Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy of Mind
The Computational Theory of Mind
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 November 2023
Summary
The Computational Theory of Mind says that the mind is a computing system. It has a long history going back to the idea that thought is a kind of computation. Its modern incarnation relies on analogies with contemporary computing technology and the use of computational models. It comes in many versions, some more plausible than others. This Element supports the theory primarily by its contribution to solving the mind-body problem, its ability to explain mental phenomena, and the success of computational modelling and artificial intelligence. To be turned into an adequate theory, it needs to be made compatible with the tractability of cognition, the situatedness and dynamical aspects of the mind, the way the brain works, intentionality, and consciousness.
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- Series: Elements in Philosophy of MindOnline ISBN: 9781009183734Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 07 December 2023
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