In an engaging and provocative paper, Linda Trevino and Gary Weaver spell out the differences between the methodological approach characteristic of the natural sciences on the one hand and that of normative inquiry on the other (Trevino and Weaver, 1991). Near the end of their paper they raise a haunting question that will have increasing significance as the management literature in ethics evolves: namely, “Can the two approaches be integrated?”

As C. P. Snow (1962) noted, no one can deny either the stark differences between the two worlds of normative and empirical inquiry, or the mutual suspicion shown by their inhabitants. The methodology of natural science implies a non-normative, thoroughly descriptive vision of the world in which reality awaits discovery by the scientist prepared to use increasingly sophisticated techniques. In contrast, the methodology of normative inquiry, i.e., that of traditional moral philosophy, implies a world-vision in which most important issues are allocated to ethics, where empirical pursuits are frequently trivial and always require ethical guidance, and where empirical theories contain normative presuppositions unrecognized as normative even by their scientific adherents.

The author argues that a continuing effort to avoid self-deception is the pre-requisite to any ethical analysis; that this effort cannot be altogether successful; that it is likely to even be dysfunctional in a variety of organizational contexts, perhaps particularly in the context of corporate middle management, but that it ought not therefore be ignored. It is contended that business ethicists should be committed to making the difficulties associated with self-scrutiny explicit. Finally, it is argued that in order to do that legitimately for the corporation, university based business ethicists must be willing to face up to parallel difficulties in the university generally and in the school of business in particular.

It is proposed that mangers have to be moral, have to be concerned about the distribution of benefits and the allocation of harms brought about by their decisions and actions, in order to build trust, commitment, and effort among the stakeholders of the firm. Trust, commitment, and effort on the part of all of the stakeholders are essential for long-term corporate success, given the economic conditions of intense global competition that now exist for the foreseeable future.

A synthesis of the two theoretical bases of business ethics—normative philosophy and descriptive social science—is called for. Examples from the literature are used to demonstrate that to ignore the descriptive aspects of moral behavior is to risk unreal philosophy, and that to ignore the normative aspects is to risk amoral social science. Business ethics is portrayed as a single unified field, in which fact-value distinctions are inappropriate.

Reading these papers—each one a straightforward declaration of a preferred position—has the odd (and I trust, unintended) effect of projecting the reader into a world of virtual reality. The words, the concepts, the theories, the divisions and dualisms, the premises, the arguments themselves all seem to be real. They seem to make sense. Yes, we can say to ourselves, I see and understand what each one is saying. “Fact,” “value,” “empirical,” “normative,” “science,” “philosophy,” “naturalistic fallacy,” and similar terms all invoke meanings that seem to be clear and that help to clarify the issues being debated. But do they? To what extent is this particular discussion about business ethics only virtually real, a product of an imagined or invented dialogue that may rest on little more than the assumed and inherited meanings assigned to the phrases we toss around so freely?

By raising the question, it should be obvious that I am inclined to believe that the debaters have convinced themselves that they are engaged in a dialogue about something “real” but which actually exists only in the invented forms and phrases that they have brought to the debate. The issues are only “virtually” real. If that is so, then one needs to ask where did those inventions—the virtual realities of the debate—come from. Why are they so appealing? Why do they seem to make so much sense to us? Why are they defended so vigorously by both sides or, perhaps more aptly, by all sides?

The question of how far, if at all, values invade, or should invade, the realm of empirical research is the focus of this issue of Business Ethics Quarterly. Readers will find a variety of answers and perspectives, along with some illustrative examples that support one or another of the possible views. Feelings run high on this topic, and they occasionally break through the normally staid atmosphere that one finds in most academic journals. That in itself may tell something about whether inquiry may be safely cordoned from a contaminating normative orientation. In form of presentation also, some of the articles selected by the editors vary from the conventional design. Essays and opinion pieces take their place alongside more formal presentations. Also included are two discussant papers.

The original inspiration for this collection was a symposium presented during the 1992 annual meeting of the Social Issues in Management division of The Academy of Management. Held in Las Vegas, more than one attendee enjoyed the irony of business ethicists rubbing shoulders with gamblers and other related exotica found in Sin City. The symposium papers are grouped together and, with one exception, appear in the original order of presentation. They are followed by the two discussants’ comments. It is fair to say that in the intervening period, all of these authors have had second, or even third, thoughts and have revised their initial declarations somewhat. This echoes a time-honored practice in the U. S. Congress of allowing members to “extend their remarks” for the (official) Congressional Record, which is another way of giving politicians a chance to tell it the way they wished they had said it in the first place. That’s not bad in the case of academics also, if someone is careful to see that the “extensions” do not extend too far, and in that sense the editors have done what they could. The lead paper, though not part of the earlier symposium, is closely related to the general theme and is included for that reason.

Ethical analyses of the relations between managers and subordinates have traditionally focused on the employment contract. The inequality and requisite mutual trust between managers and subordinates makes the sub-disciplines of professional ethics and feminist ethics more applicable than the contractarian perspective. When professional ethics is applied to hierarchic relationships, specific obligations emerge for managers and subordinates alike. The application of feminist ethics results in the identification of an entirely different, though not contradictory, set of obligations. In toto, the analysis improves on the conventional wisdom governing hierarchic relationships while at the same time remaining consistent with our moral intuitions.