Element contents
Series: Elements in Ethics
Moore's Ethics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 August 2020
Summary
This Element critically surveys the full range of G. E. Moore's ethical thought, including: (1) his rejection of naturalism in favor of the view that 'good' designates a simple, indefinable property, which cannot be identified with or reduced to any other property; (2) his understanding of intrinsic value, his doctrine of organic wholes, his repudiation of hedonism, and his substantive account of the most important goods and evils; and (3) his critique of egoism and subjectivism and his elaboration of a non-hedonistic variant of utilitarianism that, among other things, creatively blends aspects of act- and rule-oriented versions of that theory.
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- Series: Elements in EthicsOnline ISBN: 9781108581295Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 24 September 2020
References
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