My Dear Sir,

Concurring with you in opinion that the Government of this great country does less for the encouragement of science than that of any other civilised state, I am not disposed to admit that our English universities and ecclesiastical establishment are copartners with our civil governors in the disgrace attaching to them by this statement of a fact. As to “Natural History,” as a science, it was not “come to the birth”—was scarce indeed conceived, or in embryo state—at the time when the several colleges were founded, and scholarships and fellowships endowed, by the pious and munificent of days gone by. These men saw and felt the want of something more immediately necessary than science itself; and it is no imputation on their judgment or their charity—on their heads or their hearts—that they provided, in the first place, and by due preference, “for their own.” Had they not done so, they would have been “worse than the infidel” of modern times, who endows no institution for the promotion of that science he affects to value as the favourite of Liberals, and the one thing “useful.”

(129.) The innumerable objects composing the animal world, may be compared to the isolated facts of all physical sciences. For unless they are arranged and digested under proper heads, no general conclusions from them can be drawn. No sooner, therefore, has the naturalist become acquainted with the forms of the objects he studies, than he proceeds to arrange them according to their agreements and disagreements. He first places them in primary groups, as an entomologist would separate the beetles from the butterflies; and these, from the bees and the flies: from each of these, again, he proceeds to make other divisions; separating the butterflies which fly by day, from those which are nocturnal, and so on. This is arrangement or classification; from which all systems or methods originate. Now, it is obvious, that if we are not guided in this proceeding by some general rules known to be universally applicable, every one may consider himself qualified to follow his own impressions, and to make that arrangement which he thinks best. Hence have originated the innumerable systems and methods which have been, and are still, in use. One writer attaches a primary importance to particular characters, which another undervalues; a third rejects both these, and founds his system upon certain points of structure on which his predecessors have placed no value; a fourth, disregarding all outward organisation, builds his method upon internal anatomy.

(41.) Could we suppose man had never known evil, – that he had continued, as at first created, a terrestrial, yet an immaculate being, alike a stranger to the bad passions and the inordinate desires that now agitate him, – what pursuits, may we suppose, would occupy his time? or upon what subjects would he exercise those powers of reason by which he is united to the spiritual world? The answer is obvious. The works of God, as manifested in all visible nature, would be his only study. Surrounded by innumerable objects attractive by their beauty, wonderful by their construction, or interesting by their economy, his days would be spent in surveying the material world; – his heart enlarged, and his reason exercised, in meditating on all that he saw. Every new discovery would increase his veneration for the Divine Author of such wonders; and although placed upon earth, his contemplations would be those of the inhabitants of heaven. Such is the reply suggested by reason, to our previous question; and such, does inspiration assure us, was the occupation of the parent of mankind. “And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowls of the air, and to every beast of the field.” It is fit that the study of nature should be coëval with the creation of man. Though his spirit has been changed, – though care and trouble, those thorns and thistles of his present state, entangle and distract him, and he is called to the discharge of moral and social duties,–yet this remnant of primeval happiness is still left to him.

(295.) We have enlarged, in the preceding chapter, upon those means possessed by the government and the universities for giving a new impulse to the science of Britain; because no renovation can be complete and effective, which does not commence from these sources. The organisation of our scientific societies, however, is a subject of some moment; because, unless we ourselves evince a disposition for improvement, we cannot expect assistance from higher quarters. To expose defects, and to animadvert upon the proceedings of such institutions, is at all times an ungracious task; yet experience has shown, that it is most necessary. Imperfection attaches to every thing human; and we are most ignorant of that imperfection, in proportion as we turn away from advice, and disregard the opinions of others. Now, where there is a disposition in the majority to think correctly and to act wisely, we are more disposed to treat with indulgence existing defects, than to expatiate upon their universal prevalence; preferring, at all times, dispassionate reason to bitter declamation and general sarcasm. We, therefore, leave to others the exposition of existing or assumed abuses; contenting ourselves with touching only upon those points which regard the well-being of our respective societies, which are most conducive to effect the objects they have in view, and which are sanctioned both by reason and experience.

(191.) We have already explained, and familiarly illustrated, the two sorts of relations which natural objects bear to each other, and which are distinguished by the terms Analogy and Affinity. The prevalence of these relations is so universal throughout nature, that there is no group of beings, however small, which does not present them. Nay, we question not that every individual species has its analogies, as it certainly must have its affinities. In a future volume we propose to enquire more particularly into these relations, and to bring forward such instances of their prevalence, as to sanction the hypothesis that they are uniform, constant, and universal in every part of the animal creation. In regard to affinities, indeed, this truth is self-evident; because, whatever forms part of a series, must of necessity have affinities, and these must be of different degrees. But, in regard to analogy, the case is different, and calls for a much more extended enquiry. On the present occasion, however, we shall merely consider those arguments which may be used, à priori, in favour of the supposition that analogies are, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, universal; and that they consequently assume an importance of the highest order when applied to illustrate, and to confirm, any theory on the variation of animal structure.

(192.) In the first place, it is unnecessary to enforce the axiom long established by sound philosophy, that natural and moral truths are but parts of the great system of nature.

(238.) The facts detailed in the last chapter being admitted, because they are notoriously undeniable, we come then to the following questions: — 1. Is such a state of things peculiar to England, or common to other nations? 2. Does abstract science, more particularly zoology, stand in need of any peculiar or national encouragement? and, 3. What are the causes which operate to its neglect? By discussing these questions impartially and dispassionately, we shall then be prepared to form a sound opinion, whether science, among us, is in a healthy state; and whether, in truth, it is advancing, quiescent, or retrograding. On a subject in every way so important and interesting, we have much fear, after the able manner in which it has already been treated, of not doing justice to the cause we advocate. But the general sense of any body of men can only be gathered from the expression of individual opinions; and although some of these will be more eloquent, and the reasons assigned more convincing, than others; yet, if they advocate the same general principles, and concur in the same sentiments, the reiterations of the weaker will give confirmation to the arguments of the more powerful advocate; and if several of these, taking up different departments of science, — each in their own walk, — arrive by different inferences at the same conclusions, we may safely believe that there is much of truth in the result.