To what extent can human and institutional actors place their trust in a technology like distributed ledger technology, including blockchain? With the key role that technology increasingly plays in human trusting relationships, exploring the nature of trust in technology (and thus of trust in distributed ledgers as technical artefacts) is important. This chapter defines and explores three distinct but interrelated forms of trust applicable to blockchain technology: the notion of ‘trustless trust’; the notion of ‘user trust’; and the notion of ‘ledger trust’. In considering these three notions of trust, the chapter argues that trust relies—at least in part—upon evidence of the trustworthiness of parties to be trusted. But where does that evidence come from? One such source is records, including the ledgers that have long been used as evidence of all sorts of human transactions, especially financial ones. Distributed ledgers—which include blockchains—thus theoretically contribute to the formation of grounds for trust through affording a new form of recordkeeping that is said to assure trustworthy records as sources of evidence relating to transacting parties’ trustworthiness.

Trust is critical to the economic, political, and social coordination and cooperation underpinning society, yet we find ourselves in a perceived “crisis of trust,” particularly in institutions such as government, business, the media, and NGOs. But what is trust, and why is it thought to have declined in recent years? This chapter considers the problem and the nature of trust in both an interpersonal and an institutional (collective) form, asserting that trust involves a three-part relationship between a trustor, a trustee, and some domain of behavior wherein the trustee’s behavior is perceived to encapsulate the interests of the trusting party. Choosing to trust is not a risk-free endeavor for the trusting party, as it involves the acquisition of (usually imperfect) information about the trustworthiness of a trustee that is then used to form a justified true belief about the trustee’s trustworthiness as a basis of a trustor’s decision about whether to act in a given situation. By clarifying the notion of trust in its interpersonal and institutional forms, this chapter lays the foundation for considering the relationship between trust and distributed ledgers, including blockchains, in the following chapter.

The discipline of “diplomatics” – originating in the seventeenth century to systematically test the authenticity of medieval documents – has more recently been adapted to the study of digital records and their systems. In establishing the necessary elements for the long-term preservation of authentic records, archival diplomatics provides one possible (and powerful) analytic framework and methodology for analyzing the trustworthiness of records, including those to be found in blockchain and distributed ledgers. Regardless of the type of blockchain and distributed ledger system under examination, each relies upon trust in the ledger and in the records the ledger contains. Yet each type of blockchain and distributed ledger system still has limitations when judged against archival diplomatic standards of records’ trustworthiness, which demands the accuracy, reliability, and authenticity of records. By gaining an understanding of the elemental requirements for trust in records (and in record systems), there is hope that the designers of blockchain and distributed ledger systems might continue to improve the evidentiary quality of blockchain records and recordkeeping.

Blockchain has been the subject of much hype, but does it really offer a potential solution to issues like disinformation and “disorders” of trust? This chapter examines the genesis and development of blockchain, addressing some of the common misperceptions and confusion about what blockchain is (and is not). Next, some of the touted properties of blockchain are considered – tamper-evidentiality, decentralization, transparency, and pseudonymity – with a focus on whether these produce the immutability needed to establish trust in the blockchain ledger. Given the conditionality of blockchain immutability, the chapter ultimately concludes it is inadvisable to view it in essentialist terms as a fixed and stable blockchain property. Rather, blockchain immutability is best viewed as a sustained commitment that a group of individuals holds onto because they believe that the attribute is desirable, even necessary.

Blockchains and distributed ledgers, like records of all kinds, can be viewed as socio-informational-technical ecosystems, not just technical artifacts. As such, they are governed by principles, procedures, and rules created by social actors. These “epistemic rules of the game” – and the version of social “truth” that results from their operation – are deeply interrelated to epistemic and social trust, and with power and authority. When peer disagreements arise within blockchain and distributed ledger ecosystems, much can be learned from how such epistemic disagreements are resolved (or not) about what version of “truth” concerning a state of affairs will be accepted in the face of two alternate justified true beliefs, and about the basic character and cohesiveness of these ecosystems and the socio-epistemic realities they constitute.

This chapter outlines the steps needed to rebuild a culture of repair. The same tools firms enlist to stifle repair can be used to reinvigorate it. Laws can be rewritten, markets reorganized, designs reconfigured, and norms reshaped. From tax incentives and spare part mandates to design standards and warranty protections, an array of policy interventions should be undetaken. But at the same time, we have to change our attitudes and behaviors as consumers.

This chapter traces the history of repair. Beginning with the earliest human tools, like hand axes and spears, repair techniques evolved to keep pace with technology. In industrial era, the introduction of interchangeable parts promised to make repair easier and more reliable than ever before. But over the course of the twentieth century, manufacturers realized that product durability often wasn’t in their economic self interest. So they found ways to induce consumption and discourage repair. As early as the 1920s, firms were exploring the strategies that would eventually become known as “planned obsolescence.” By the 1950s, those techniques were cornerstones of the consumer economy.

This chapter addresses the Federal Trade Commission’s Nixing the Fix report, assessing both its promises and its limitations.

This chapter considers how the set of tools provided by consumer protection law can push back on repair restrictions. Consumer protection law is designed, in part, to ensure the accuracy of information in the marketplace. But even in absence of outright deception, it recognizes the need to prohibit unfair practices that take advantage of the natural information asymmetries that sellers enjoy. It also offers remedies when products fail to live up to minimal, baseline guarantees of quality. Although consumer protection cases rarely lead to dramatic, structural remedies,the law profoundly influences marketplace behavior and can improve the day-to-day experiences of consumers seeking repair.

This chapter considers three sets of concrete benefits that flow from repair. First, repair helps consumers save money by extending the lifespan of products and fostering secondary markets. Second, repair lessens the massive environmental burden of modern consumerism, from the extraction of natural resources to the eventual disposal of the devices we buy. Finally, repair helps us grow and flourish as people. Through repair, we become better informed about the world around us, develop analytical and problem-solving skills, exercise greater autonomy, and build stronger communities.