To further explore the issues discussed in previous chapters, this chapter uses the city of Bloomington, Indiana, and its open data portal as a case study. As open data portals are considered to be an instantiation of digital commons, it is assumed that its design and governance would support cooperation and community participation and at least some forms of communal ownership, co-creation, and use. To test these assumptions, the GKC framework and its concepts and guiding questions are applied to this specific case to understand the actions around the portal and their patterns and outcomes.

Smart city technology has its value and its place; it isn’t automatically or universally harmful. Urban challenges andopportunities addressed via smart technology demand systematic study, examining general patterns and local variations as smart city practices unfold around the world. Smart cities are complex blends of community governance institutions, social dilemmas that cities face, and dynamic relationships among information and data, technology, and human lives. Some of those blends are more typical and common. Some are more nuanced in specific contexts. This volume uses the Governing Knowledge Commons (GKC) framework to sort out relevant and important distinctions. The framework grounds a series of case studies examining smart technology deployment and use in different cities. This chapter briefly explains what that framework is, why and how it is a critical and useful tool for studying smart city practices, and what the key elements of the framework are. The GKC framework is useful both here and can be used in additional smart city case studies in the future.

America’s market for legal technology presents a puzzle. On the one hand, America’s market for legal services is among the most tightly regulated in the world, suggesting infertile ground for a legal technology revolution. On the other side of this puzzle is America’s advanced and free-wheeling market for legal tech, which is likely the most robust in the world. This chapter explains this seeming puzzle and then uses that explanation to make some predictions about where legal technology will continue to flourish in America and where legacy players—lawyers, law schools, and judges—will instead stymie its development. In order to predict the future we first must understand the present and the past, so the chapter presents a brief overview of lawyer regulation, the structure of the American market for lawyers and legal services, and the current state of legal tech. This more granular view of the innovation ecosystem can explain why some tech sectors are booming, while others remain stubbornly behind, and also where we’ll see continued and even accelerated legal tech growth and where we won’t.

Should the justice system sustain remote operations in a post-pandemic world? Commentators are skeptical, particularly regarding online jury trials. Some of this skepticism stems from empirical concerns. This paper explores two oft-expressed concerns for sustaining remote jury trials: first, that using video as a communication medium will dehumanize parties to a case, reducing the human connection from in-person interactions and making way for less humane decision-making; and second, that video trials will diminish the ability of jurors to detect witness deception or mistake. Our review of relevant literature suggests that both concerns are likely misplaced. Although there is reason to exercise caution and to include strong evaluation with any migration online, available research suggests that video will neither materially affect juror perceptions of parties nor alter the jurors’ (nearly nonexistent) ability to discern truthful from deceptive or mistaken testimony. On the first point, the most credible studies from the most analogous situations suggest video interactions cause little or no effect on human decisions. On the second point, a well-developed body of social science research shows a consensus that human detection accuracy is only slightly above chance levels, and that such accuracy is the same whether the interaction is in person or virtual.

What effect will potent new legal tech tools have on the civil litigation landscape, and what can or should we do about it? Recent trends in plaintiff win rates and damages awards suggest the American civil justice system is growing more slanted toward the “haves” at the expense of the “have-nots.” Some say that AI-fired legal tech tools will reverse this trend and democratize the system. We disagree. Potent new legal tech tools are surely coming. Many are already here. But these tools are, and will likely continue to be, unevenly distributed because of the privileged access to data and technical know-how of emerging consortia of corporations, law firms, and tech companies. As a result, legal tech will, at least over the near- to medium-term, further skew the litigation playing field, shaping not just the resolution of claims but also the evolution of substantive law. As the American civil justice system enters the digital age, the haves will be propelled yet further ahead.

The COVID-19 pandemic has powerfully disrupted the American legal system. Yet, as with so many other aspects of life, the pandemic was most powerful as an accelerant of trends already in motion. And nowhere has this been more evident in law than in the civil justice system’s uptake of new legal technologies. With “legal tech” tools of all shapes and sizes gaining traction, the system, long a bastion of stasis and tradition, has begun a profound transformation.

