What is an emotion?

Each of the previous chapters has provided us with reasons for approaching emotions from a teleonomic perspective and for analysing the control of emotions by biological methods. As I stated at the beginning of this book, I think the data show that biology provides a useful basis for the study of emotion. It enables us to ask the right sort of questions about emotion. I also stated at the outset that the book would not provide a new theory of the emotions. There are two reasons, in this case, why asking the right sort of question does not lead immediately to what could be thought of as the right sort of answer. First, a biological approach should be seen as providing only the foundation for the construction of theories of emotion. (The virtue of biology is that the foundation it provides is a stable one.) There are many aspects of emotion, particularly in humans, which require social/cultural analysis, in addition to biological analysis, for their elucidation.

From mouse to monkey to man

In the preceding chapters I have discussed emotional processes and behaviour as if statements about one species would be generally true of a variety of species. This was justifiable, in part because we can assume at least some degree of phylogenetic continuity; in part from the fact that the discussion was aimed at elucidating general principles rather than specific ones; and, in part from the fact that many of the conclusions arrived at were of the form ‘X can occur in some cases but does not in others’. The problems of making simple generalisations about emotional processes are considered further in the last chapter.

In Chapter 1, I specifically suggested that general principles would be most easily seen if we avoided the question of whether any specific emotion was in some sense identical in different species. However, this question cannot be avoided indefinitely. Not only does a biological view of emotion lead one to expect large differences between species in emotional behaviour (e.g. the species-specific defence reactions discussed in Chapter 9); but also, unfortunately, the question is politically ‘loaded’.

The impetus for this book came when I was delivering a series of undergraduate lectures on emotion to psychology students at the University of Oxford. I was unable to find what I considered a suitable basic text for the course. The available books consisted almost entirely of presentations of particular theories of emotion. It struck me as strange that any field of science should have such a multiplicity of theories – except for the fact that in many cases different theorists were addressing different data bases. What seemed to me to be lacking, therefore, was a general pretheoretical framework into which all of the relevant data could be fitted.

This book is an attempt to provide such a framework. It does not present a specific theory of emotion, although it might bias one in favour of some theories rather than others. The central idea of the book is that biology and particularly evolution provide the best starting point for the study of emotion. This idea is neither novel, since it is the basis for Darwin's work, nor is it unrepresented in current theorising (see particularly Plutchik's various works). However, I do not think its implications have ever been considered outside the bounds of specific theorising. In particular, I have tried to show that all of the conventional properties of emotion such as expression, feeling, and motivation can be considered in a scientific manner and useful conclusions drawn therefrom.

Why do emotions produce expressions?

Common experience suggests that emotional states are reflected in facial and bodily expressions, and that in some cases specific states may result in specific, identifiable, expressions. It would be parsimonious if we could assume that an emotion releases a facial expression (Chapter 2). However, unlike organised skeletal responses or internal physiological change, facial expression has neither a direct physical effect on the external environment nor any obvious function with respect to the internal environment. The main function of expressions can be presumed to be communication (see Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973, p.20). Particularly with human beings, therefore, it is possible that expressions would be deliberate rather than reflexive and that the form of an expression could be easily learned rather than being innate (cf. the different gestures used in the various sign languages). How closely particular expressions are linked to particular emotions, the extent to which they are learned, and the extent to which they do in fact convey information, are all important questions.

Teleonomy and procreation

In the previous chapters we have treated emotions as if their exact form were fixed genetically and only minor variations would occur as a result of differing experience in different individuals. We have also considered emotions for which teleonomy can be largely assessed in terms of the survival of the individual (which is then taken to imply an increased probability of reproductive success). The present chapter departs from both of these approaches. While individual survival is necessary it is not sufficient for positive selection pressure. As has been argued in a particularly elegant form by Dawkins (1978), what is really critical is the survival of the genes which code for any particular phylogenetic characteristic. Such survival is highly dependent in higher organisms on successful parent–infant interactions.

The major emotion associated with such interactions in most people's minds would be love (Note 8.1). However, in addition to this there must be an important contribution to the infant's well-being from the fact that parents will be the main, and usually sole, source of virtually all of its homeostatic needs. We might presume from this that the neonate would be supplied with a variety of innate responses which would tend to elicit appropriate behaviour or sustenance from the parents.

What place has learning in the analysis of emotion?

In the initial parts of this book the internal and external expressions of emotions were treated as if they are fixed both in form and in terms of adequate releasing stimuli. However, the previous chapter shows that the exact form of adult emotional reactions depends on early experience – and hence in some sense on learning. Learning is also a critical factor in determining adequate stimuli for many organisms. It will be remembered from Chapter 2 that the adequacy of a stimulus for the release of a state-dependent reflex depended on the interpretation of the stimulus by the animal rather than any gross aspect of the physical characteristics of the stimulus complex.

In this context the study of animal learning is important for two different reasons. First, it gives us a way of studying scientifically (and hence in the terms of the present book biologically) the modifiable aspects of the control of emotional behaviour, which are not amenable to comparative analysis because they differ from individual to individual even within the same species. Second, it provides us with a means of assessing the internal states and processes which give rise to emotional behaviour and the nature of the adequate stimuli which give rise to those states. In this sense learning theory can provide us with an assessment of cognitive factors in animals.

