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Tacitus writes that, by insisting that legionary legates who had not so far held the praetorship should immediately proceed to that office, Asinius Gallus ‘altius penetrare et arcana imperii temptari’. In C.Q. N.S. xvi (1966), 327, I suggested that this demand of Gallus’ was probably probing dangerously deeply into and perhaps threatening to wreck the carefully worked-out imperial promotions system, the working of which has been examined by Birley.
It is the purpose of this note to look at a number of examples of such irregularity, which, though not as early as the debate during the course of which Gallus made his suggestion, do at least illustrate the process later in the Julio-Claudian era.
Ardizzoni retains , but gives no reasons for doing so. Platt's correctionis technically easy, but the difficulty is, I feel, imaginary. I take . as asabsolute, = ‘joined the expedition’: so at 1. 90, 139—not, as LSJgive, ‘come next‘—and is dative of interest or advantage, as, for example, Od. 24. 400 , 21 209, 12.438, A.R. 2. 1092, Q,.S. 6. 119, 10. 24. here does not ‘govern‘ a dative any more than does, for examplel, at Od. 24. 400.And seems to me to be rather oddly placed.
In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4
This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out that it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory.