Business history, if it is to comprehend the men and movements with which it deals, must of necessity invade other academic fields. This article is an attempt to trace the social and economic influences which fashioned the ultimate business activities of German-Jewish investment bankers in the late nineteenth century. Second only to the group of houses of Yankee origin, the group led by Kuhn, Loeb & Co. provides us with an outstanding example of a business elite in operation. Significant from the point of view of business history is the fact that in origins, early activities, and outlook, these family firms displayed remarkable similarities. Once established in New York they became even more tightly knit through marriage and social life. Only when all these factors have been taken into account can we claim to understand the unique role which these businesses played in the development of the American capital market.

National divergencies in economic development produce variant national patterns of business organization. But the reverse is also true. In France, the legal structuring of business has been a causative factor of some importance, imparting a distinctive character to the timing and nature of French economic growth. At the same time, however, the history of organizational evolution in France has a certain universality. Here, as elsewhere, such evolution essentially has taken the form of a series of compromises between the need for greater corporate flexibility and the fear of abuse. From 1673, when the unlimited liability of partners was affirmed, the pressures of economic expansion produced a succession of devices aimed at facilitating the flow of investment funds into commerce and industry. When, however, that point was finally reached where limited investor liability, freely negotiable shares, and recognition of a corporate autonomy had been achieved, fear of fraudulent practice became a dominant factor. Legislative steps to protect the investing public introduced rigidities into French business at the very time when internal growth and international competition for markets called for a highly adaptable business system.

A study of the career of Ignaz Jastrow, guiding spirit of the Berlin Handelshochschule, invites attention to the broader subject of academic education for business. There was a close relationship between the educational philosophy embodied in the founding of the Berlin school in 1906 and in that of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in 1908. This relationship was not accidental, and establishment of these two institutions constituted a decisive point in a long history, beginning in the eighteenth century. Over the years, the basic difficulty had been that of endeavoring to raise professional training for business above the secondary school level. In those instances during the nineteenth century where university-level training was attempted, the result was overemphasis on the general background of business. In 1900, despite the many promising experiments in European countries and America, a sound foundation for high-level business training was still lacking. Jastrow's Handelshochschule was the first institution that focused on the real world of business and at the same time was truly academic in nature. This same combination was also effected at Harvard, where the basic objectives were implemented by reformed teaching techniques and by a continuing program of research upon business subjects.

The story of George Gunton is that of an astonishingly accurate economic prophet whose viewpoints have found wide acceptance a half-century after they were enunciated. Gunton is shown in this article not as a paid defender of big business but as an apostle of compromise, standing in the No Man's Land of a vast battleground. With equal fervor Gunton declared, “It is our industries that make us great,” but that laborers' wages were “as elastic as human wants … capable of as much expansion as the social character of man.” His numerous commentaries are a lucid clue to the relative importance of contemporary issues, and those commentaries are enhanced by Gunton's instinctive sense of history. Out of the confusion of contradictory evidence recorded at the Chicago Conference on Trusts, before the Industrial Commission, and elsewhere on the business and political stage Gunton framed his thesis of the essential interdependence of big business and organized labor. His convictions were, in total, unique, and his judgment and reconciliation of conflicting viewpoints have meaning and utility today.

Compared with the great inter-regional networks, the Eastern Railroad did not loom large. Its creation, however, is an integral part of New England history and well worthy of inclusion in any first chapter of American railroading history. The development pattern is one of piece-meal extension from several population centers, the linking of the segments, and the proliferation of branch lines. External difficulties took the shape of competition from stage and boat lines, and the rivalry of the fledgling Boston & Maine. Internally, the chief problems revolved around establishment of an effective management organization and the maintenance of adequate financial controls. Threading a populous route from Boston to Portland, Eastern's future seemed bright. Yet, in a faint foreshadowing of events of a far later day, main-line profits were swallowed up by operation of branch connections built or acquired with more enthusiasm than foresight and, once acquired, not easily disowned.