We tend to think of scientific knowledge as the paradigm case of what knowledge should look like. But the dominant image of science does not reflect what actually goes on in the making of scientific knowledge. Real scientific knowledge relies heavily on human judgment. And it relies heavily on communities.

Hugo Grotius is best known as one of the originators of international law. Philosophers of the period also saw him as making a fundamental break with ancient philosophy and Thomistic classical natural law deriving from Aristotle. Grotius carried forward an important distinction made by Francisco Suarez between “law” and “counsel.” Good moral reasons may counsel action without yet requiring it. Law, by contrast, obligates, and obligation is conceptually related to accountability. It concerns what we would be blameworthy for failing to do without excuse. Grotius develops a theory of natural rights and law and sets the philosophical agenda by asking what could ground such a law (Anscombe’s Challenge). His response is human “sociability,” by which he means not simply any desire to affiliate, but the drive to live with others on terms of mutual accountability.

Chapter 1 explores the concept of nihilism in two works by the German writer Jean Paul. In “The Dead Christ Proclaims That There Is No God,” Jean Paul tries to follow the scientifically based denial of God to its logical conclusion to show that this leads to a horrifying view that no one can accept. In the work, Christ descends down to earth and declares that there is no God. A terrible scene of death and destruction follows, which provides a powerful image of nihilism. The rest of the chapter analyzes the novella The Valley of Campan. While “The Dead Christ” was concerned with refuting the denial of God, this work tries to refute the denial of the doctrine of immortality. A small group takes an excursion in the Valley of Campan in the Pyrenees, and they discuss the issue of immortality as they go. Each member of the group tries to convince the scientist Karlson of the truth of immortality, but he stubbornly refutes all their arguments. However, in the end he capitulates to the idea since he cannot bear the thought of the complete and final destruction of his beloved Gione. The argument is that it is impossible to live a happy life without belief in immortality.

The Introduction to Kant on Freedom, Nature, and Judgment: The Territory of the Third Critique argues that the question that orients and unifies the Critique of Judgment is: For what may I hope? This question is fundamentally about the unity of the system of freedom and nature. What the Critique of Judgment develops is a third, independent, and mediating sphere of human experience that at once completes and expands the critical system. It accomplishes this through judgments of reflection that both pattern themselves after as well as refer us to life, understood as a causal unity of freedom and nature. The Introduction lays out the basic argument of the text, as well as situates the manuscript within the larger history of the reception of the third Critique in German Romanticism and Idealism, and later the neo-Kantians.

This chapter introduces the book’s approach and its main theses, ending with an overview of the Phaedo. I argue that the dialogue has an unfolding structure, in which claims made early are often explained only at later stages. I briefly lay out the distinct stages of Socrates’ accounts of the forms, of the soul, and of ethics. These are not three independent topics; instead, his ethical account is grounded in his account of the soul, which is in turn grounded in his account of the forms. Another important thread running through the dialogue is how Socrates responds to Simmias’ and Cebes’ fears by trying to help them acquire the right sort of rational confidence in their views. I also discuss how Socrates appropriates and transforms ideas from his religious, scientific, and literary context in articulating and defending his philosophical theories.

This introduction describes the place of formal logic in Hegel's logic and outlines the problem to which Hegel will respond: the logocentric predicament. It explains why this problem became important in the wake of Kant's critical philosophy, which Kant's idealist successors accused of relying on logic in an uncritcal way. It further goes into versions of the problem that have arisen in philosophy before Hegel and since, especially in Frege, Wittgenstein and more recent analytical philosophy. Finally, it distinguishes the approach I take to post-Kantian logic from that of Robert Pippin.

This book reconstructs and critically assesses the theories of property developed by Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Marx. It aims to clarify how these philosophers understood the concept of property and to explain their different views concerning the specific form that this concept ought to have in society. I emphasize how in the writings of these philosophers the idea of a pre-social and pre-political right to property is undermined by how social recognition forms a constitutive moment of the concept of property. Any account of how the concept of property is instantiated in specific property rights or forms of property must therefore accommodate this moment of social recognition. Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Marx are shown to provide different accounts of how this is achieved. Each time, however, the specific form of property is shown to be justified in terms of the same idea and value, namely freedom.

This chapter sets out the broad metaphysical picture that guides the inquiry. I derive a naturalist notion of kinds from the nineteenth-century discussion of classification and kinds initiated by Whewell, Mill, and Venn, rather than the more recent essentialist view of natural kinds suggested by Kripke and Putnam. I go on to defend a “simple causal theory” of cognitive kinds, which conceives of them as “nodes in causal networks” in the cognitive domain. In addition, I argue against the layer-cake picture of scientific domains and put forward some reasons to resist reductionism when it comes to cognitive categories, based on different bases for individuating cognitive and neural categories. Finally, I respond to some concerns that the resulting ontological picture is not a realist one, on the grounds that it countenances the existence of cognitive kinds that are mind-dependent and self-reflexive.

This book relies on two main assumptions. Here is the first one: suffering is bad. Being burned alive or starving to death make you suffer. They feel bad. If you could do something to prevent bad things from happening, or otherwise alleviate their impact on individuals, without thereby bringing about more bad things in the world, and without jeopardizing anything of similar or greater importance, you ought to do it. This is the second assumption.

This chapter introduces the two main questions that this book attempts to answer. First: Why powers? Second: What are powers like? It also discusses the overlap between metaphysics and science, some differences between powers and qualities, the relationship between properties and substances, how we can know powers, and different types of powers isms. The chapter then distinguishes between networking and nodal accounts of powers before previewing the central idea of the book: the 3d account of powers (a nodal account), which combines two core theses. The first is the Physical Intentionality Thesis, which concerns the fact of physical intentionality: that the power is directed toward manifestations. The second is the Informational Thesis, which concerns the content of physical intentionality: what the power is for or directed toward. Lastly, a roadmap for the rest of the book is provided.