International investment law is a small part of the international economic law normative universe and whose distinctive characteristics form its constitutive legitimacy. Robert M. Cover once wrote in his famous “Nomos and Narrative” that “[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.” Norms cannot be understood if taken out of their context, their narrative. International investment law norms are a good example: international investment law norms are created in a specific context characterized by highly particularized features that are, arguably, found nowhere else. Taking an investment norm outside of its context would strip away its constitutive legitimacy and render it inapplicable and obsolete in another context and another narrative. In other words, for one to fully grasp the meaning of an international investment norm or practice, one has to understand the context in which it is generated and applied.

This chapter analyses the regime for shareholders’ claims respectively in domestic regimes, under the customary international law of diplomatic protection and in human rights law. It begins with the analysis of domestic regimes and the very broad application of the no-reflective loss principle. This prohibition is justified by policy considerations such as the protection of creditors. In the context of diplomatic protection in the realm of international law, the International Court of Justice also opted for the prohibition of shareholders’ claims for reflective loss, as demonstrated by its landmark judgement in Barcelona Traction. This chapter explains, however, that the decisions of the ICJ addressing shareholders’ claims are not applicable by analogy to international investment law and arbitration as a consequence of the specific context in which they were generally adopted: the customary international law of diplomatic protection. Finally, this chapter provides a brief overview of the prohibition of shareholders’ claims for reflective loss which has generally been adopted by human rights courts and is applicable in human rights law.

In this chapter, we hope to elucidate the definition of emotional intelligence (EI) and to provide support for homing in on one specific approach to its study: the ability approach, as developed by Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2016; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 1997; 2002; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), which most researchers adhere to (at least in a definitional sense). We will go on to review how research using this ability approach has related emotional intelligence to workplace predictors and outcomes; we will then point out gaps in current understanding and suggest promising future research directions.

This chapter addresses a second set of answers to parallel proceedings in the context of shareholders’ claims for reflective loss, the risks of double recovery, and the inconsistent decisions they lead to: a broader use of the mechanism of consolidation and mass claims in international investment arbitration. First, the mechanism of consolidation is analyzed in the context of investment arbitration by focusing on treaty practice and investment case law. This chapter explains why this mechanism can be useful to reduce instances of parallel proceedings and why it is particularly well suited in the context of such proceedings created by shareholders’ claims for reflective loss. The same analysis is undertaken with respect to the practice of mass claims in investment arbitration, and for similar reasons as with respect to consolidation, this chapter suggests a broader use of such multiparty proceedings in investment arbitration, especially with respect to shareholders’ claims for reflective loss.

Creativity and innovation play an important role in today’s work life as they are key to enhancing organizations’ competitiveness (e.g. Amabile, 1988; Anderson, Potočnik, & Zhou, 2014; Bledow, Frese, Anderson, Erez, & Farr, 2009). Creativity may be defined as a facet of innovation that refers to the generation and development of new and useful ideas (Amabile, 1983, 1996). Innovation, in contrast, is “the intentional introduction and application within a role, group or organization of ideas, processes, products or procedures, new to the relevant unit of adoption, designed to significantly benefit the individual, the group, the organization or wider society” (West & Farr, 1990, p. 9). In other words, whereas creativity refers to the generation of ideas, innovation additionally includes the implementation of those ideas.

Over the past decades it has become manifest that jealousy and envy may be quite prevalent within organizations (see e.g. Dogan & Vecchio, 2001; Smith, Merlone, & Duffy, 2017). Although the term “jealousy” is often used as more or less synonymous to “envy,” from a theoretical point of view jealousy and envy are evoked by different stimuli. Workplace jealousy refers to the negative thoughts and emotions that result from the interference by a coworker within a valued relationship at work, and may, for instance, be evoked when someone feels that his or her superior pays attention to a new colleague at the expense of the attention paid to him or her. In essence, workplace jealousy is triadic in that it involves three individuals: the focal employee, the rival, and the valued target person. In contrast, workplace envy is defined essentially in dyadic terms, and refers to the negative thoughts and emotions that result from the perception that a coworker has obtained outcomes or has capacities that one strongly desires (Vecchio, 2000). As noted by Sterling and Labianca (2015) “Envy is at its most basic level the pain felt at another’s good fortune” (p. 297; see also Tai, Narayanan, & McAllister, 2012). According to Parrott and Smith (1993), envy is characterized more by feelings of inferiority, longing, and resentment, whereas jealousy is characterized more by fear of loss, distrust, anxiety, and anger.

