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Series:   Elements in Ethics

Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2020

Neil Sinclair
Neil Sinclair
Affiliation:
University of Nottingham

Summary

Ethical subjectivists hold that moral judgements are descriptions of our attitudes. Expressivists hold that they are expressions of our attitudes. These views cook with the same ingredients – the natural world, and our reactions to it – and have similar attractions. This Element assesses each of them by considering whether they can accommodate three central features of moral practice: the practicality of moral judgements, the phenomenon of moral disagreement, and the mind-independence of some moral truths. In the process, several different versions of subjectivism are distinguished (simple, communal, idealising, and normative) and key expressivist notions such as 'moral attitudes' and 'expression' are examined. Different meanings of 'subjective' and 'relative' are examined and it is considered whether subjectivism and expressivism make ethics 'subjective' or 'relative' in each of these senses.
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Keywords

ethicssubjectivismrelativismexpressivismmoral disagreement

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Type
Element
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Series: Elements in Ethics
Online ISBN: 9781108581134
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 10 September 2020

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Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism
  • Neil Sinclair, University of Nottingham
  • Online ISBN: 9781108581134
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Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism
  • Neil Sinclair, University of Nottingham
  • Online ISBN: 9781108581134
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Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism
  • Neil Sinclair, University of Nottingham
  • Online ISBN: 9781108581134
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