Element contents
Series: Elements in Ethics
Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 March 2021
Summary
There is presently a debate between Subjectivists and Objectivists about moral wrongness. Subjectivism is the view that the moral status of our actions, whether they are morally wrong or not, is grounded in our subjective circumstances – either our beliefs about, or our evidence concerning, the world around us. Objectivism, on the other hand, is the view that the moral status of our actions is grounded in our objective circumstances – all those facts other than those which comprise our subjective circumstances. A third view, Ecumenism, has it that the moral status of our actions is grounded both in our subjective and our objective circumstances. After outlining and evaluating the various arguments both against Subjectivism and against Objectivism, this Element offers a tentative defense of Objectivism about moral wrongness.
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- Series: Elements in EthicsOnline ISBN: 9781108588249Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 15 April 2021
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