This chapter presents an extended critique of the Quoine case in Singapore where the seven trades at issue were fully automated. The central point of the case is that one or both contracting parties decided to deploy or rely on technological assistance and that does not in itself justify a departure or a deviation from long-standing legal principles of contract law. While there is no denying that the contracting process can be optimized by means of a broad range of technologies of varying complexity and that such technologies often create unique risks, it does not follow that such technologies have a disruptive effect on contract law itself. Innovation in commercial dealings need not lead to an innovation in contract law. To the contrary, the latter has shown a surprising resilience to technological disruption, mainly due to the broad, flexible, and technology neutral formulation of its core principles.

The online environment has proven over the last thirty years to be a crucible for the study of legal authority, legitimacy and reception. The overlapping claims of local and global lawmakers are now magnified beyond the scope of what was possible before this global, virtual telecommunications space was opened to individuals and communities. Law is a mix of the local and the regional. We have come to recognise the transnational nature of law with decentred sources of authority claims such as the European Union. What the online digital environment has opened is a digital ‘right to roam’.

This chapter examines some ways in which human agency might be affected by a transition from legal regulation to regulation by AI. To do that, it elucidates an account of agency, distinguishing it from related notions like autonomy, and argues that this account of agency is both philosophically respectable and fits common sense. With that account of agency in hand, the chapter then examines two different ways – one beneficial, one baleful – in which agency might be impacted by regulation by AI, focussing on some agency-related costs and benefits of transforming private law from its current rule-based regulatory form to an AI-enabled form of technological management. It concludes that there are few grounds to be optimistic about the effects of such a transition and good reason to be cautious.

This chapter argues that care must be taken when considering whether law reform is essential in light of new technologies and their applications. The application of each new technology raises its own issues, and not all of these will invariably require legal change – but some undoubtedly will because the issues raised are beyond the reach of existing laws. In line with this argument, a sketch is presented of a methodical approach for determining whether and how consumer protection law should be reformed in the face of technological developments. Focusing on the need to determine the precise challenges the new technology poses invites an open mind to the legal reform response, and it is important to test each option (tweaking existing rules, creating of analogous rules attuned to the digital and technological advances, or new models of regulation including solutions focused on technological applications rather than consumer rights) to find the best mix of responses, subject to the overriding requirement to ensure that consumer protection is not diluted. This approach is then tested in respect of two areas, the reform of the EU’s Product Liability regime and the arrival of digital assistants which will enable algorithmically automated contracting.

Legal ‘regulatory escape’, ‘regulatory disconnection’ or ‘regulatory disruption’ on the part of particular regulatees or commercial practices has been observed across diverse regulatory environments, ranging from environmental protection to provision of gambling services. Instances of legal regulatory escape appear particularly prevalent with the introduction of novel technology products and services. Evaluation of technology-related legal regulatory escapes provides examples of deliberate, even overt, evasion of legal constraints, as well as avoidance via practices such as regulatory mimicry or differentiation. This chapter identifies examples of recent legal technology-related ‘regulatory escape’, discusses key reasons why legal regulation may fail to effectively cater for complications arising from specific technology practices, products or classes of regulatee and considers possible regulatory responses to address the risks, or capture the benefits, of technological advances.

This chapter explores the potential and limitations of AI in the legal field, with a focus on its application in legal research through tools like Lexis+ AI. It critically evaluates Lexis+ AI’s capability in case retrieval, a crucial function for legal professionals who rely on accurate and comprehensive legal sources to inform their work. The study provides an empirical analysis of Lexis+ AI’s performance on cryptocurrency-related legal queries, revealing that while the tool can generate accurate responses, it often falls short in terms of relevance and completeness. This chapter concludes by discussing the implications for legal professionals and legal tech companies, emphasizing the need for ongoing refinement of AI technologies, the importance of keeping legal professionals involved in decision-making processes, and the necessity of further collaboration between the legal and tech sectors.