While a shift to virtual courts has been lauded by technological enthusiasts and reformers for decades, little research has examined how this technological change may affect vulnerable unrepresented persons and low-income people in the United States on the “have not” side of the digital divide. In this Chapter, we cast light on how virtual proceedings unfold for low-income unrepresented persons in the everyday. It is important to do so. To date, much of the conversation has lauded Zoom court proceedings as the future of civil justice, centering this praise on idealized forms of online proceedings and their conveniences, without interrogating the impact of the precarity that low-income people contend with or persistent digital divides. In marked departure, we examine how these new technologies affect the experiences of low-income unrepresented persons who encounter, and contend with, adversities within virtual court proceedings. We examine how these new technologies reconfigure the features, affordances, and barriers present within the civil justice system, and the impact of these new technologies on the psychology of judges, lawyers, and unrepresented persons, as well as the impact of these new technologies on the meaning of the judicial role and on a person’s unrepresented status.

Faith in technology as a way to narrow the civil justice gap has steadily grown alongside an expanding menu of websites offering legal guides, document assembly tools, and case management systems. Yet little is known about the supply and demand of legal help on the internet. This chapter mounts a first-of-its-kind effort to fill that gap by measuring website traffic across the mix of commercial, court-linked, and public interest websites that vie for eyeballs online. Commercial sites, it turns out, dominate over the more limited ecosystem of court-linked and public interest online resources, and yet commercial sites often engage in questionable practices, including the baiting of users with incomplete information and then charging for more. Search engine algorithms likely bolster that dominance. Policy implications abound for a new generation of A2J technologies focused on making people’s legal journeys less burdensome and more effective. What role should search engines play to promote access to quality legal information? Could they, or should they, privilege trustworthy sources? Might there be scope for public-private partnerships, or even a regulatory role, to ensure that online searches return trustworthy and actionable legal information?

This chapter explores various aspects of community land trusts (CLTs), focusing on how this governance model effectively functions as an ownership structure for common pool resources. Indeed, understanding the incentives facing the owners of any communal ownership structure is vital to successfully creating and managing a CLT. These resource commons aspects are conceptually explained and explored below through a descriptive account of current practices within the CLT sector.

This chapter will argue that the federal court data paywall—PACER fees—unduly hinders the production of research on America’s federal courts. This effective limitation on public access to data leaves us with less access to better justice. Worse, there is little to no offsetting benefit. Although PACER fee revenue is often described as high, it is actually tiny as an economic matter. Congress can and should enact legislation that both mandates free public access to PACER’s vast array of information and replaces the associated fee revenue. That would allow the judiciary to continue its current operations and also allow appropriate research on federal courts.

This chapter explores the changes that AI brings about in corporate law and corporate governance, especially in terms of the challenges it poses for corporations. The law scholar Jan Lieder argues that whilst there is the potential to enhance the current system, there are also risks of destabilisation. Although algorithms are already being used in the board room, lawmakers should not consider legally recognizing e-persons as directors and managers. Rather, academia should evaluate the effects of AI on the corporate duties of boards and their liabilities. By critically examining three main topics, algorithms as directors, AI in a management board, and AI in a supervisory board, the author suggests the need for transparency in a company’s practices regarding AI for awareness-raising and the enhancement of overall algorithm governance, as well as the need for boards to report on their overall AI strategy and ethical guidelines relating to the responsibilities, competencies, and protective measures they established. Additionally, the author argues that a reporting obligation should require the boards to deal with questions of individual rights and explain how they relate to them.

This chapter by the law scholar Antje von Ungern-Sternberg focuses on the legality of discriminatory AI which is increasingly used to assess people (profiling). Intelligent algorithms – which are free of human prejudices and stereotypes – would prevent discriminatory decisions, or so the story goes. However, many studies show that the use of AI can lead to discriminatory outcomes. From a legal point of view, this raises the question whether the law as it stands prohibits objectionable forms of differential treatment and detrimental impact. In the legal literature dealing with automated profiling, some authors have suggested that we need a ‘right to reasonable inferences’, i.e. a certain methodology for AI algorithms affecting humans. von Ungern-Sternberg takes up this idea with respect to discriminatory AI and claims that such a right already exists in antidiscrimination law. She argues that the need to justify differential treatment and detrimental impact implies that profiling methods correspond to certain standards. It is now a major challenge for lawyers and data and computer scientists to develop and establish those methodological standards.