The celebrated incompleteness theorem of Gödel [1931] is one of many results about formal arithmetic that involve an interplay between computability and logic. Although full proofs in this area are beyond the scope of this book, we are able to outline some of the arguments discovered by Gödel and others. We shall highlight particularly the part played by computability theory, which in many cases can be viewed as an application of the phenomenon of creative and productive sets.
In §§ 1 and 2 we present some results about formal arithmetic that lead up to the full Gödel incompleteness theorem in § 3. In the final section the question of undecidability in formal arithmetic, already touched upon in § 1, is taken up again. Our presentation in this chapter does not assume any knowledge of formal logic.
Formal arithmetic
The formalisation of arithmetic begins by specifying a formal logical language L that is adequate for making statements of ordinary arithmetic of the natural numbers. The language L has its own alphabet, which includes the symbols 0, 1, +, x, = (having the obvious meanings), and also symbols for logical notions as follows: ¬ (‘not’), ∧ (‘and’), ∨ (‘or’), → (‘implies’), ∀ (‘for all’), ∃ (‘there exists’). (In this chapter we will reserve the symbols ∀, ∃ for use in L, and write the phrase ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’ when needed in informal contexts.) In addition, L has symbols x, y, z,… for variables, and brackets (and), and there may be other symbols besides.
The statements (or formulas) of L are defined to be the meaningful finite sequences of symbols from the alphabet of L. For instance, the statement
∃y(y×(1 + 1) = x)
is the formal counterpart of the informal statement ‘x is even’.