A classic comedy cliché is a man slipping on a banana peel, with audiences laughing as he struggles and falls again. From Shakespeare to the Three Stooges to modern sitcoms, slapstick comedy has had such a prominent place in entertainment that scholars have scratched their heads to understand why and how we seemingly enjoy the pain of others. Some propose that laughter is a way to release pent-up tension, while others suggest that laughter is a response to the incongruity inherent in comedy (Peacock, 2014). But how can we explain these feelings, derived from someone’s misfortune, in contexts such as the workplace, where such humor or pleasure are considered inappropriate?

This chapter analyses what is probably the biggest concern raised by shareholders’ claims for reflective loss: parallel proceedings and the risks they engender such as inconsistent decisions and double recovery. Parallel proceedings, which can lead to double recovery and inconsistent or contradictory decisions, can severely impact the legitimacy of international investment arbitration by creating uncertainty, inconsistency, and unfairness. This chapter scrutinizes the different types of parallel proceedings to which shareholders’ claims for reflective loss can lead. It also undertakes an in-depth analysis of the dangers created by parallel proceedings. Finally, this chapter focuses on a specific instance of parallel proceedings involving proceedings before domestic courts and international courts or tribunals. In particular, it is explained why traditional claim-limiting provisions found in international investment agreements are of limited practical use in the context of shareholders’ claims for reflective loss.

Extended beyond the previous chapter’s analysis of the main problems raised by parallel proceedings, this chapter proposes a first way in which such risks can be reduced or eliminated altogether: a broader application of international res judicata. This chapter starts by defining and explaining the concept of international res judicata by comparing it to the understanding of the same concept in both civil law and common law jurisdictions. It then proceeds to argue for a broader and realistic (i.e., more flexible) application of this principle, which should be qualified as a principle of customary international law. This chapter also briefly addresses the principles of estoppel and lis pendens in international law and explains why they can be useful to answer the risks associated with parallel proceedings in the context of shareholders’ claims for reflective loss.

In this chapter, we review the literature on leadership and emotion. Progress in understanding the junction of these two ideas has been steady but slow. To address this concern, at the conclusion of this chapter, we briefly discuss two theoretical obstacles that, in our view, have slowed progress. However, we begin with the larger substance of our chapter, which focuses on leaders’ affect at three levels of analysis – the overall climate, the work team, and, finally, the leader himself or herself. We show that leader emotion can be important at all three levels of analysis. At the highest level of analysis, leaders create emotional climate through personnel practices, by rewarding (or punishing) culturally appropriate emotion displays, and by their treatment of individual employees. Moving to teams and dyads, we will see that emotions can influence followers through contagion or emotional correspondence. Finally, looking within the leader, our review underscores how emotional intelligence is crucial for effective leadership.

A stigmatized identity refers to some socially devalued aspect of a person that (typically) cannot be changed and evokes negative stereotypes, attitudes, and behaviors from others (Quinn & Earnshaw, 2013). With the increase of protective laws, individuals with a stigmatized identity face less formal discrimination than in the past but continue to face substantial subtle and interpersonal discrimination (Ruggs, Martinez, & Hebl, 2011). While the majority of stigma research has focused on visible stigmatized identities, many stigmatized identities are simply not visible. It is this latter category on which the current chapter focuses. Invisible stigmatized identities are devalued aspects that an individual is generally able to conceal from others. Invisible and/or concealable stigmas may include lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer or questioning (LGBTQ+) identities; some disabilities; and multiracial and religious identities. For the remainder of the chapter, we will refer to such identities as “concealable stigmas” or “invisible stigmas.”