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Series:   Elements in Philosophy of Mind

Bayesian Models of the Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2025

Michael Rescorla
Michael Rescorla
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles

Summary

Bayesian decision theory is a mathematical framework that models reasoning and decision-making under uncertain conditions. The Bayesian paradigm originated as a theory of how people should operate, not a theory of how they actually operate. Nevertheless, cognitive scientists increasingly use it to describe the actual workings of the human mind. Over the past few decades, cognitive science has produced impressive Bayesian models of mental activity. The models postulate that certain mental processes conform, or approximately conform, to Bayesian norms. Bayesian models offered within cognitive science have illuminated numerous mental phenomena, such as perception, motor control, and navigation. This Element provides a self-contained introduction to the foundations of Bayesian cognitive science. It then explores what we can learn about the mind from Bayesian models offered by cognitive scientists.
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Keywords

Bayesian decision theorymental representationBayesian cognitive sciencesubjective probabilityconditionalization

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Element
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Series: Elements in Philosophy of Mind
Online ISBN: 9781108955973
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 30 January 2025

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Bayesian Models of the Mind
  • Michael Rescorla, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Online ISBN: 9781108955973
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Bayesian Models of the Mind
  • Michael Rescorla, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Online ISBN: 9781108955973
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Bayesian Models of the Mind
  • Michael Rescorla, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Online ISBN: 9781108955973
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