1. In the view of Zini, Eliyahu Rahamim, Rabanan savor'ai ve-kelale ha-halakhah (Haifa: Ofakim Reḥavim, 1992), 285–300Google Scholar, this approach was sustained within the world of Halakhah until the end of the geonic period. Though jurisprudential rules had begun appearing as early as the early Amoraim, these were applied only in exceptional cases.

2. For a general introduction and detailed discussion of amoraic jurisprudential rules referring to tannaitic literature, see Halivni, Ephraim Betsalel, Kelale pesak ha-halakhah ba-talmud (Lod: Mekhon Haberman Le-meḥkere Sifrut, 1999)Google Scholar and Yehuda Brandes, “Re'shitam shel kelale ha-pesikah” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 2002).

3. Brandes, Yehuda, “Mahapekhat ha-pesikah shel Rabbi Yoḥanan: Kelale ha-pesikah,” in Be-darke shalom: ‘Iyyunim be-hagut ha-yehudit mugashim le-Shalom Rosenberg, ed. Ish-Shalom, B. (Jerusalem: Beit Morashah, 2007), 515–35Google Scholar.

4. The first compositions to offer such lists of rules are works of the geonic period: Hilkhot dayanin and Halakhot keẓuvot mi-bene ma‘aravah, which later were incorporated with Sefer halakhot gedolot (ed. Esriel Hildesheimer, 3:12, 17–18), and Seder tanna'im ve-’amora'im, which appears to have developed not as a book per se, but as several lists of rules that at a relatively late date were redacted as a book (Kalman Kahana, ed. [Frankfurt am Main: 1935]). This was demonstrated by Marx, Alexander in the introduction to his essay “Neue Texte des Seder Tannaim we-Amoraim,” in Festschrift zu Israel Lewy's siebzigstem Geburtstag, ed. Brann, M. and Elbogen, J. (Breslau: M. R. H. Marcus, 1911Google Scholar; also printed separately in pamphlet form), 1–8. It is clear from the various surviving textual variants of the book that it is not a single compilation that has come down to us in a variety of versions, but quite the opposite—a conglomeration of disparate compilations that were combined into one. It stands to reason that the material for these compilations was drawn from jurisprudential traditions practiced in geonic study halls.

For an overview of the relevant MSS and the present state of scholarship on this work, see Stampfer, Yehuda Zvi, “Hilkheta’ ke-batra'i (The Law Is in Accordance with the Later Sages): Various Approaches in the Geonic Period,” Jewish Law Annual 22 (2000/2001–2003/2004)Google Scholar: 418 nn. 6–7. Some of these rulings and principles made their way into transmissions of the Talmud during the savoraic or the early geonic period, as demonstrated by Zini, Rabanan savor'ai, 71–209, 281–366. See also Milgram, Jonathan, “Methodological Musings on the Study of ‘Kelalei pesak’: ‘Hilkheta ke-Rav be-’Issurei ve-khi-Shemu'el be-Dinei,’” Journal of Jewish Studies 61, no. 2 (2010): 278–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

The present essay is concerned not with these relatively belated rules, but with purely amoraic pronouncements concerning debates between Tannaim. For this purpose, the contribution of later compilations of rules is solely the collection of these statements within books of rules in a manner that facilitated their construal as rules per se, as opposed to rulings specific to a given discussion.

5. Urbach, Ephraim E. notes as much in his essay “Masoret ve-halakhah,” Tarbiz 50 (1981): 136–63Google Scholar (reprinted in idem, Me-‘olamam shel ḥakhamim: Koveẓ ma'amarim [Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988], 67–70). In his view, this approach was a continuation of Halakhah as long practiced, an “institutional” corpus that “continued to be formulated in the style of defined rulings, issued in accordance with the laws of the Torah.”

6. The introduction situates the story within the context of the halakhic ties between Ula and the sages of Babylonia. B. Niddah 20b notes that Ula refrained from examining blood samples when in Pumbedita, perhaps out of reticence to issue a halakhic ruling within the jurisdiction of Rav Yehudah, so that it was necessary to send Rav Yiẓḥak to discover what his practice was. We find in several instances that he was critical of the actions of the sages of Babylonia, or specifically those of Rav Yehudah and his son Rav Yiẓḥak (B. Shabbat 147a; B. Pesaḥim 88a; B. Kiddushin 71a), yet Babylonian Jews’ reactions to his comments (B. Niddah 20a) testify to their esteem for his rulings. See Albeck, Chanoch, Mavo’ la-talmudim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969), 302–4Google Scholar. For further discussion of the meaning of the term ’iklaʿ in the Babylonian Talmud, see Cohen, Avinoam, “Le-mashma‘ut ha-historit ha-gelumah ba-munaḥ ‘'iklaʿ rav ploni,’” Sidra 15 (1999): 51–64Google Scholar.

