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Aquinas, as a good historian, reads the text of the Ethics closely and tries to work out Aristotle's intention, from the context and from other works. Aquinas's efforts to reconcile his interpretation of the chapter of the EN with his other views about Aristotle require us to understand "rational by participation" in two ways. Once we think more carefully about what historical accuracy might properly involve, we can see why it would be unreasonable to avoid philosophical judgments, and why it might be quite appropriate to rely on one's own philosophical judgment in the exposition of Aristotle. The question should not be about whether interpreters argue on the basis of their philosophical judgment, but about whether their judgment contributes to the understanding of Aristotle's intentions or of his achievement. If we want to reach a historically accurate account of Aristotle, we ought not to ignore Aquinas's contributions to this goal.
The author shows that Aquinas's commentary interprets Aristotle's remark about the destruction of virtue correctly. The author discusses Aquinas's concept of the will as a capacity for free choice: a notion central to his conviction that people can lose their virtue. The author considers two parts of his Ethics commentary where Aquinas clearly injects his own opinion: that virtues divide into principal and merely secondary virtues, and that disposition is something we exercise when we will. Aquinas's conviction that virtuous people can lose their virtue through moral backsliding carries with it a more cheering corollary: with enough time and effort, vicious people can improve. In both cases the individual's power of free choice gives her the capacity to change her character. As Aquinas's ethical theory denies that anyone on earth is infallibly virtuous, so it denies that anyone on earth is incurably vicious.
Aquinas, as a good historian, reads the text of the Ethics closely and tries to work out Aristotle's intention, from the context and from other works. Aquinas's efforts to reconcile his interpretation of the chapter of the EN with his other views about Aristotle require us to understand "rational by participation" in two ways. Once we think more carefully about what historical accuracy might properly involve, we can see why it would be unreasonable to avoid philosophical judgments, and why it might be quite appropriate to rely on one's own philosophical judgment in the exposition of Aristotle. The question should not be about whether interpreters argue on the basis of their philosophical judgment, but about whether their judgment contributes to the understanding of Aristotle's intentions or of his achievement. If we want to reach a historically accurate account of Aristotle, we ought not to ignore Aquinas's contributions to this goal.
Aquinas extends Aristotle's narrow concern with questions of truthfulness and falsehood about oneself to a more general consideration of truth and lies as such. The first section of this chapter promotes EN 4.7 within the larger contexts of EN 4.6-8 and EN 4 itself; this gives us a good idea of what Aristotle himself regards as distinctive about the virtue (and corresponding vices) discussed in EN 4.7. The second and third sections are devoted to detailed exegesis of the very finespun analysis conducted by Aristotle in EN 4.7. The detail is necessary in order to clearly show the coherence of Aquinas's interpretation. The fourth section looks directly at this interpretation as set out in Aquinas's Ethics commentary. This chapter examines the relationship between ST 2-2.109-113 and EN 4.7, noting a surprising connection with Augustine. Aquinas exposes things that are not found in EN 4.7.
The ethics of Thomas Aquinas should be counted among the most fruitful and influential approaches to moral philosophy. It is often seen as the medieval counterpart to the towering achievements of ancient and modern ethics produced by thinkers like Aristotle and Immanuel Kant. This chapter provides a rough sketch of Aristotle's influence on Aquinas's ethics. It provides views on Aquinas's commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (EN), the Sententia libri Ethicorum. Aquinas's views on the will imply that the systematic structure of his action theory and ethics differs from Aristotle's in an important respect. Aquinas does not merely assume that the will, as a rational appetite, is a distinct power of the soul. For Aquinas, the most fundamental action of a human being is the internal act of the will, which is completed when the will accepts one course of action proposed by reason (Perkams).
This chapter principally considers the scheme of the cardinal virtues in ST 2-2, which Aquinas developed in order to organize comprehensively the subject matter of ethics. It discusses key differences in ethical method between Aristotle and Aquinas Aquinas develops Aristotle's ethical theory in the EN by resolving difficulties inherent in the EN, drawing on principles taken from Aristotle to do so. He does so as part of a project that he regards as primarily speculative, accounting for the truth of things, and not merely practical, aiming at the good. Ethical theory, if it is true, must have a formal structure, consistent with the best contemporary accounts of the world, and that admits of being more deeply articulated as investigation proceeds and deepens. Aquinas's virtue ethics has a clever, deep, and compelling rational structure. Its claim to truth depends crucially on the claims to truth of Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics.
The ethics of Thomas Aquinas should be counted among the most fruitful and influential approaches to moral philosophy. It is often seen as the medieval counterpart to the towering achievements of ancient and modern ethics produced by thinkers like Aristotle and Immanuel Kant. This chapter provides a rough sketch of Aristotle's influence on Aquinas's ethics. It provides views on Aquinas's commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (EN), the Sententia libri Ethicorum. Aquinas's views on the will imply that the systematic structure of his action theory and ethics differs from Aristotle's in an important respect. Aquinas does not merely assume that the will, as a rational appetite, is a distinct power of the soul. For Aquinas, the most fundamental action of a human being is the internal act of the will, which is completed when the will accepts one course of action proposed by reason (Perkams).
