Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time was published in 1927, and the text has been intensely discussed and studied ever since. Despite long-standing and unfolding controversies around Heidegger’s affiliation with the Nazis, Heidegger scholarship is ubiquitous. New editions and translations of Heidegger’s work appear regularly. Journals are dedicated exclusively to his philosophy. And countless papers and monographs draw on and address various themes in Heidegger’s writings. Why then another book on Heidegger’s philosophy? Why consider anew Heidegger’s magnum opus, about which so much ink has already been spilled?

This chapter refutes three interrelated feminist objections to Heidegger’s thought. Section 6.1 argues that the analytic of Dasein should not be seen as the elaboration of an implicitly masculine exemplar, but rather that it is the articulation of a structural essence, which can and has been productively employed by feminist philosophers. Section 6.2 suggests that far from erasing the issue of gender at an ontological level, Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s neutrality speaks to an anti-essentialist critique of binary gender. Finally, Section 6.3 offers an interpretation of authenticity as a form of genuine self-understanding – similar to Sandra Lee Bartky’s notion of developing a ‘feminist consciousness’ – which can work to critique and transform role-based relations and ‘inauthentic’ understandings prescribed by das Man. The aim of this chapter is thus to demonstrate that far from being inimical to feminist theorizing, Being and Time can be a fruitful resource for furthering feminist projects.

This chapter considers Heidegger’s “two-handedness” on the issue of realism versus idealism: on the one hand, an apparent realism about entities, while on the other, an apparent idealism about being. Interpreters tend to resolve the tensions such two-handedness engenders by giving one side or the other the upper hand. Kantian approaches to Heidegger privilege idealism, other readings favor realism. The latter readings neglect Heidegger’s own rather mocking remarks directed at those who fear idealism as “the foul fiend incarnate” and favor instead what he calls a “blind realism.” Properly understood, such remarks point toward a position beyond both realism and idealism, a position akin to, but importantly different from, Quine’s naturalism. Quine’s imagery of “working from within” and “mutual containment” provide models for a more evenhanded approach to the issue of realism and idealism. Moreover, they help us to understand Heidegger’s principal aim of rejecting both positions.

Authenticity plays key methodological and normative roles for early Heidegger: as he puts it, to ‘work out the question of Being adequately … we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being’. But the precise nature of those roles, and how Heidegger differs from other thinkers of authenticity, is much less clear. This chapter considers three possible interpretations of authenticity found in the contemporary literature. On a transcendental reading, authenticity is what allows us to first recognize reasons as such and act in light of norms at all. On a unity reading, authenticity unifies Dasein’s commitments, and thereby grants a special narrative or judgmental coherence to my life. Finally, on the structural reading, ultimately defended here, authenticity is an inchoate awareness of the structural features of normative space and of Dasein’s own way of being. It is only this interpretation, it is argued, that can make sense of Heidegger’s text and the centrality of authenticity within his early work.

This chapter begins by outlining Heidegger’s project of identifying the timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) of human existence as what is ontologically distinctive about it. The chapter also recounts how, in the context of establishing that distinctiveness, Heidegger demonstrates that timeliness to be the “original time,” that is, the origin of so-called “world-time” (Weltzeit) (the time of the workworld) and, via use of the clock, the origin of the purely serial time attributed to things on hand in nature. In the wake of this exposition and after flagging criticisms of Heidegger’s undertaking, the chapter examines Ernst Tugendhat’s influential criticism that Heidegger’s putative demonstration is invalid since it has recourse to serial time (“time in the normal sense”) and, hence, is viciously circular. The chapter ends with a sustained rebuttal of Tugendhat’s criticism.

