Methodological reorientation

We have noted (§4) that in the Categories, the substantial individuals are (as it was put) “methodologically opaque”, so prodigiously “atomic” as to display no internal structure. And we saw (also in §4) that the treatment of both the synchronic and the diachronic unity or “oneness” of substantial individuals is unusually terse and obscure: synchronically, the explanation of the “this”-hood of substance quickly gets into deep trouble (pp. 30–33). And diachronically, the requirement that a substantial individual have a permanent essential nature which it cannot “migrate” out of while remaining the same and numerically one, is at most insinuated there by some not very luminous outgivings about “definition”, rather than made unmistakably explicit (pp. 34–38). Subsequent to that, some few main features of substantial individuals according to the Metaphysics concept have been sketched out, in a rather schematic way; but we have not yet tried to see very deeply into their internal structure, to conceptualize with any vividness what “substantial being” comes to. To get further, we must try to do this.

However, the best way to do this is not, I believe, to try to wring an intuitive understanding directly out of Aristotle's own positive outgivings on the topic, particularly those coming down to us as the peri tēs ousias, “On Substance”, i.e., Metaphysics ZHΘI. That is an abstruse and imperspicuous work, as is well-known in itself and well-attested-to by the notably uneven successes of the interpretive tradition, and this tends to discourage such a frontal approach; but besides, for an intuitive understanding there is a better way in, one that can for now circumvent some of the perplexities of the metaphysical writings, and that may later enable us, as it were, to come up beneath them under our own power.

Three lessons from the biology

Now we are in a position to bring this inquiry home to the metaphysics: extracting the relevant points of intuition and theory developed in connection with biological objects as Aristotelean substances, in order to illuminate what he calls (Meta. Zeta 1) the central and most vexatious metaphysical question: What is substance? Let us first take stock of the more significant new aspects that have been introduced into our aristotelische Weltauffassung since we took leave of the Categories.

The size and depth of the world

First, the little world of the Categories is seen from the biological perspective to be embedded in, to be a spatially discontinuous fraction of, a much wider and deeper universe: the total sublunary universe of Empedoclean matter. This universe is wider, in having a great deal more in it than just the (“primary”, sensu Cat.) individual substances and their cross- and intra-categorial paraphernalia: there is matter in many other states than as worked up into substances – such as the many piles (molar “earth”), jugfuls (“water”), breezes, conflagrations, etc. ad lib. And this universe is deeper: for the “primary” substances of the Cats., which in that work, as has been noticed already (§4), are atomic, opaque, and inscrutable, are now seen to be endowed with internal structure: as the semi-stable “knots” that are open to the detailed analysis that goes in terms of Matter and Form.

Hupokeitai DIKHŌS: the two-stage domain

The three very broad points of perspective reviewed in §17: (i) the size and depth of the world, (ii) the vertical, organizational moment in differentia and genus, and (iii) the connection of form and unity, are by no means exhaustive of the metaphysical morals derivable from the biology; but they are already sufficient to give the outlines of the kind of universe that Aristotelean metaphysics puts up to correspond to (or in contemporary terms, to serve as a “model” for) the distinction that was floated in §8 between “constitutive” and “characterizing” things-predicated.

It is a universe (“model”) of two levels or stages.

Metaphysical framework: outline of the static picture

The upper stage is that of the individual substances and their accidental attachments, inherents or “coincidences” (sumbebēkota); it is in most respects – though not completely – identical with the entire universe of the Categories. Based as it is on a domain of well-distinguished substantial individuals, to which attach or “coincide” (or in which inhere) the various qualities and so on, it also bears some slight affinity, to that extent at least, to the sorts of structures that can be thought of as models for present-day formal languages analyzed in terms of standard first-order quantification theory that were mentioned briefly in §8, although the comparison is highly extrinsic, most anachronistic, and made at all only to point the contrast that follows.

The lower stage is that of the shaping-up of the individual substances through form out of matter, and accordingly it is matter rather than discrete individual “thisses” that is cast in the logical-semantical role of subject of predication.

Two criteria for the substantial

Proceeding from the “philosophical grammar” (as it was once or twice styled in the foregoing) of the Categories, to the full theory of substance that is attempted in the Metaphysics, is like travelling from the complex surface of a solid into its multiply-complex interior. In fact, the problem of complexity is one that can very easily get out of hand with this theory, for the object or “solid” in question is highly multidimensional; and this makes for difficulties of both organization and tactics, to which very likely no solution is ideal. Also, the full picture requires of us moderns some rather considerable mind-bending if we are to take it all in. The best course, it seems, is to proceed in stages, by degrees; for while bending one's mind is highly salutary for the philosophical soul, I would not wish to break any minds, or blow them. It has been indicated in §0 that particular emphasis is going to be placed on Aristotle's biological writings as a source of concrete metaphysical intuitions, and we shall move in that direction shortly. But it will both help us in focusing on the right issues, and also work in the spirit of proceeding-by-degrees, first to indicate roughly and provisionally some main features of the Metaphysics concept of the sort of thing a substance is, and from the outset to separate some questions that it is very important to separate. The first of these tasks is for the present section; the second is undertaken in §7.

