This article prefaces our Special Issue on “AI and the Decision to Go to War.” We begin by introducing the prospect of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled systems increasingly infiltrating state-level decision making on the resort to force, clarifying that our focus is on existing technologies, and outlining the two general ways that this can conceivably occur: through automated self-defense and AI-enabled decision-support systems. We then highlight recent, on-going developments that create a backdrop of rapid change and global uncertainty against which AI-enabled systems will inform such deliberations: (i) the widespread tendency to misperceive the latest AI-enabled technologies as increasingly “human”; (ii) the changing role of “Big Tech” in the global competition over military applications of AI; (iii) a conspicuous blind spot in current discussions surrounding international regulation; and (iv) the emerging reality of an AI-nuclear weapons nexus. We suggest that each factor will affect the trajectory of AI-informed war initiation and must be addressed as scholars and policymakers determine how best to prepare for, direct, and respond to this anticipated change. Finally, turning to the pressing legal, ethical, sociotechnical, political, and geopolitical challenges that will accompany this transformation, we revisit four “complications” that have framed the broader project from which this Special Issue has emerged. Within this framework, we preview the other 13 multidisciplinary research articles that make up this collection. Together, these articles explore the risks and opportunities that will follow AI into the war-room.

Solomon Islands’ plural legal system, in which customary law operates in parallel with common law, and its practice and effects on society have drawn scholarly attention in spaces of legal studies, policy, economics, and state governance. An area that remains understudied is the dynamic nature in which landowners use Indigenous cultural heritage such as ancestral sites or genealogies as kastom evidence in courts. We explore this intersection through a critical review of the literature, Solomon Islands court judgments, and the nation’s lacking cultural heritage legislation. Two major infrastructure development projects in Solomon Islands, the Tina Hydro Project located on Guadalcanal and the Bina-Talifu Project on Malaita, are also examined to explore the nuances of state-led compulsory versus negotiated land acquisition. Fueling the perception that the customary land system is more of a hinderence than a strength to its peoples, these case studies demonstrate the fluid and unpredictable nature with which kastom evidence has been implemented in legal forums to substantiate or dispute claims. Ultimately, we argue that this largely reflects an incongruence between the British legal framework and traditional land tenure systems. Furthermore, we highlight how greater integration of archaeological expertise into legal processes of land surveying in Solomon Islands has the potential to mitigate some of these challenges.

This study aims to understand if the American public supports five policies related to the involvement of healthcare providers in immigration enforcement efforts such as documenting legal status in medical charts to actively assisting immigration enforcement. We also seek to establish whether public attitudes are stable on this issue using an experiment highlighting the implications of these policies for immigrants, communities, and the broader public. To assess public attitudes, we fielded a survey (N = 6049) from 7 March to 26 March 2025. We randomly assigned respondents to one of six treatments highlighting various implications of these policies for immigrants and communities. We found a divided public on the topic, with a substantial number of Americans willing to blur the lines between immigration policy and the provision of healthcare. Respondents were most receptive to tracking the number of undocumented patients served and least supportive of assisting in detaining patients. We found substantial differences based on party affiliation and presidential vote choice but not personal connections or residence inside or outside of border states. Our findings suggest that a majority of Americans support some level of immigration enforcement in healthcare settings while public opinion on this issue is hard to move.

Although they are critical for military units’ compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), junior leaders are often overlooked in the development of ethical and moral decision-making when it comes to education and training. To foster the internalization of IHL principles in this vital cohort, those principles must be better melded with military ethics. Through examination of different military efforts to create ethical warriors, important points from behavioural ethics, the use of warrior ethoses, instances of competing positive values, and ideas for effective and affordable curricula, the present article suggests a path forward for accomplishing this.

Post-Dobbs v. Jackson, abortion regulation is left entirely to the states. Laws that restrict access to abortion generally allow for exceptions when determined necessary for the life or safety of the pregnant patient. Some states, e.g., Ohio, use a “subjective” legal standard when determining whether an abortion is medically necessary. Other states, e.g., Texas, rely on an “objective” legal standard, whereby the necessity of an abortion is not determined by any particular physician’s judgments, but rather by the judgment of a hypothetical “reasonable physician.” Though objective legal standards are widespread in American jurisprudence, they are a poor fit for clinical judgments about the medical necessity of abortion. On the contemporary model of clinical decision-making, medical judgment is irremediably subjective. In addition to being responsive to patient values and medical evidence, medical judgment is, and should be, informed by physician values. Because Texas abortion regulations rely on an objective standard of judgment that fails to correspond to a medically meaningful category, they fail to provide adequate guidance to physicians regarding the circumstances under which abortion is legally protected.

