For, with regard to interactions with others there is appropriateness and inappropriateness, and they are distinguished by difference in age, in status, in family relationship and in benefits conferred [, and in any other difference of this sort between people]. For there is a certain form of interaction that seems not to be inappropriate for the young in respect to the young but is inappropriate with respect to an elder.

Since the Pythagorean Precepts have traditionally been regarded as a fabrication by Aristoxenus consisting of elements stolen from Plato and Aristotle, there has been little attempt to try to understand the ethical system they promulgate as a whole. Most scholarly attention has been directed at identifying the supposed borrowings from Plato and Aristotle. Similarly, there has been essentially no discussion of their place in the history of Greek ethics, since they have not been regarded as based on genuine Pythagorean thought.

They said that true love of what is beautiful and fine is found in our pursuits and in the sciences. For to prize and love customs and pursuits that are fine, just as also those kinds of sciences and practices which are fine and seemly, is truly to be lovers of what is beautiful and fine, but that which is called love of the beautiful and fine by the many, such as that which arises with regard to things that are necessary and useful for life, lies, presumably, as the spoils of the true love of what is beautiful and fine.

Concerning desire they said the following. This experience is complex in its variety and has the most forms. Some desires are acquired and provided from without, but others are born with us. Desire itself is a certain motion of the soul towards [something], an impulse and longing for filling or for presence of sensation, or for emptying and for absence and not to perceive.

The entire fragment is preserved in sections 230–3 of Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean Way of Life, but about the first half of the fragment is also preserved earlier in the VP by Iamblichus in sections 101–2. In neither case does Iamblichus indicate the source of the information that he quotes, which is typical of his procedure in most of his writings.

Concerning luck they said the following: A part of it is divine, for some inspiration arises from the divine for some people, either for the better or for the worse, and it is clearly in accordance with precisely this that some are lucky and some are unlucky. This is most clearly seen when those who do something with no prior consideration and without plan are often successful, while those who do something after planning in advance and taking correct precautions fail.

As we have seen, most recent scholars (e.g., Burkert, Kahn, Zhmud) depend on Rivaud and Wehrli for what can be called the standard view of the Precepts. These earlier scholars state the view in a very uncompromising fashion. Rivaud proposes that “Aristoxenus with the help of texts from the Republic has reconstructed a Pythagorean politics that no Pythagorean author had ever expressly formulated” (1932: 784) and later adds, “if Aristoxenus presents Pythagorean doctrine it is necessary to recognize that Plato’s originality is mediocre” (1932: 787).

The Precepts have a distinctive style and format that is largely determined by their nature as described above. In identifying the notable features of their style, it is important to start just from the evidence provided by the extracts explicitly identified as from the Precepts by Stobaeus. These stylistic features can then be used to help identify passages in Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean Way of Life that derive from the Precepts even though Iamblichus does not explicitly identify their source.

In Book 2 of Cicero’s On the nature of the gods, Balbus argues for a Stoic theology and view of religion, and in Book 3 Cotta, an Academic skeptic, argues against him. I argue that both characters are supporters of traditional Roman pagan religion. In contrast to the Epicurean Velleius in Book 1, Balbus argues that the gods do care for us, in fact that the cosmic god fates every detail of our lives. He describes a world whose beauty is a principle reason to think that this rational creator has planned it for us, and further argues that this creator is good. He offers a complex rereading of Roman religion and poetic myth, according to which Roman religious practices were begun in ways that Stoic theology can support, and that it can still support once later distortions of this theology have been cleared away. Cotta, a pontifex, says that his skepticism is consistent with his priestly office, on grounds reminiscent of modern fideism. But he argues that Balbus’ dogmatic Stoic theology would destabilize the beliefs of those practising Roman religion, because Balbus cannot rigorously relate the many Roman gods to the one Stoic cosmic god.