INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I trace the changing uses of RETL since the late 1970s and the policy context in which these changes have taken place. Controversy has dogged the power almost since its inception in 1955. Since then, one report asserts that over 3 million people have been sent to RETL.

I examine the ways in which the political and administrative modes of governance that predominated in the pre-reform era have continued to influence the development of RETL since 1978. In particular, I identify the use of RETL as a flexible tool to address changing social order problems in a way that is analogous to its use as an adjunct to political campaigns in the pre-reform era. I explore the proposition that, to date, there has been a high degree of continuity from the pre-reform era in the modes of governance and uses of the power, but that the objectives of RETL and the policy contexts in which it is used have changed. Originally RETL was implemented to consolidate state power by targeting opponents of the Party and government and other ‘bad’ people in order to educate and reform them. In the reform era, the focus of RETL has shifted toward targeting socially disruptive behaviour and minor criminal offences for the purpose of preserving social order and maintaining political control.

INTRODUCTION

Ensuring that central policies are implemented at the local level in China has been understood as key to the maintenance of political power. Party elites have sought to ensure that the local political-legal organs, the police, procuratorates and courts comply with Party policy and directives, especially when conducting hard strikes. For leaders such as Peng Zhen, Party leadership over the police and law enforcement was essential to ensure that law and order policy was consistently enforced, as well as to prevent abuse of power. Decentralisation of power as a consequence of economic reform has made these objectives difficult to achieve.

In May 1988, the Legislative Affairs Bureau of the State Council discussed two major problems of poor law enforcement amongst administrative agencies. The first was inadequate legal empowerment of administrative agencies. The second was serious problems of dereliction of duty, abuse of power and unlawful actions by officials exercising their enforcement powers. To address these problems, the meeting resolved to provide a more complete legal basis for administrative action; to improve procedural law; and to strengthen mechanisms for controlling administrative conduct. To strengthen supervision, the meeting proposed instituting systems for supervision, improving self-regulation and raising the standard of officials.

The problem of abuse of power is most acute amongst the public security organs. In a 1992 survey sampling eighteen provinces, 35.1 per cent of respondents identified the public security organs as leaving the worst impression of all government departments.

One of the powerful themes in this chapter is the role physical appearance plays in age discrimination. This is vaguely reminiscent of ancient kings being executed at the first sign of physical defect. The purpose of regicide was to avert decay in the country and was best carried out when the king was still healthy. While these customs have disappeared, many otherwise erudite thinkers see age as different from other grounds and age discrimination as more acceptable than other forms. This acceptance is sometimes based on stereotypes of people of a certain age or on the traditional use of age as a rational management and organisational tool. Confusion has even surrounded what age discrimination actually is. This chapter has two deceptively simple aims: first, to explore age as a human characteristic and how it can impact on work and life; and second, to examine the age strand within the Employment Equality Directive (Employment Directive) and wider contexts. It will emerge that although age differs in some respects from the other Article 13 EC Treaty grounds, just as they all differ from each other, age discrimination is not necessarily different and may particularly hurt those at the intersection of age and other grounds. The inclusion of age in the Employment Directive has already achieved two important results. Firstly, age discrimination is prohibited in each Member State, nominally providing a uniform minimum level of protection, and secondly, there now exists a definition of age discrimination in European law.

Introduction

The last chapter examined the systemic framework of interaction between WTO law and national law. The present chapter turns to the institutional framework of that interaction. On the institutional side, it is, as already noted in the introductory chapter, the WTO's unique dispute settlement mechanism that makes the interaction highly prominent as well as important from a policy point of view. Systemically, the supremacy of WTO norms (flowing, inter alia, from Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement), coupled, of course, with their extensive coverage, sets limits, more than any other contemporary international treaty, on the policy choices of national law-makers and other authorities. And, institutionally, it falls, in large measure, upon the WTO dispute settlement organs to oversee whether national constituencies (legislative, administrative or judicial) are respecting those limits. The reasons for this have already been touched upon. To recall, because of characteristics such as compulsoriness, exclusivity and automaticity, the WTO dispute settlement system is used truly extensively. Thus, in case of disagreement between Members as to whether a national law or other measure has transgressed the limits set by the WTO treaty, it is often the dispute settlement organs which, as third party arbiters, have the last word.

On occasion, the application of WTO norms to national laws by these organs even evokes the idea of a national (constitutional) court applying constitutional norms to inferior laws. A good example of this is provided by the parallel cases before the US courts and the WTO regarding a law enacted by the US state of Massachusetts, namely the Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in Burma (Myanmar).

Introduction

Amongst the most exciting of the new possibilities in the Amsterdam Treaty is the provision enabling European legislation to be made in relation to equality and non-discrimination. This provision is contained in Article 13 EC, which as then agreed, stated:

It was clear from the outset that action under Article 13 depended for its content on proposals from the European Commission. As soon as the Amsterdam Treaty was agreed the Commission began to mull this over. There was time to do this. Although the Amsterdam Treaty was signed by the high representatives on 2 October 1997 it required ratification by each Member State to come into effect. This was not concluded until 1 May 1999, and the hiatus provided a useful opportunity for some preliminary consideration as to the effect that would be given to it. For this purpose the Commission held a major conference over 3 and 4 December 1998 to discuss what could and should be done with Article 13.