We explore themes in Nobel Prize–winning economist James M. Buchanan’s work and apply his Ethics and Economic Progress to problems facing individuals and firms. We focus on Buchanan’s analysis of the individual work ethic, his exhortations to “pay the preacher” of the “institutions of moral-ethical communication,” and his notion of law as “public capital.” We highlight several ways people with other-regarding preferences can contribute to social flourishing and some of the ways those who have “affected to trade for the public good” might want to redirect their efforts. We show how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business.

We present a rationale for bidder termination provisions that considers their effect on bidders’ and targets’ joint takeover gains. The provision’s inclusion can create value by enabling termination when the target becomes less valuable to the bidder than on its own, but creates a trade-off because termination may also occur when the target is more valuable to the bidder than on its own. This trade-off explains why the provision is included in only some deals, and explains variation in termination fees. Inclusion of the provision is associated with larger combined announcement returns, provided that the termination fee is priced appropriately.

We study trading and risk management decisions of banks in over-the-counter markets, accounting for 2 types of risk: payoff risk from loans and counterparty risk from trading activities. Our model provides empirically supported predictions on the structure of the interbank credit default swap (CDS) market: i) banks with high default probabilities either buy or sell CDS contracts; ii) because of the counterparty risk friction, payoff risk is only partially shared; and iii) safe banks act as intermediaries and help diversify counterparty risk. Banks manage their default probabilities to become creditworthy counterparties, but they do so in a socially inefficient way.

Empirical research is largely supportive of the assertion of instrumental stakeholder theory that a positive relationship exists between “managing for stakeholders” and firm performance. However, despite considerable debate on the subject, the amount of variation across firm investments in stakeholders (stakeholder management performance) has not been adequately investigated. We address this gap using a sample of more than eighteen thousand firm-level observations over ten years. We find evidence to support an inverted U–shaped relationship between variation in stakeholder management performance and Tobin’s q, suggesting that firms that have some imbalance in their stakeholder management, but not too much, perform best. We discuss the implications of our study for instrumental stakeholder theory and managerial practice.

Drawing on Wales, Monsen, and McKelvie's (2011, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(5), 895–923) model of entrepreneurial orientation pervasiveness and the strong culture hypothesis (Denison, 1984, Organization Dynamics, 13, 4–22), this study investigates how entrepreneurial orientation (EO) strength, defined as the level of agreement in the shared perceptions of EO, serves as a boundary condition of the EO–firm performance relationship. Four field studies provide evidence for a valid and reliable 10-item multidimensional measure of entrepreneurial orientation, the EO-10, which in turn, may be used to assess EO strength. We establish content and construct validity of the EO-10 (study 1; n = 447 employees), criterion-related validity with revenue growth and sales growth (study 2; n = 412 employees in 43 profit centers), and convergent validity with Covin and Slevin's (1989, Strategic Management Journal, 10, 75–87) 9-item measure (study 3; n = 291 employees). Finally, in study 4 (n = 853 employees nested in 22 organizations), we demonstrate the interactive effects of EO and EO strength on profit growth and revenue growth. In sum, this study provides conceptual and empirical evidence for the importance of EO strength as a moderator of the EO–firm performance relationship.

We study the relation between electoral politics and government small-business lending, employment, and business formation. We construct novel measures of electoral importance capturing swing and base voters using data from Facebook ad spending, independent political expenditures, the Cook Political Report, and campaign contributions. We find that businesses in electorally important states, districts, and sectors receive more loans following the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, controlling for funding demand and both health and economic conditions. Estimates from survey and observational data show that electoral politics and the allocation of government funds affect employment, small-business activity, and business applications.

As a new management reform adapting the development of the times, electronic human resource management (E-HRM) covers all possible integration mechanisms and contents between HRM and Information Technologies. E-HRM promotes employees' subject status with the network characteristics of openness and cooperation. Taking the theory of work adjustment as the instruction, this research studies the adaptive process induced by reconstructing the sense of matching when employees experience the reform, along with the influence of E-HRM on employee's initiative behavior from the perspective of job crafting. In total, 706 employees and their supervisors were investigated with matched questionnaire survey. The results show that: (1) E-HRM can stimulate employees' personal initiative behavior; (2) task crating, relational crafting and cognitive crafting as three dimensions of employees' job crafting, mediate the effect of E-HRM on personal initiative behavior and (3) the self-development motivation of employees' internet use plays a positive moderating role, steering self-oriented job crafting in the positive direction which conforms to the organizations' expectation.

The fundamental nature of humility and prosocial motivation entails transcending self-interest to enact behaviors that benefit others. We theorize that leader humility may enact a self-transcendent contagion effect that will manifest in enhanced follower prosocial motivation. Due to the fundamental nature of humility, this construct holds great promise in understanding how contextual signals (i.e., leader behaviors) shape prosocial motivation in followers. In this study, we find that leader humility impacts follower prosocial motivation through followers' perception of work meaningfulness. Specifically, we found that leader humility is positively related to prosocial motivation. We also found that this relationship is mediated by followers' perception of work meaningfulness, and that this mediation is moderated by followers' perception of relational vitality. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Research on firm-level corporate political activity often treats firm-government interactions as independent of the market competition between firms. Yet, firms that compete in the market will consider rivals when making strategic nonmarket decisions. Ignoring market rivalry when studying nonmarket strategy introduces fundamental endogeneity problems and potentially overlooks a central mechanism explaining firms’ political choices. Our study demonstrates this by investigating the strategic nonmarket interactions of large US tobacco manufacturers, a case study that is independently interesting. From 1992 to 2008, the US tobacco industry experienced dramatic upheaval in its business environment as regulatory authority shifted from the state to federal level, under the Food and Drug Administration. Using firm-candidate–cycle data, a complete information campaign contributions game, played in the nonmarket environment, is estimated for two of the United States’ largest tobacco manufacturers. Results demonstrate that, rather than acting in isolation, US tobacco firms strategically coordinated their firm-level political campaign contributions.