The last four Deductions take up no more than six or so Stephanus pages (160b5–166c5). Parmenides has lost interest in establishing his results in as virtuosic a fashion as is displayed in the first two Deductions. Still, these Deductions are important to the plan of the dialogue.

THE FIFTH DEDUCTION

D5A1 (160b5–d2)

D5A1 establishes two conclusions, (C1) that if the one is not, then the one is different from the others, and (C2) that if the one is not, then we have knowledge of the one.

Assume (P1) that in saying “the one is not” what we are saying is not is contrary to the not-one. Taken on its own, P1 entails (L1) that if the one is not, then the one and the not-one are contraries. Now, by D2A11P4, the others are those that are not one. Taken on its own, D2A11P4 entails (L2) that the others are the not-one. Hence, by L1 and L2, if the one is not, then the one and the others are contraries. Now, by D4A3P2, if X and Y are contraries, then X is not the same as Y, and, by D2A4P1, if X is not the same as Y, then X is different from Y. Taken together, then, D4A3P2 and D2A4P1 entail (L3) that if X and Y are contraries, then X is different from Y (and hence, if the one and the others are contraries, then the one is different from the others).

In the speech in which he challenged all and sundry to falsify the higher theory of forms, Socrates (so we are told) “kept from moment to moment expecting Parmenides and Zeno to get annoyed” (130a3–5). But Socrates' expectations were not rewarded. Rather, Parmenides and Zeno “both paid close attention to Socrates and often glanced at each other and smiled, as though they admired him” (130a5–7). And at the conclusion of the speech, just before launching into his criticisms of the higher theory, Parmenides compliments Socrates on his “keenness for argument” (130b1).

Given the interpretation of the dialogue arrived at thus far, Socrates is right to worry about how Parmenides and Zeno will react to his brash challenge. Although he clearly respects his elders, Socrates does not show much in the way of deference to their philosophical views. Why, then, does Plato have Parmenides and Zeno exchange smiles and then have Parmenides express admiration for Socrates' logical acumen? The correct explanation, as I see it, is that the smiles being exchanged are knowing smiles, the smiles of men who can afford to listen patiently and indulgently to Socrates' goading remarks because they take themselves to understand things that Socrates does not yet see. What it is that they see that he doesn't is the subject of this chapter.

THE EXTENT OF THE FORMS

At first sight, Parmenides' first criticism of the higher theory of forms is that the result of combining theorem E and axiom Ⅱ has some untoward consequences.

In the first two chapters I set out the high theory of forms (as outlined by middle-period Socrates), described the subtle changes to this theory effected by young Socrates in his speech at Parmenides 128e5–130a2, and reconstructed the criticisms of the theory offered by Parmenides at 130b1–134e8. At 133b1 Parmenides describes the last of these criticisms as a great difficulty [aporia], and were the dialogue as a whole similar to those of Plato's early period, we would expect it to end soon after Socrates confesses to seemingly irredeemable perplexity. But, as the rest of the dialogue reveals, Parmenides has only just begun to flex his logical muscles. The main question on the minds of those who have read and understood Parmenides' criticisms of the higher theory is whether there is any way to save this theory, whether it be by attacking the validity of the criticisms themselves, or, with their validity having been acknowledged, by modifying the theory without destroying its major theoretical advantages (such as fruitfulness and explanatory power).

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the method Parmenides describes as the means by which (most of) the criticisms he has raised may be answered. Parmenides' description of his method occupies the transitional section at Parmenides 134e9–137c3. With a proper understanding of this section, it becomes possible to read the second part of the Parmenides as a direct and rational response to the problems raised in the first part of the dialogue.

Immediately after the first two Deductions, Parmenides begins a new stretch of reasoning (155e4–157b5) that initially appears to be a Third Deduction. As he puts it at 155e4: “Let's speak of it [i.e., the one] yet a third time.” But appearances are misleading. This stretch of five arguments comprises what would be better described as an “Appendix” to the first two Deductions. There are two main reasons for this. First, the Appendix does not fit into the overall description of the Deductions provided by Parmenides in the transitional section. Rather, what Parmenides there counts as the material one would expect to find in the Third Deduction (namely, arguments leading to results about the others on the supposition that the one is) actually appears immediately after the Appendix (at 157b6–159b1). Second, Parmenides begins the Appendix by saying (at 155e4–6): “If the one is as we've described it – being both one and many and neither one nor many …” This makes it rather clear that Parmenides means to use the section to consider consequences that may be obtained from results reached in the first two Deductions. For it is in D2 that Parmenides establishes that [if the one is, then] the one is many (D2A3, D2A5), and it is in D1 that Parmenides establishes that [if the one is, then] the one is not one (D1A17) and not many (D1A1).

As should be readily apparent from the brief outline of Galen's life given above, he was well versed in philosophy and this is clearly reflected in his writings. That he had a detailed knowledge of earlier medical writings and an active engagement with contemporary medical theories and practices goes without saying. The extent to which other philosophers and doctors, both predecessors and contemporaries, are mentioned in his many works is very variable as, indeed, is the treatment they are accorded. Those referred to in the translated treatises in the present work are listed in Table 2. It is noteworthy that in these works references to, and remarks about, different individuals are altogether temperate in tone, in striking contrast with those in some of his other works, for example De methodo medendi.

