In a parallel and complementary way to Chapter 3, in this chapter via sustainable business models we try to understand the new paradox and competitive dynamic of firm strategy and the natural environment. Thus, the nature, main features and theories to frame general business models are presented. Then, sustainable business models are analysed, highlighting a sustainable value proposition characterised by the emergence of a new business logic mindset with technological innovation, and value networks of stakeholders as its main feature. Finally, the chapter distinguishes between social and environmental business models.

Chapter 6 constitutes the core proposition of this book, in which the regenerative strategy is explained. Jointly with the theoretical arguments, two main figures capture the main characteristics of this disruptive environmental strategy, which is composed of two main elements: (1) a disruptive technological solution capable of fighting against the climate emergency through pollution reversion, net zero and even net negative emissions, which constitutes the creation of positive environmental externalities; and (2) a new firm purpose, driven by a new ecological, ethical and moral value that we name ‘eco-emotional wealth’, guiding environmental performance and, finally, the achievement of systemic socioecological resilience. To do so, we advocate a new approach to stakeholder management including unconventional and fringe stakeholders, such as communities, governments, global citizenship, the natural environment and future generations, jointly with a new very long-term perspective.

Chapter 3 carries out a critical review of environmental strategies, from reactive postures, such as pollution control, to the most proactive and advanced ones, such as pollution prevention and product stewardship. In doing so, the literature review shows the main theoretical streams used to frame different environmental strategic positionings, such as the institutional theory, the natural resource-based view, a new stakeholder theory or the microfoundations of strategy. To carry out a critical review of existing typologies of environmental strategies, they are deconstructed into their main features and dimensions following two research traditions: strategy (defenders, prospectors, analysers and reactors) and innovation (exploitation, exploration and ambidexterity). We conclude that these conventional approaches can be catalogued as ‘business-as-usual’ environmental strategies and finally present a disruptive alternative called the regenerative strategy.

The first and introductory chapter explains the necessity of this book, in other words, why it should be read. Several questions arise to illustrate this: If climate emergency is the grand challenge, why is so difficult to address it? Is it technically feasible? Economically? Trying to address it, we frame the current climate emergency as an extreme case of the well-known phenomenon of ‘the tragedy of the commons’. As a potential solution, we introduce a new disruptive business model and environmental strategy called ‘regenerative’, characterised by two main elements: (1) cutting-edge climate science solutions (capturing and utilising atmospheric carbon dioxide capable of producing net zero and even net negative emissions or positive environmental externalities); and (2) firm purpose redefinition under a new ecological, ethical and moral paradigm. Finally, a brief description of the book’s contents is presented.

The second chapter analyses the response to the climate grand challenge by institutions, governments, business practice and academia. Since the 1980s, climate science has alerted us, with data and evidence, to the serious effects that human intervention is having on the climate. This grand challenge constitutes a global problem that can be plausibly addressed through coordinated and collaborative efforts at a planetary scale, requiring the involvement of governments, supranational institutions, companies and, of course, management academics. From a historical perspective, we introduce the reader to how climate change was initially treated by multinational institutions and governments, and then we delve into the reaction of industry to this evidence, paying special attention to the fossil fuel industry because of its prominent role in the generation of greenhouse gases. Finally, we analyse the role of academia in addressing this challenge, in particular the role of organisations and the natural environment academics.

In the final chapter, readers find a brief review of the main contents that have been covered in the book. Jointly with that, there is a series of reflections derived from everything we have discussed throughout the text, such as the key role played by business education and the entrepreneurial action of governments in the fight against the climate emergency. In accordance with a more humanist management proposal and a greater awareness of the organisations–natural environment relationship, we highlight the educational proposals that stand out for presenting the new management values that this book aims to highlight and that begin by redefining the company's internal mission of regenerative strategy. The chapter ends with a brief reflection on the role that the entrepreneurial state must play in the definitive boost of the technologies that can help us face the climate emergency, not only by supporting companies and solving market failures, but also by creating markets and taking risks that no other agent is willing to bear. From our perspective, the climate emergency calls for it.

A Military Disaster?

In a ground-breaking article published in 1980, Cheynet pondered whether Manzikert was “un désastre militaire.” Since then, the consensus among historians of the period has been that Manzikert was not a military disaster and that the imperial army seems to have escaped relatively unscathed from the day's fighting on August 26, 1071, with the political and socio-economic consequences of the defeat far outweighing the losses the empire sustained on the battlefield. The rearguard and reserve units of “the tagma of the Hetairiae and that of the nobles” under Andronikos Doukas certainly escaped back to the capital without suffering any casualties, whilst Bryennius's left wing, which included the five western tagmata also escaped with relatively few losses; these units are reported defending the Balkans against the Patzinaks in the following years. Concerning the units of the right wing under Alyates, and especially the Armenian and Kappadokian forces, the sources tell us that a significant number of them managed to make an orderly escape to Trapezounta, Theodosiopolis, and Dokeia. According to Attaleiates, the units under Alyates reportedly pledged their allegiance to the emperor after his release from Turkish captivity.

Furthermore, what is notable is that the prominent men who were reported to have died in the battle were few and relatively unknown figures (Leon, who was epi ton deeseon and the magistros and protoasecretis Eustratios Choirosphaktes), while even fewer were captured alive (the protovestes Basileios Maleses and Nikephoros Basilakes, the latter having been taken prisoner the day before the main battle).5 If we add the elite units of Trachaneiotes and Roussel, which retreated to Melitene before the battle, a significant number of perhaps even twenty thousand men, it seems clear that the actual losses incurred during the battle were limited to the Diogenes's immediate retinue, the Armenian infantry, and the palatine and other elite units close to him, around five to ten percent of the campaigning army.