I also discuss how one may become bad, using the case of Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ play Philoctetes, discussed by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VII, to show how a young person’s thought and feeling can become interdependent even if they are thrown off track by pernicious influences like those of the lying Odysseus in this play. Finally, I argue that shame is not a separate stage in moral development.

Origen here represents Christian notions of angelification, although brief consideration is given to antecedents, namely Clement of Alexandria and the Valentinians. Origen, like Empedocles, offered a cosmic story of fall and redemption. According to Origen, humans are “cooled” intellects whose natural state is to burn with love for God. A species upgrade is part of humanity’s evolutionary design, but it takes intense moral labor. Origen offers the most speculation on the nature of angels, the original consubstantiality of angels and souls, how angels and souls fell from divine Love, and the moral means of their return.

Chapter 4 is about choice (prohairesis), an Aristotelian innovation. This is the central chapter of the book, drawing together the threads of the previous chapters. Aristotle says that virtue of character is a disposition involving choice and he defines choice as desiderative thought or thoughtful desire. He is here emphasizing each side of choice, thought, and desire. I argue that choice can belong to good, bad, and akratic people, but my main aim is to show how thought and desire are interdependent in the case of the good person. To that end, I analyze the type of thought involved in the choice of the good person – deliberation – showing that it cannot be adequately explained without mentioning virtue and hence desire and feelings. Conversely, I show that the type of desire involved, which I argue takes up the motivation both of wish (which I argue is in the rational part of the soul) and the feelings, requires thought. I conclude with some examples of choice, showing how from one point of view virtue makes the goal right, and from another it makes what contributes to the goal right. That is because virtue of character and thoughtfulness are intertwined.

This introduction distinguishes angelification (becoming an angel) from angelomorphism (becoming like an angel), although it acknowledges ambiguity. After briefly discussing angelification in modern literature and film, it defines both angels and daimones in the ancient sense, discusses the analogous concept of a hero, and distinguishes angelification and daimonification from the broader concept of deification in the ancient world.

I discuss Aristotle’s account of the psyche (soul) in book 1 chapter 13 of the Nicomachean Ethics, his further distinction between theoretical and practical thinking in Nicomachean Ethics VI 1, and the famous function argument of Nicomachean Ethics I 7. I also address Aristotle’s unclarity about how to characterize desire, and his skepticism about parts of the psyche in de Anima III 9. This leads to a brief discussion of Plato’s division of the psyche in Republic IV and the Phaedrus, and whether both Plato’s and Aristotle’s divisions lead to problems concerning the unity of motivation. This discussion begins to set the stage for my interpretation of Aristotelian prohairesis (often translated as “choice”), the characteristic motivation of the good person. As we shall see, the phenomenon of choice straddles different parts of the Aristotelian psyche in a way that Plato never envisaged in his own account of the psyche.