iii.1.1 We have stated in general terms that the virtues involve mean points, that they are concerned with decision, and that their opposites are vices, and what these are. Now let us take the virtues individually and discuss them in sequence, beginning with courage.

iii.1.2 It is pretty much universally held both that being courageous is about one’s fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. Earlier, in our list, we distinguished fear and recklessness as opposites, and in fact these are in a way contrary to one another. iii.1.3 So clearly those who are described in terms of these states will likewise be contrary to one another – the coward, who is described in terms of being more fearful and less confident than one ought, and the reckless person, described in terms of being such as to be less fearful and more confident than one ought. This is where the term is derived from: the reckless person is named derivatively after recklessness.

iii.1.4 Courage is the best disposition with respect to fear and confidence. One should be neither like the reckless, who display deficiency with regard to the former and excess with regard to the latter, nor like cowards, who do the same, except not in the same respects but the other way around – they have a deficiency of confidence and an excess of fear. Hence it is clear that courage is the mean disposition between recklessness and cowardice, this being the best.

ii.1.1 Next we must discuss what follows, taking a new starting point. All good things are either within the soul or external to it, and the more choiceworthy of these are those within the soul, a distinction we also make in the exoteric works. For wisdom, virtue and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these are considered by everyone to be the goal. Of those in the soul, some are states or capacities, others activities and processes. ii.1.2 Let these distinctions be assumed and let it be assumed further, concerning virtue, that it is the best disposition or state or capacity of each of the things that have some use or function. This is clear from induction, since we consider things to be this way in all cases. For example, a cloak has a virtue, since it has a function and use, and its best state is its virtue. The same applies to a boat and a house, and so on, and hence to the soul, since it has some function.

Let us assume that the better state has a better function. And, ii.1.3 just as states are related to one another, let the functions that arise from them be so related. And let the function of each thing be its end. ii.1.4 So it is evident from this that the function is better than the state. For the end, being the end, is the best thing, since it has been laid down that what is best and ultimate is the end, and all the other things are for its sake. So it is clear that the function is better than the state and the disposition. ii.1.5 But ‘function’ has two senses. Some things have a function that is over and above their use. For example, the function of the builder’s art is not building but a house, and the function of the art of medicine is not healing or treating, but health. With other things, their use is their function. For example, the function of sight is seeing and the function of mathematical knowledge is studying. Hence, where a thing’s use is its function, the use is necessarily better than the state.

vi.1.1 Next we must make a fresh start and say that when it comes to character states there are three kinds to be avoided: vice, lack of self-control and brutishness. For two of them the opposite is obvious; one of them is called virtue and the other is called self-control. But when it comes to the opposite of brutishness it would be most fitting to call it superhuman virtue, a kind of heroic and divine virtue – as Homer portrays Priam saying about Hector that he was exceptionally good ‘and he did not seem to be a child of mortal man but rather of a god’. vi.1.2 So if, as people say, humans can become gods through an excess of virtue then the state which is the counterpart to brutishness would clearly be of this sort. For just as a brute beast has neither virtue nor vice so too a god has neither. The condition of a god is something more honourable than virtue and the other is a different kind of vice. vi.1.3 Since the occurrence of a ‘godlike’ man is rare – this is the term customarily used by the Spartans when they admire some man intensely; they say he is a ‘gawdlike’ man – in the same way a brutish man is also rare among human beings. It happens most often among barbarians but some cases also occur as a result of disease and deformity. We also use this word as a term of abuse for those humans who are excessively vicious.

vi.1.4 But we should discuss this sort of disposition later; we have already discussed vice. We need to discuss lack of self-control and softness and indulgence, as well as self-control and toughness. We shouldn’t suppose that each of these is concerned with the same states as virtue and wickedness, nor that they are a different kind altogether. vi.1.5 As in the other cases, we must set down what appears to be the case and, after first puzzling through those appearances, we must display all the reputable beliefs about these conditions, or if not all then most of them and the most important ones. We will have done a sufficient job at this if the difficulties are dissolved and the reputable beliefs remain.

Turning to Plato (427–347), we turn away from largely fragmentary and sparse testimonial evidence to substantial primary textual evidence and to such evidence as bears directly on the question “What is pleasure?” We have more from Plato on pleasure and specifically on the identity question than from any other ancient author. Because of this, I have divided the discussion of Plato’s treatment of pleasure into two chapters. The emphasis of the present chapter is on what Plato takes pleasure to be. The emphasis of Chapter 5 is on a distinction central to Plato’s thinking about pleasure, namely, between true and untrue or true and false pleasures. As we will see, the two topics overlap to a considerable extent.

Plato discusses pleasure in many of his dialogues. His most important discussions occur in three: Republic (specifically, Book 9), Timaeus, and Philebus. Our discussion will focus on Plato’s treatments of pleasure in these texts. I will also have some things to say about Plato’s treatment of pleasure in two other dialogues, Gorgias and Hippias Major.

This is a book about ancient philosophical poetics. It is not concerned with ancient literary theory, criticism or scholarship in general. Those are interesting topics with important implications for our understanding of ancient poetry. Here, however, our concern is with ancient attempts to answer specifically philosophical questions about poetry.