It was also let fall in §0 that my interpretive approach would be, in places, “reconstructive”, “approaching the text by convergence”.

In the previous chapters we have considered various aspects of Plotinus’ account of sense-perception. There are two topics that seem to me to stand out in this account in the sense that we have been led to them in many different contexts: Plotinus’ direct realism and his soul-body dualism. In this final chapter I summarize and expand our main conclusions concerning these two central topics. As regards the former, the survey given here is also meant to show how the main conclusions from previous chapters can be interpreted as elements in a single, relatively coherent view.

Judgement, affection and the objects of perception

We have seen that Plotinus’ doctrine is that the objects of perception are external objects and their qualities. It remains to be seen whether and, if so, how Plotinus reconciles this with his doctrine about the mediacy of sensory affections in perception. The problem can be stated as follows: perceptions are described as judgements; the judgements belong to the soul and they are to be sharply distinguished from sensory affections that belong to the animated body; the affections function as mediators between the soul and the external objects because the soul cannot directly assimilate sensibles; but if the affections are thus in between the external qualities and that which perceives, it may seem that the affections and not the external objects or qualities are what is immediately apprehended. Or how would Plotinus respond to such a charge?

First, let us recall what we noted in Chapter iv, that Plotinus holds that the affections are necessary in order to account for how we apprehend things in space.

Synopsis of the theory of souls

In order to approach Plotinus’ views on man and the human soul it will be helpful to have a synopsis of his general theory of souls. According to Plotinus’ orthodox view one must distinguish between at least four kinds of soul.

There is (1) a transcendent soul which is not the soul of any particular thing, either individuals or the cosmos, and is said to remain in the intelligible realm. Although this soul is, presumably, ontologically posterior to the Intellect, it is in fact not clear how they differ as regards internal properties: both are wholly engaged in pure thinking. But the different terms do suggest a difference in function. Plotinus normally chooses to talk about soul when he is concerned with the generation of the sensible from the intelligible, whereas the term “Intellect” is reserved to refer to the life in the intelligible as contained in itself. For clarity I shall write “Soul” with a capital S when I want to refer to this transcendent soul.

There is (2) the World-Soul which is responsible for the life of the visible cosmos. The usual doctrine is that the World-Soul rules the cosmos without descending into it as its body. Often, however, Plotinus distinguishes between two levels of the World- Soul, a higher level, which is the one just mentioned, and a lower, immanent level. Even if this lower level is on any account closely tied with the higher World-Soul by being its direct ontological descendant, it is for various reasons convenient to discuss them under separate headings.

The merest glance at a list of the treatises of the Enneads, or at an index verborum, is sufficient to show that Plotinus took a great interest in sense-perception. Three treatises deal specifically with questions relating to perception, and remarks of varying lengths about perception are to be found throughout the Enneads. A philosophically-minded person who bothers to look at some of these passages is bound to find statements and arguments that evoke his curiosity.

Nevertheless, very little has been written about Plotinus' views on perception; none of the classic Plotinian studies, for example, discusses them in any detail. Presumably the main reason for this is that among Plotinian scholars there has been a strong tendency to focus on those aspects of Plotinus' philosophy that are of theological or religious interest; hence, other subjects have tended to receive less attention than they deserve. In any event I shall deal, in the present work, with the subject of sense-perception in Plotinus. In what follows I shall give some account of the nature of this undertaking.

The Enneads are held to be unusually difficult to read, even among philosophical works. Indeed it takes considerable effort to acquire sufficient feeling for Plotinus' thought, so as not to be lost most of the time. One – and perhaps the most important – reason for this is the nature of the composition of the Enneads: they are a collection of treatises intended for circulation in Plotinus' school and not for publication.

Perceptions as acts

The notion of act (energeia) is an Aristotelian borrowing, which Plotinus, like Aristotle, uses in various contexts. As a first approach to Plotinus’ notion of energeia in connection with perception, it will be instructive to compare his views with those of Aristotle. But first, a remark about terminology: The term energeia in Aristotle has been translated variously as “act”, “activity”, “actuality”, “actualization”, and “realization”. As will become clear, I think that so far as Plotinus is concerned, his notion of energeia is best captured by “act” or “activity”, though “actualization” may sometimes be appropriate. But since we are concerned with finding what it means for him to say that something is energeia, and since a choice between the different English words listed above may prejudge the question at issue, I will use the Greek term to begin with.

Several commentators have remarked that Plotinus’ description of perceptions as energeiai shows that he thinks of perception as something active, where “active” is contrasted with “passive” in the sense according to which things are said to be passive when they are “mere recipients” or do not contribute anything of their own. Now, I think that this interpretation of Plotinus is quite right and that the point is an important one. However, it seems to me that it is far from self-evident that this is what the term energeia suggests, especially if we consider its Aristotelian origin. According to Aristotle and, as we shall see, Plotinus as well, the notion of energeia is correlated with that of dynamis (potency).