The wheels of decolonization and reparatory justice in Africa are slow. Each gain is fundamentally instrumental, resolute and instructive. In its judgment in John Ssempebwa v Kampala Capital City Authority, the High Court of Uganda resisted the applicants' compelling attempt to constitutionalize reparation for colonial legacies but exercised judicial activism in obliging the authorities to proactively embrace reparatory justice approaches. Names of public infrastructure especially in a capital city are symbols of a nation; they should promote positive memory and sustainable futures. The succinct ruling avoided spatial politics and the historical sensibilities that characterized colonialism such as the construct of racial superiority that negated the rights of African Ugandans. This omission undervalues the ruling at a time when multisectoral efforts such as legislating reparatory justice are required to advance Africa’s reparations agenda. Reparation and decolonization of public memory by Africans for Africans in Africa is critical amidst ongoing global efforts.

The right of the accused to a timely trial is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial, regarded as a cornerstone of criminal justice systems worldwide. This article explores how this right can be enforced through writ jurisdiction, with a particular focus on Sri Lanka. By comparing writ jurisdiction in Sri Lanka with that of the United Kingdom and Australia, the article examines how developments in these jurisdictions have recognised delays in proceedings as a form of procedural unfairness, thereby establishing it as a valid ground for invoking writ jurisdiction. While the right to a timely trial is an implied fundamental right in Sri Lanka, the article highlights how the rich Indian jurisprudence on this matter could guide in more precisely defining its scope and developing a legal framework for its protection. Furthermore, the article discusses how the intersection of writ and fundamental rights jurisdictions in Sri Lanka has enabled judicial review of violations of the right to a timely trial by inferior courts. Overall, the article offers valuable insights into expanding writ jurisdiction to ensure the timely resolution of criminal trials in other Commonwealth jurisdictions that, like Sri Lanka, follow English legal principles in judicial review.

Since the mid-20th century, medical devices have proliferated in clinical care, operating rooms, and in everyday life via home health and wearable technologies. Medical devices include a broad range of technologies such as imaging devices, genomic assays, surgical implants, assistive devices, and health monitors. Unlike pharmaceuticals, food, and cosmetics, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did not prioritize medical device regulation in the early 1900s; devices only became a site of concern post-World War II as more complex and invasive technologies were developed and used in health care. Drawing on analysis of FDA regulations, government documents, historical media coverage, and FDA oral histories, this article traces the evolution of medical device regulation, historicizing persistent debates that position technological innovation and regulation in tension with one another. We demonstrate how limited legal authority prior to 1976 positioned FDA as lagging behind the proliferation of medical devices, which continues to haunt device regulation today. We then analyze the values embedded in device risk classifications and regulatory pathways, considering the consequences for the public’s safety and trust.

In the post-Brexit world it is generally considered that parliamentary sovereignty is the ultimate Grundnorm of the English/United Kingdom sovereignty. The author contends that this truism is largely borne out by recent decisions of the UK Supreme Court in a series of major constitutional cases (Gina Miller (No 2), Privacy International, Scottish Independence Bill and Re Allister and Peeple’s Application). Yet two of these decision (Gina Miller (No 2) and Privacy International) show that the position is slightly more nuanced than this. The latter case shows that the UK courts will not give effect in practice to legislation which ousts the general judicial review power of the High Court. It is also possible that Gina Miller (No 2) will over time lay the foundation for a new Grundnorm whereby the UK courts can review executive decisions on the ground that they are inconsistent with a higher norm of fundamental democratic principles. By contrast, the Irish example shows in one way how far Ireland has travelled from its original common law constitutional roots. The existence of a Kelsenian-style written constitution with a defined hierarchy of norms and system and an express system of judicial review of legislation has over time produced very different methods of judicial thinking and reasoning, so that popular – and not parliamentary – sovereignty view of the referendum process is now the ultimate Grundnorm in the Irish constitutional system.

Cultural heritage occupies a paradoxical position in law: It is protected as property but experienced as a repository of identity, memory, and dignity. This article examines whether cultural heritage could, in principle, be recognized as a subject of law, drawing on emerging developments in environmental and nonhuman personhood. After tracing the historical and conceptual evolution of legal personhood—from human and corporate subjects to nature and ecosystems—it explores the moral, relational, and symbolic dimensions that might justify extending personhood to heritage. The analysis highlights both the potential benefits of such recognition, including stronger ethical and representational protections, and the associated risks, such as legal inflation, state appropriation, and conflicts with ownership and restitution law. Ultimately, it argues that rethinking heritage through the lens of relational personhood reveals the need for a more pluralistic and ethically responsive legal imagination.