Έκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεἶ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ κκατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι

CHAP. I.

In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second kind of rhetorical proof, viz. the ethical, the ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι. The treatment of it is cursory ; and we are referred backwards to the analysis of virtue moral and intellectual in Book I c. 91, for further details of the topics from which are to be derived the enthymemes whereby the speech and the speaker may be made to assume the required character of Φρόνηησις, ἀρετή and εὔνοια; and forwards to the chapter on ϕιλία and μῖσος (11 4), in the treatise on the πάθη, where the indications of these affections are enumerated, which will enable the speaker to convey (always by his. speech) the good intentions and friendly feeling by which he is affected towards his audience. As supplementary and auxiliary to the direct logical arguments this indirect ethical mode of persuasion is indispensable to the success of the speech. People are hardly likely to be convinced by a speaker who sets them against him.

[Among the books belonging to the late Mr Shilleto which have been recently acquired by the University Library, are two interleaved copies of the edition of the Rhetoric printed at the Oxford University Press in 1826. One of these, which is in bad condition owing to many years of use, contains a large number of annotations of very unequal value, written in various hands; in the other, which bears on the title-page the name Richard Shilleto with the date Dec. 15, 1863, apparently all the notes on which his maturer judgment set any value, are copied out by himself in a hand rivalling that of Richard Porson for clearness and beauty. All these notes, and a few selections from the older book, with some trifling omissions, (parallel passages, for instance, already quoted at large in these volumes,) I have transcribed in full by permission of the Syndics of the University Library, and I append them here as an epilogue to Mr Cope's Commentary.]

The attempt to control the free expansion of the Greek language by rigorous rules which forbade the deviation from set forms of speech, and allowed for no irregularities of expression by which nice shades and varieties of thought and feeling might be conveyed; rules derived mostly from a somewhat limited observation, often from the usages of the tragic and comic writers alone, the least departure from which was to be summarily and peremptorily emended; this attempt, which was involved in the practice of scholars like Dawes, Porson, Elmsley and Monk and their followers, has been happily frustrated, and we have learned, chiefly under the guidance of Godfrey Hermann, to deal more liberally and logically with Greek grammar. That Hermann was infallible; that he did not sometimes overreach himself by his own ingenuity; that his nice and subtle distinctions in the interpretation of grammatical variations are always well founded; or that he is always consistent in his explanations, I will not take upon me to assert: but it may at least be said that in this branch of scholarship, the application of logic to Greek grammar, he has done more than any other scholar, past or present.