Considering philosophers first, Plato is undoubtedly the one that Galen most obviously and overtly respected. As De Lacy writes:

The matters on which Plato is of particular relevance to Galen include: the basic structure of the body, relying on ideas of elements, qualities and humours as propounded in the Timaeus; the recognition of design in nature, involving the concept of the ‘Demiurge’; the tripartite division of the soul, including consideration of the physical correlates of the psychic; and, of special relevance to the present study, Plato's ideas on causation in general and in medicine in particular, as expounded primarily in the Timaeus and the Phaedo.

INTRODUCTION

In the four translated treatises, two on diseases and two on symptoms, the first of each pair is devoted to definition and classification. In any nosological endeavour, classification depends on definition. Here the entities (if, in fact, they are entities) to be defined (if, in fact, definition is applicable) are disease and symptom. The two provisos, obviously interrelated, are intended to indicate the difficulties of Galen's taxonomic undertaking, difficulties which he himself clearly acknowledged, not least when he considered the issue of ‘disease in itself’. It is undeniable, however, that a satisfactory classification of, and distinction between, diseases and symptoms is of considerable value in both the theoretical and the practical aspects of medicine. Prior to these treatises there is no attempt at systematic and exhaustive classification, at least none that is extant, which invests these works with particular historical interest, not to mention their relevance to medical practice at the time. As has been noted earlier, Galen himself saw them as a necessary bridge between his theoretical writings and his manuals of practical medicine.

This is not to say there were not some prior attempts at definition and classification – there were – but what is notable is their paucity both in number and content. This is especially surprising given the attention paid to these matters in other fields, including biology generally, by such notables as Aristotle, Speusippus and Theophrastus.

SYNOPSIS

INTRODUCTION

The terms cause and causation are relevant to a large part of day-to-day experience yet the concepts and theories underlying them have been matters of contention since the beginning of philosophy and remain so today. Galen, in the two treatises on causation in the four works under consideration, sets out to give an account of the causes of diseases and symptoms. This should be distinguished from an attempt to give a theoretical analysis of causation in disease and its related symptomatology, although he does make a brief excursion into the latter. In other words, he is aiming to provide an exhaustive (as he sees it) list of causes of diseases and symptoms which is of practical relevance to the practising doctor in that elimination or counteraction of causative factors is of primary importance in prophylaxis and treatment, just as recognition of causative factors is critical to diagnosis. So these are practical works. But they are also works with a significant embedded theoretical component which, when taken in conjunction with his other works on causation, signal Galen's interest in the fundamental aspects of the subject. This is as it should be for a doctor who is also a philosopher.

The purpose of this chapter is, then, primarily to examine Galen's views on causes and causation in diseases and symptoms, particularly as revealed by the presently considered treatises, but also to consider his views expressed in other works in which causation has an important role.

The details of Galen's life, many of which are known from his own works, are now well established and documented, and so will be considered only very briefly here. Although some aspects such as the dates of his birth and death and specific details of his training and travels remain to some degree points of contention, recent studies, especially those of Nutton, have brought considerable clarity. The matters of particular relevance for the present study are firstly, the nature of his early training and how this influenced the way he saw the role of disciplines other than medicine in the training of a doctor, and secondly, to give an outline of the range of his works so as to place the translated treatises in the overall context of his oeuvre. A brief biographical summary is provided in Table 1.

Galen's early education, under the close and participatory supervision of his father, concentrated on mathematical and philosophical subjects, notably geometry and logic. This undoubtedly had a lasting influence on his methodological approach to medical problems and their exposition. Further, his philosophical training was eclectic and this again had a later reflection in his strong views on the importance of philosophy in medical training, not to mention his own approach to medical issues. Lack of philosophical training was a criticism he frequently levelled against his opponents.

After the redirection of his education into medicine as a result of his father's dreams, he travelled widely.

These four translated treatises constitute an important component of Galen's considerable oeuvre, signified by their incorporation into the core material of the medical training curriculum well into the second millennium. Like others of Galen's major works, they have a well-defined purpose which might be summarized as the systematic examination of the nature and causation of disease and related phenomena. Unlike many of his works, they are singularly devoid of ad hominem arguments and the often quite virulent abuse heaped upon those with opposing views. Indeed, a strikingly even-handed, if somewhat cursory, treatment is given to one particular theory, the anarmoi/poroi theory of Asclepiades and its subsequent developments, which is elsewhere shown to be a particular Galenic bête noire. These treatises are, however, disappointingly lacking in any detailed consideration of earlier and other views and are, as a consequence, a poor source of information on such views, unlike a number of other Galenic works. This is especially unfortunate with respect to nosology.

In summarizing the content of these works, three aspects of diseases and their symptoms are considered: definition, classification and causation. Based on the sequence of the argument, and on the relative space devoted to these three matters, the impression is that the first two, definition and classification, are primarily to be seen as instruments for the analysis of the third – causation. Nonetheless, all three are obviously independently important despite their close interrelationship.

SYNOPSIS

SYNOPSIS