The author shows that Aquinas's commentary interprets Aristotle's remark about the destruction of virtue correctly. The author discusses Aquinas's concept of the will as a capacity for free choice: a notion central to his conviction that people can lose their virtue. The author considers two parts of his Ethics commentary where Aquinas clearly injects his own opinion: that virtues divide into principal and merely secondary virtues, and that disposition is something we exercise when we will. Aquinas's conviction that virtuous people can lose their virtue through moral backsliding carries with it a more cheering corollary: with enough time and effort, vicious people can improve. In both cases the individual's power of free choice gives her the capacity to change her character. As Aquinas's ethical theory denies that anyone on earth is infallibly virtuous, so it denies that anyone on earth is incurably vicious.
This chapter principally considers the scheme of the cardinal virtues in ST 2-2, which Aquinas developed in order to organize comprehensively the subject matter of ethics. It discusses key differences in ethical method between Aristotle and Aquinas Aquinas develops Aristotle's ethical theory in the EN by resolving difficulties inherent in the EN, drawing on principles taken from Aristotle to do so. He does so as part of a project that he regards as primarily speculative, accounting for the truth of things, and not merely practical, aiming at the good. Ethical theory, if it is true, must have a formal structure, consistent with the best contemporary accounts of the world, and that admits of being more deeply articulated as investigation proceeds and deepens. Aquinas's virtue ethics has a clever, deep, and compelling rational structure. Its claim to truth depends crucially on the claims to truth of Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics.
The virtue of courage has long been central to debates over the relationship between Aristotle and Aquinas. The chapter provides a fresh look at Aquinas's relationship to the Nicomachean Ethics by returning to the core primary texts on courage that bear on Aquinas's appropriation of Aristotle: the Nicomachean Ethics itself, Albert the Great's first commentary on the EN, Aquinas's commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences (Scriptum super libros Sententiarum), his commentary on the EN (Sententia libri Ethicorum), and the Summa theologiae. Aquinas divides the virtues into those concerned with interior passions and those concerned with external actions. Aquinas discussion of fortitude is largely consistent with the expositions offered in the Sentences commentary and the SLE. Courage on Aquinas's own account is most perfectly realized in the endurance of martyrdom, which clings to the Divine good by grace. Courage fully articulated is dramatically different from courage as understood by Aristotle.
The soldier's pole is fall'n: young boys and girls Are equal bow with men: the odds are gone, And there is nothing left remarkable Beneath the visiting moon.
Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, 4.15.67–70
The works of William Shakespeare often look back from the early modern period upon the sensibilities of the medieval world, illuminating similar anxieties about culture, identity, ethnicity, and gender. In his plays, taboo subjects of medieval literature and history are given centre stage, acted out for an early modern audience coming to grips with its own fraught place in history. Shakespeare's dramas (Antony and Cleopatra perhaps more explicitly and completely than any other) feature numerous instances of emasculation, yet these are seldom considered in corporeal terms. Recent scholarship on early modern castration shares a number of curious features: the majority of the discussion takes place in relation to a very select number of Shakespearean sources, and the references are invariably contextualized through psycho-analytic theories of phallic lack. Through the new historicist and cultural materialist turn of late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century academia, Shakespeare has become recognized as the spokesperson for Western sensibility in general, not just a historical time and place in particular – and the deep-seated fear of effeminization or castration that is extracted from his work does indeed often appear more modern than early modern. The anachronistic moves that have been made in these studies can be conceptualized through three specific types of ‘cuts’: a temporal cut that removes Shakespeare's plays from their contemporary contexts; a textual cut that removes drama from its social functions; and finally an often horrifying and graphically illustrated corporeal cut found in early modern medical compendia.
Castration is a topic that both repels and interests, provoking profound feelings of horror and intrigue. Castrates have filled many roles: musician, singer, clergyman, historian, inventor, warrior, general, and advisor. The modern world has been shaped greatly by the influence of castrates, but most people have little to no concept of a castrate's life, especially when the common belief is that in the modern period all forms of castration have disappeared. Castrates tend to be the butt of humorous anecdotes, the victims of vicious invective, and the focus of righteous indignation and pity. Modern popular depictions of castrates and castration often attempt to present them humorously, thereby nullifying the horror of castration. However, as the articles in this volume attest, modern scholars are developing an interest in the factual experiences of castration and the information these facts can provide about the past. Castration can shed light on past mores, thought, and culture and is being studied by a diverse range of academic disciplines, such as gender, history, medicine, and music, but one field which has yet to undertake a study of castration is archaeology.
Archaeology has much to offer the study of castration. History shows that numerous castrates existed at varying times and in widely diverse areas of the world; archaeology may substantiate their existence and numbers, confirming historical accounts and elucidating further the cultures in which they existed.