It is widely held that according to Plotinus perception never reaches to the external things themselves, that perception is always of something in the percipient rather than in the external world. There are two main reasons for this view: (a) Despite Plotinus’ whole-hearted expressions of realism about perception in IV.6.1 and elsewhere, it has seemed to his interpreters that his doctrine about the mediation of sensory affections precludes such realism, (b) In an important passage on perception, I.1.7, Plotinus says things that have been understood as an explicit denial of realism. Hence, some interpreters have seen this passage as Plotinus’ recognition of a logical consequence of his own position. To this we may add another passage, V.5.1, which in my opinion causes equally severe difficulties for a realist.

It goes without saying that if these interpreters are right, Plotinus is guilty of a serious inconsistency. Moreover, this inconsistency would neither be the hidden, implicit sort of inconsistency which is laid bare only after a scrutiny of the texts and their implications, nor would it be the sort of inconsistency that is likely to arise from an author's uncertainty or ambivalence about a subtle issue. Rather, we would be faced with a patent contradiction. This is, perhaps, a possible situation but not a very probable one. As a matter of principle one should adopt such an interpretation only if there is no alternative. I think that in fact the views of Zeller and Blumenthal are seriously misguided in ways which I will soon explain.

It is a remarkable fact about vision that the things we see are at a distance from the organs through which we see them. Everyone who gives some thought to the phenomenon of vision is bound to speculate about this fact. It is evident that somehow the eye must be brought into contact with the object, but it is not at all apparent how this contact is established. The ancient Greek thinkers did not fail to apply their imagination and acumen to this matter. We have records of speculation on the subject from the times of Alcmaeon of Croton onwards. Our records suggest that this came to be a subject that every thinker felt obliged to have views about.

The Greek thinkers did not arrive at a solution in terms of light-reflection and light-waves such as that which we now accept, although some of them, Plotinus among others, approached it in some respects. One should not infer from their failure to find the correct solution that all their theories were nothing but idle speculation, that insofar as they hit upon some true insights this was more due to chance and luck than a careful study of the facts. In a way, the opposite is true. If we compare the Pre-Socratics’ doctrines about visual transmission with those debated in the first centuries AD, we can notice considerable progress and increasing sophistication. And although systematic experiments are lacking, many good observations were made. The thinkers of the second and third centuries whose discussions on this subject have come down to us – Alexander of Aphrodisias, Galen and Plotinus – all show considerable skill in testing the various theories against known observations.

The most striking feature of Plotinus’ philosophy, and of Neoplatonism generally, is its hierarchical picture of reality. This is also the feature that is most baffling for modern readers. In Plotinus’ philosophy we come across a hierarchy of three so-called “hypostases” that are called “the One”, “Intellect” and “Soul”, followed by matter at the bottom. Similar ideas characterize the writings of the other Neoplatonists. We are told that reality is somehow constituted by this hierarchy, an idea which we presumably find quite puzzling. If we look for arguments for it as such, we do not find any: it seems to be taken for granted. And if we encounter something that looks like an argument for some part of the hierarchy, we feel that it invariably presupposes the general picture.

As a first step towards approaching the Neoplatonic hierarchy, let us consider the ideas of a principle and of a hierarchy of principles. Let us suppose that there is a need to explain in general terms some phenomenon that is taken to be a fact of common experience. This may lead to the supposition of a level of entities or properties or forces, that are taken to be “behind” or “above” the ordinary phenomena, such that by supposing these entities, properties or forces to be there, an explanation has been given of the ordinary phenomenon that needed explanation. At this point we have already divided reality into two levels, the level of ordinary experience and a “more basic” level.

Plotinus' views concerning the unity of the senses, and the inferences which he draws from them, constitute what is perhaps the most original aspect of his theory of perception. I want to claim that Plotinus’ position on this issue is the result of a historical dialogue and represents the sort of statement that one might expect a dualist to make after the floor has been held for some time by the Stoics and Peripatetics. In order to set Plotinus’ views in a proper context, we shall, before we turn to them, consider what some of his predecessors had to say about this subject.

The views of Plotinus’ predecessors on the unity of the Senses

In the Theaetetus at 184 D ff. Plato distinguishes the senses from one another by reference to the differences in their objects: sight has proper objects that cannot be perceived through any other sense, so does hearing, and so does each of the other senses. But above the special senses he posits a central faculty of perception. With this faculty “we apprehend the black and the white through the eyes, and objects of other kinds through the other senses” (184 D). Here, we need not go into the details of Plato's analysis of the function of this central faculty, interesting as they are in themselves. It suffices to point out that Plato's introduction of a central faculty is prompted by observations about the unity of consciousness in perception: “It would be very strange,” he says, “if there should be many senses sitting in us as in wooden horses, and all these things should not converge in some single nature” (184 D).