Specifically philosophical questions? That is not a well-defined or stable class. But I take it to include, for example, such questions as these. What is poetry? How is it related to, and differentiated from, other human practices and products? Why is poetry? What motivates its production and consumption? If it is a universal human behaviour, common to cultures all over the world, how is it rooted in human nature? What does poetry contribute to human life? What is the point of it? In what ways may it be of value? Are we doing it properly? Eating is a natural human behaviour, but people are prone to eat things that are bad for them. Is the consumption of junk poetry harmful? How could we tell if our taste for poetry is leading us astray? If poetry is potentially dangerous, should society protect us by regulating its production or dissemination? Should there be laws to promote its true purpose? If we live in a society without such laws, how can we organise our own lives to ensure that we, and those for whose well-being we care, have a healthy diet, whether of food, or of poetry? These questions take us far beyond technical aspects of poetics, and beyond aesthetics narrowly defined. There are broader issues in, most obviously, ethics and politics, but also in psychology and anthropology. These in turn lead us on to theology; to questions about the fundamental structures of reality, the sources of knowledge, and the grounds of value; and also, of course, to differing conceptions of philosophy itself.

This book principally examines philosophical conceptions of pleasure in Greek and to a more limited extent Greco-Roman antiquity. The discussion begins with pre-Platonic treatments (Chapters 2 and 3). The heart of the book is then devoted to the contributions of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Cyrenaics, and the Old Stoics, in that order (Chapters 4–8). Consequently, the book principally focuses on a stretch of about 200 years of philosophical history, from the beginning of Plato’s literary career in the early fourth century bce to the death of the Old Stoic philosopher Chrysippus at the end of the third century bce. Chapter 9, which follows, discusses contemporary conceptions of pleasure, specifically Anglophone conceptions since World War II. Its aim is to provide perspective on and a means of assessing the ancients’ contributions. The conclusion (Chapter 10) then offers some remarks to this effect. A bibliography with suggestions for further reading follows the conclusion. Among these are suggestions for reading concerning conceptions of pleasure in antiquity after the Old Stoics.

THE RELEVANCE OF AN INQUIRY INTO ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF PLEASURE

Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 article “Modern Moral Philosophy” is often cited for encouraging a reorientation in contemporary ethical theory, away from the dominant modern traditions of deontology, utilitarianism, and contractualism, toward a style of thought exemplified by the theorizing of the Greeks, namely, virtue ethics or the ethics of character. In her article, as the epigraph indicates, Anscombe suggests that the reorientation must in fact begin outside of ethics, in philosophy of psychology, and with basic philosophical psychological concepts pertaining to the practical life of humans such as action, intention, wanting, and pleasure.

In this chapter I continue the discussion of Plato’s treatment of pleasure. As I mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 4, I will be focusing here on Plato’s distinction between true and untrue or true and false pleasures. Plato first introduces this distinction in Republic 9. It then becomes central to his discussion of pleasure in Philebus. In this respect, the treatment in Republic 9 reads like a rough draft of Philebus. Accordingly, I begin with the distinction between true and untrue pleasures in Republic 9.

Note that in the chapter title and in discussing Republic 9, I use the word “untrue” rather than “false.” This follows Plato’s usage. The distinction between an untrue and a false pleasure seems to be significant. In particular, it relates to a distinction between two truth-conceptions with which Plato operates and which I will explain in due course. Basically, in Republic 9 there seems to be a distinction between two ways in which a pleasure can be true and untrue: representationally and ontologically. In fact, there are multiple ways in which a pleasure can be representationally and ontologically true and untrue. Again, we will come to these distinctions below.

The topic of pleasure enters Greek philosophy in the fifth century bce. The principal site of entry is ethics. Early Greek ethical treatments of pleasure focus on whether, how, and to what extent pleasure contributes to a good human life. There is also some discussion of pleasure in the contexts of theology and cosmology, physiology and psychology, all areas explored by so-called Presocratic thinkers we refer to as “philosophers.” I will discuss pleasure in some of those contexts in Chapter 3. Here I discuss the early ethical contributions.

PRODICUS

Prodicus of Ceos (c. 465–395) – a man often but misleadingly referred to as a “sophist” – composed a pedagogical work, one part of which is known as The Choice of Heracles. In The Choice of Heracles, Prodicus presented the mythological hero Heracles as a young man at a crossroads poised to choose a path of life. Feminine figures representing Excellence and Depravity advertised their respective courses. Prodicus’ Choice of Heracles does not survive. However, a rendition of it by the historian and Socratic philosopher Xenophon of Athens (c. 430–354) does. Consider the following passage from Xenophon’s rendition of Depravity’s exhortation:

I will conclude this study with an examination of the ancient contributions in relation to contemporary conceptions of pleasure. To that end, this penultimate chapter presents an overview of contemporary treatments of pleasure. As with my discussions of the Greek material, my treatment of the contemporary material is, among other things, intended to underscore the historical nature of the contributions – and this is so, even while some of the history here is very recent. In the course of the chapter, the reader will also notice many points of comparison with the ancient material. To facilitate the exposition, I note some of these points, but relegate them to footnotes. Once again, I return to the points of comparison, which will be the focus of the discussion, in the final chapter.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF PLEASURE IN THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD

In the first half of the twentieth century, philosophical discussion of the identity question was sparse. Contrast the work of psychologists who had been examining the nature of pleasure extensively since the end of the nineteenth century, that is, since the work of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) and Edward Titchener (1867–1920). It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that philosophers began a concerted examination of the identity and the related kinds question. Accordingly, I will refer to this period of philosophical investigation of pleasure as the “contemporary” period.