Heidegger’s subordination of reason to “care” in Being and Time has exposed him to the charge of irrationalism. Against this view, I argue that Being and Time offers a “normativity-first” account in which reason, as reason-giving (logon didonai), is an ineluctable demand constitutive of authentic selfhood. Examining Heidegger’s rejection of the neo-Kantian equation of reason with logic in his 1929 Kantbuch, I explain the threads that connect what Heidegger calls “pure sensible reason” to his extensive phenomenological account, in Being and Time, of the “everyday” and “authentic” modes of Dasein’s care-structure. As authenticity’s discursive mode, the “call of conscience” is Dasein’s portal into normative space. As the essay “On the Essence of Ground” makes plain, Dasein’s response to the call involves answerability for what it holds to be best in its practical life, hence reason-giving. Such an origin of reason contrasts with rationalism only in eschewing any principle of sufficient reason.

Part of the fascination of Being and Time is that it seeks to weave together so many different strands of thought. But unsurprisingly, its readers also worry that such a work must subject itself to such strain that ultimately it itself must unravel. Key tensions are between the outlooks of three figures: Heidegger the pragmatist, Heidegger the existentialist, and Heidegger the philosopher of being. Seeing how openness to our concerns as a whole is both necessary for authenticity and reveals a unified horizon against which entities with different ways of being show themselves, dissipates these apparent tensions. Recognition of the mediating role played by a conception of the good – that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and Augustine inspired – helps make clear that authenticity is both compatible with the practical embeddedness of our concerns and reveals a form of understanding necessary for ontology to be possible.

Heidegger’s account of death plays a crucial role in the argument of Being and Time. There is, however, no broad consensus on how best to understand this account. An adequate interpretation of Heideggerian death should, first, explain how Heidegger distinguishes death from other phenomena such as “demise,” “perishing,” and “dying.” An adequate interpretation should also explain how relating to death in the right way transforms our existence – individualizing us and enabling an authentic form of being-in-the-world. In this chapter, I critique the “existential death interpretation” of Heideggerian death, and offer an alternative account – a modal interpretation. According to the modal interpretation, the death-demise distinction should be understood as the distinction between a possibility and an event that actualizes that possibility. The import of death is found in the way death modalizes all our other possibilities.

What does Heidegger mean by “curiosity” and why does he characterize it as a kind of epistemic vice, when most contemporary accounts view it as a virtue? Being and Time disparagingly notes that curiosity “concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known” (BT 217/172); the curious person busies herself with “entertaining ‘incidentals’” (BT 358/310). Building on previous work – wherein I argue that virtues are best understood as tendencies to cope well with existential obstacles to flourishing (McMullin 2019) – I show that curiosity as Heidegger frames it is an epistemically vicious misunderstanding of self and world arising in large part from our tendencies toward impatience, arrogance, and fear. Because Heidegger’s account of curiosity in Being and Time is not well-developed, we will look at nearby texts to get a better understanding of this sometimes-overlooked concept in Heidegger’s corpus.

This chapter explores the connection between Heidegger’s existentialism and fundamental ontology. Specifically, and contra John Haugeland who argues that existentialism is a key feature of fundamental ontology insofar as taking responsibility for our existence entails getting the being of entities right, this chapter argues that taking responsibility for our existence explicitly exhibits the temporal horizon that is fundamental for all our purpose activities and our understanding of entities, generally.

In this chapter, I examine arguments that have been or might be used to establish or defend the distinction that Heidegger draws between entities (things that are) and the being of entities (that by virtue of which those things are). I find these arguments for the ontological difference to fail – due largely to the self-concealing nature of being, which makes it difficult to distinguish being from entities. At the same time, I see something positive in these troubles for the ontological difference, that is, they serve as prompts to question the meaning of being.

Heidegger says very little about language in Being and Time, but he says quite a lot about “discourse” (Rede). What is discourse, according to Heidegger, and what is its relation to language? It is, he says, the “foundation” of language, so they cannot be identical. He also says that the “spoken expression” of discourse is language, but can discourse also be unspoken, or even nonlingustic? Remaining silent and the call of conscience, he also says, are kinds of discourse. In this chapter, I argue that what Heidegger means by “discourse” is communicative expression in a broad sense, which includes but is not limited to language. Expression and communication are, however, what discourse and language have in common. I show that competing accounts in the secondary literature either understate or overstate those features, which are essential to both linguistic and nonlinguistic cases of discourse