This study examines the antecedent role of organizational culture and the mediating role of digital transformation when promoting big data analytics capabilities. Employing the Competing Values Framework, we scrutinize the influence of various cultural typologies, including digital culture on the successful deployment of digital transformation and the enhancement of big data analytics capabilities. Our analysis utilizes Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling on a dataset of 183 firms to evaluate our hypotheses. The findings reveal that adhocratic, digital and hierarchical cultures significantly foster big data analytics capabilities mediated by digital transformation, which is a dynamic process that needs supportive digital and innovative values. In contrast, market and clan cultures exhibit weaker linkages. By providing empirical evidence and practical implications, this study highlights how organizations with a strong adhocratic and digital cultures outperform those with traditional cultures in their digital transformation and big data analytics capabilities efforts.

Despite its popularity, authentic leadership remains enigmatic, with both advantages and disadvantages. The connection between authenticity (an internal process) and leadership (an external influence process) is complex. We introduce a theory that connects these processes through self-regulation, suggesting that authenticity results from managing multiple identities regulated by factors such as active self-identity. Using ironic processes theory, we propose a model that encourages leaders to focus on their active self rather than suppressing misaligned aspects. We present authenticity as a dynamic process, adaptable across individual, relational, and collective levels, with self-identity shifting contextually. This perspective offers insights into developing leader authenticity, addresses the limitations of the authentic leadership approach, and provides a roadmap for future research.

For the past decade, U.S. communications policymakers have been debating the need for net-neutrality regulation of “dominant” communications carrier platforms. One of the reasons advanced for regulating these carriers derives from a fear that carriers could reduce competition in the production and distribution of video media through their ownership of media companies, but is there any evidence supporting the notion that vertically integrated communications companies have successfully used such a strategy? This paper provides evidence from the financial markets that carrier integration into video production has not redounded to the benefit of these companies’ stockholders. In fact, this integration appears to reduce the value that investors place on such carriers, a result that suggests that the difficulties in managing a large, vertically integrated media and communications company more than offset any benefits (if any) that may derive from anticompetitive behavior induced by vertical integration.

Because nuclear power development entails massive initial investments in power plants, along with institutional innovations in regulation, law, and basic physical infrastructure, there are strong grounds to support the pervasiveness of the central state in the industry. Furthermore, considering the scale economies in reactor installation, standardization in design, and enhanced learning by doing, little scope remains for the consideration of decentralized business interests. This article argues that competition, in the sense of rivalry between firms, can nonetheless be a driving force behind the nuclear industry. To illustrate the point, we draw a comparative, eventful history of two Iberian nations, Portugal and Spain: Portugal has failed several attempts to introduce nuclear power, while Spain has become one of the largest nuclear power nations in Europe. A fine-grained analysis of the circumstances surrounding the nuclear history of both countries is presented, highlighting the key variables of business history and the role of the central state and political actors in economic policy.

The theme of the 2024 Business History Conference was “doing business in the public interest,” but what does it actually mean to “do business in the public interest?” This presidential address challenges the idea of shareholder primacy as the main purpose of business enterprises historically and examines various ways that business historians might approach the idea of businesses acting in a public interest. In particular, it analyzes instances in which corporations made a decision in the public interest without clear evidence that it would benefit their bottom line; cases where it would demonstrably hurt their bottom line to prioritize the public; corporations that made a decision allegedly in the public interest that actually turned out to be bad for the public interest; and corporations that made a decision that was bad for the public interest that also turned out to be bad for their own bottom line.