When the Williams brothers migrated from Connecticut to New York State in 1825 they established themselves as country merchants, yet their activities bore a distinct resemblance to those of the seaboard merchants of the late eighteenth century. Although divorced from international trade, the Williamses exhibited the same dependence on country produce, the same need to exchange produce for specie and specie for manufactured goods as did the House of Hancock.

One of the recurring problems in the study of management theory concerns the authority relationships between stockholders, officers, and directors of corporations. The power centers in the corporate form of enterprise are quite different from those that obtain in an individual proprietorship and in a partnership. In addition, many differences between these types of legal organizations may be noted as one considers them from the point of view of the source of executive authority or from the viewpoint of statute law and its interpretations.

The Kress Room of Baker Library recently acquired the Latin and German editions of a book which must be considered one of the first, if not the first, guide for investors published in Germany. According to the custom of the times, the titles are cumbersome indeed. The earlier Latin edition's title reads: Commentatio juris praesertim Germanici tam consonarais quam dissonantis de pecunia mutuaticia tuto collocanda. An wen, wie, und wo die Capitalien am sichersten auszulehnen (Goettingae, 1761); while the German edition is entitled Der Kluge Capitalist, oder politisch redlicher Unterricht, wie Gelder am sichersten zu benutzen und anzulegen (Nürnberg, 1766; 2d ed., 1786).

In the annals of American labor the deeds of the carpet weavers are writ large. Their experiences are significant not only for the labor movement; they have permanently left their mark on the business institutions which were involved. In no case is this more true than in that of the Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Company. A study of the history of this company is under way at the Harvard Business School. This paper is drawn mainly from the records of the two largest and most important of Bigelow-Sanford's six ante-bellum predecessors: the Lowell Manufacturing Company and the Thompsonville Carpet Manufacturing Company.

From time to time historians and other recorders pursue a practice, not discouraged by business historians, of pointing out that for every Napoleon and Wellington there existed a Rothschild and Baring, and for every American Revolution—whether in the 1770's or 1860's— there lived a Robert Morris or Jay Cooke, some one person or group of persons who could supply the economic and business administrative sagacity required to keep the financial arteries of war flowing successfully. When in the 1830's the people of Texas ended their political subordination to Mexico by military revolution, the thread of this business-makes-it-possible pattern can be found to be running true. In Texas two men, unsung for military exploits, in large measure made possible the financial continuance of the Texas government and its army during a period when the stage was being set for the eventual annexation to the United States of an area roughly the size of France. Without these two men, Thomas F. McKinney and Samuel May Williams, the disputed genius of Sam Houston might not have won a decisive victory at San Jacinto, terminating the Mexican hold on Texas, for without their aid Houston's army conceivably would have lacked clothes, provisions, and most especially, arms.

Business history, as the study of the history of the administration and operation of business, is a relatively new discipline. As a separate academic field of study, research, and instruction, it is only about twenty-five years old and still in the stage of formulation and definition. Business history has been a peculiarly American development; the name itself was first used in the United States in 1925 to designate this special interest. But no scholar or generation of scholars begins de novo; each builds on foundations laid by earlier workers. Certainly, this is true of business history as we know it today; it owes a great deal to many individuals and to many disciplines. A number of historians and economists in the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the early part of the twentieth century made material contributions toward the development of this field. One of the most important of these was Werner Sombart. It is the purpose of this paper to indicate Sombart's role in this evolution.

Business history has proved an attraction to German businessmen and German scholars over a considerable period of time—to the former as promoters of anniversary volumes or Festschriften, and to the latter occasionally as authors of such volumes but especially as investigators with broader interests. Why such has been the case, in comparison for example with the weaker attraction to corresponding groups in other European countries, is not easily explained. Perhaps it stemmed originally from the businessman's desire to achieve greater acceptance in a society in which inherited landownership and service in government and army had a conspicuous influence. At all events, one must take the length and breadth of German business history as facts.

The Chinese have a proverb to the effect that language is used to conceal intentions. Notwithstanding their traditional frankness, Americans have written letters designed to mislead the reader. Certainly no series of letters, whether from clergymen, politicians, or businessmen can be taken uniformly at face value. But how may statements be discounted or interpreted in such a way that one may draw the correct meaning from them?

Usually the letters of one man are used in connection with the preparation of a biography of their author or the detailed analysis of a series of his actions. In either case cumulative knowledge of the writer's idiosyncrasies, continuing motivation, and, most of all, his actions themselves provide clues to acceptable interpretations. But when one reads the letters of a large group of men engaged over the course of many years in a common occupation, all of these conventional indicators are lacking.

At first, the early Massachusetts railroads did not fix the passenger and freight rates on the basis of any theoretical rate-making formula. Instead, they met the competition of wagons and stages and, where necessary and possible, the steamboats. The railroad directors wanted to assure the stockholders reasonable and regular dividends, but I have seen no evidence that the directors expected to maximize the profits, even within the limits of the charters. Only an occasional director was willing to risk the possibility of greater profits by experimenting with extremely low rates on the theory that really cheap, improved transportation sufficiently increases the demand for transportation to justify the lower fares.