Historians have recently tried to explain why the century-long work-reduction movement ended in the 1940s. A history of Kellogg's Six-Hour day program reveals that the loss of business and management support contributed to this demise. Mainstream corporations such as Kellogg's once thought that managed work reduction would save capitalism, and they developed a capitalist vision of freedom from work remarkably similar to recent socialist writings. But Kellogg's management reversed course and ultimately opposed the Six-Hour day. Instead they developed more conventional corporate views: that industrial progress is defined by more work for more people, that increasing the number of jobs is a primary economic goal (but not the responsibility of the individual firm), and that work can be perfected to become the most satisfying part of life.

Despite some exceptions, the business ethics literature on the moral responsibility of corporations does not emphasize a subject critical to that inquiry: the general nature of corporations. This article attempts to lessen the imbalance by describing three conceptions of the corporation that have been prominent in twentieth century legal theorizing, and by sketching their implications for the moral responsibility of corporations. These three conceptions, at least two of which have counterparts in the philosophical and organizational theory literature, are the concession, aggregate, and real entity theories. The article concludes that the real entity theory is the most plausible of the lot. At least under prevailing tests of moral responsibility, it then contends, corporations-as-real-entities are morally responsible for most of their members’ actions.

Under the present judicial interpretation of federal securities law, an individual is prohibited from trading on non-public information that has been misappropriated in contravention of a fiduciary duty. Trades made using non-public information that has not been misappropriated are not prohibited by Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The current requirement of misappropriation to trigger Rule 10b-5 liability creates a gap that permits transactions that are both ethically and economically undesirable. Judicial or legislative reforms are recommended to close the gap and help ensure the fairness and efficiency of securities markets.

Alan Wertheimer's paper on “Unconscionability and Contracts” presents an enlightening discussion of a complex and contentious legal concept. His primary objective is not to contribute to legal scholarship, but to use the law to shed light on the ethics of exchange relationships. Specifically, he wants to “use the doctrine of unconscionability in contracts as a lens through which to get a clearer understanding of exploitation—its essential characteristics and moral force” (p. 480). It is apparent that he sees exploitation (and unconscionability) as closely linked to a more general notion of fairness.

Corporate moral agency is an important philosophical issue with significant implications for corporate law scholarship. While some legal scholars have recognized the significance of this issue for the analysis of corporate law, legal scholars generally have yet to give it the kind of attention and thorough examination it deserves. In this regard, Michael Phillips makes a valuable contribution to the debate, exploring how theories of the corporation prevalent in legal scholarship bear on the question of corporate moral agency. His analysis provides us with many insights. Still, I wish to raise some questions regarding his approach. Raising these questions, I believe, will help us to recognize more fully the possibilities the issue of corporate moral agency holds for corporate law scholarship.