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Between the expert and majority rules

Part of: Mathematical economics Operations research and management science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2016

Daniel Berend  and
Luba Sapir
Daniel Berend*
Affiliation:
Ben-Gurion University
Luba Sapir*
Affiliation:
Ben-Gurion University
*
∗ Postal address: Departments of Mathematics and of Computer Science, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel.
∗∗ Postal address: Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel. Email address: lsapir@cs.bgu.ac.il
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Abstract

Sapir (1998) calculated the probabilities of the expert rule and of the simple majority rule being optimal under the assumption of exponentially distributed logarithmic expertise levels. Here we find the analogous probabilities for the family of restricted majority rules, including the above two extreme rules as special cases, and the family of balanced expert rules. We compare the two families, the rules within each family, and all rules of the two families with the extreme rules.

Keywords

Dichotomous choice modelexpertdecision rulebalanced expert rulerestricted majority ruleprobability being optimallogarithmic expertise levelpartial information

MSC classification

Primary: 91B06: Decision theory 91B12: Voting theory 90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives

Information

Type
General Applied Probability
Information
Advances in Applied Probability , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , December 2003 , pp. 941 - 960
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 2003 

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