Do physiological changes determine emotion?

Introspection suggests that we perceive some fact and evaluate it; that this evaluation results in an emotional state which causes us to act; and that this emotional state is then accompanied or followed by specific feelings. As was discussed in Chapter 1, James (1884) suggested ‘on the contrary … that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feelings of the same changes as they occur is the emotion’ and this has been taken to imply that emotional behaviour would not occur in the absence of feeling.

Cannon (1927) proposed a number of objections to James's position which are at the heart of much of the research we will discuss:

1. Total separation of the viscera from the CNS does not alter emotional behaviour.

2. The same visceral changes occur in very different emotional states and in non-emotional states.

3. The viscera are relatively insensitive structures.

4. Visceral changes are too slow to be the source of emotional feeling.

5. Artificial induction of the visceral changes typical of strong emotions does not produce them.

Teleonomy, a redefinition of purpose

In the previous chapter we discussed the release of behaviour patterns in terms of general control mechanisms without considering how and why such mechanisms might have evolved. In his preface to the 1965 edition of Darwin's book Lorenz cites as a key to modern behavioural biology ‘the fact … that behaviour patterns are just as conservatively and reliably characters of species as are the forms … of bodily structures; … (they) unite the members … of taxonomic units … (and) can become “vestigial” or “rudimentary” just as the latter can. Or on losing one function they may develop another.’

The idea of purpose has for many years been problematic in biology. However, it is possible to discuss some classes of purpose in biology from a scientific point of view – by referring to ‘purposes’ which specifically exclude the existence of any purposive entity as their source. One such alternative is ‘function’ as used by Lorenz.

What is an emotion?

Emotion is a striking feature of human experience. In any one day we may experience fear, love, pity, rage and many more. Emotion colours our everyday thoughts and actions and generates most of the behaviour which makes our friends and neighbours interesting. Much of Art and Literature is devoted to exploring its subtleties and, at a more practical level, emotions sway events in politics and commerce to a frightening extent. Psychology, the science of the mind, might therefore be expected to give pride of place to emotion as a topic of concern.

Unfortunately, there has never been any clear agreement as to what the word means. Amongst philosophers, ‘emotion has almost always played an inferior role … often as an antagonist to logic and reason … Along with this general demeaning of emotion in philosophy comes either a wholesale neglect or at least retail distortion in the analysis of emotions’ (Solomon, 1977, cited by Lyons, 1980, p ix). Psychologists have followed this lead.

Why do physiological changes accompany emotion?

The work of Cannon discussed in Chapter 1 centred on pain and fear as ‘great emotions’. It is also now obvious that ‘in the natural state and particularly in subhuman species, the aggression, attachment and sexual patterns are usually accompanied by autonomic discharge …. The same functional stimuli activate the behaviour pattern and the autonomic nervous system arousal’ (Mandler, 1975, p.136). Cannon suggested, essentially, that most such changes can be viewed as physiological preparations for the situation facing the animal. Even with the broader selection of emotions presented by Mandler, this view is unlikely to be contentious in either mechanistic or teleonomic terms.

Let us consider mechanism first. Particularly with examples like the let-down reflex or salivation (Section 2.4) to guide us we can accept that certain stimuli or the interpretation of those stimuli could result in activity in either the autonomic nervous system or glands under nervous control. The release of compounds such as adrenaline or direct action of the autonomic nervous system can then produce extensive changes in the animal's physiology which can involve increased muscular power, decreased bleeding, etc.

Teleonomy, physiological change and feelings

Chapter 5 discussed a variety of physiological changes which can accompany emotions and which, we argued, adjust the organism's bodily systems in preparation for classes of action frequently required when that emotion is present. Chapter 6 concluded that such changes are not merely of physiological utility but can also play a controlling role in the psychology of emotion. As was noted, the presence of some compound such as adrenaline, or the changes in particular organ systems induced by such compounds, could come, through further evolution, to act as controllers of psychological states. Why, teleonomically speaking, they should do so is, however, not at all clear – and is quite likely to involve rather different reasons for different internal changes and different emotions.

In the present chapter I will discuss a particular behavioural phenomenon, the partial reinforcement extinction effect, and its underlying control. I will present a provisional account of the teleonomy of this phenomenon which will, I hope, show that reasonable teleonomic accounts of the psychological role of physiological changes can be constructed.

Dialectical and non-dialectical interactions in emotion

The previous chapters have, as far as possible, treated the various components of emotion in isolation. One reason for doing this has been simplicity. However, a more important reason has been that, given the likely evolution of emotional systems (Chapters 2, 3), there is no guarantee that the individual ‘components of emotion’ do not have entirely separate control systems from each other. Such separation would not require us to give up emotion as a concept, since teleonomy alone could provide a conceptual link between different components. However, the normal use of the word emotion implies some direct connection between the different components. This chapter, therefore, considers interactions between those aspects of emotion which have been separated by the previous chapters. Throughout, it should be borne in mind that the usual co-occurrence of such components is no justification for treating them as linked. As a corollary to this it should also be remembered that mechanistic links between components of one emotion do not imply mechanistic links between the same components of some other emotion.