7. Refreshments of a sort commonly described by the Talmud as offered to guests or visitors; see B. Shabbat 74a; B. Eruvin 52a; B. Ḥullin 106a.

8. MSS Munich 6, Munich 95 add: “and come and tell me” (ותא ואימא לי).

9. MS Munich 95: “through the agency of Abbaye” (ביד אביי).

10. Numerous variants appear in the manuscripts. The printed version expresses criticism of the son's personal traits. The variant in MS Lunzer–Sassoon, “your authority and your rabbinic office” (שררותך ורבנותך), indicates that the son's rabbinic stature caused him to send Abbaye instead of going himself. The remainder of the manuscripts contain variations on and syntheses of these two basic possibilities. Throughout the preparation of the present article, I consulted MSS using the Sol and Evelyn Henkind Talmud Text Database of the Saul Lieberman Institute. This is the place to acknowledge the profound contributions of the database to the study of the Talmud.

11. MS Munich 6: “that the tradition will not be stated in his name” (דלא תיתמר שמעתא משמיה). MS New York – JTS Rab. 1608 (ENA 850): “that you cannot state the tradition in your name” (דלא תימא שמעתא משמך). MS New York – Columbia X 893 T 14a: “that the tradition will not be stated from his mouth” (דלא תיתמר שמועתא מפומיה), i.e., “will not be recited in your name.”

12. See discussion below of the importance of transmitting a tradition in the name of its author.

13. For examples of letters containing halakhic rulings, see B. Shabbat 115a: “A letter has come from the West in the name of R. Yoḥanan that it is forbidden”; B. Bava Batra 41b: “I can bring you a letter from the West that the law is not as R. Shimon b. Elazar”; B. Sanhedrin 29a: “We can bring a letter from the West that the law is not as R. Yehudah”; B. Shevuot 48b: “I can bring a letter from the West that the law is not as R. Elazar.” These missives were taken as decisive proofs in jurisprudential debates among the Amoraim of Babylonia. See Lifshitz, Berechyahu, “The Legal Status of the Responsa Literature,” Jewish Law Annual 9–10 (1981/1982–1982/1983): 279Google Scholar, and see notes there.

14. Thus MS Munich 95.

15. This comment, earlier attributed to Karna, explains that Jacob had his sons go to the trouble of conveying him to the Land of Israel for burial so that he would not suffer the pain of rolling through subterranean tunnels upon returning to life in the Time to Come. Following this tradition, the letter conveys the brothers’ demand that Rabbah migrate to the Land of Israel. They encourage him to come to study under R. Yoḥanan.

16. Ethical instructions sent to Rabbah by his brothers for him to follow if he chose not to come to the Land of Israel. For a possible link between these instructions and criticism of his remaining in the Diaspora, see Brandes, Yehuda, ’Aggadah le-ma‘aseh, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Beit Morashah, 2012), 272–75Google Scholar.

17. MS Vatican 130: “Yeshayah” (ישעיה).

18. The baraita appears to be cited here not as part of the halakhic dictum, but as a relatively late interpretive addition whose purpose is to explain what is meant by the word “mules.” Brief talmudic rulings unrelated to the passage at hand typically are accompanied by the source material to which they refer; see examples below.

19. See M. Kil'ayim 8:4; T. Kil'ayim 5:5. The Mishnah cites the view of R. Yehudah that the mare is the determining factor: any two animals to which female horses gave birth may be interbred even if the sires were jacks, and vice versa. Animals birthed by female horses, however, may not be interbred with animals birthed by jennies, notwithstanding the fact that all are designated mules. In the Tosefta, the sages disagree with Rav Yehudah, opining that all mules belong to a single species. The fact that these three Amoraim found it necessary to rule in accordance with the view of R. Yehudah attests that they were not yet familiar with, or else did not accept, the principles espoused by R. Yoḥanan for deriving legal conclusions from the Mishnah, although they were his contemporaries and were active in his study hall. The rule that the law follows an unattributed view in the Mishnah that is the subject of debate in a baraita may have been formulated later by R. Abbahu (B. Ketubbot 46b); see Brandes, “Mahapekhat ha-pesikah shel Rabbi Yoḥanan.” The passage in B. Ḥullin appears to indicate that Shmuel viewed the Mishnah as recording a view held exclusively by R. Yehudah and thus ruled in accordance with the sages cited by the baraita (B. Ḥullin 79a).

20. Thus MS Petersburg – RNL Evr I 187.

21. The words “some say: ‘Reish Lakish’” are absent in MS Vatican 113 and MS Vatican 130.

22. MS Vatican 130: “<Yeshayah—I do not know which> {Oshayah—Reish Lakish said, “This is Hoshayah Be-rabbi}” (ישעיה איני יודע איזהו) [אושעי' א”ר לקיש זה הושעי' ברבי). The anomalous version of the text in the MS appears preferable to the others, in accordance with the principle of lectio difficilior potior, as well as because Rav Oshayah's generation preceded that of the sages who appear in connection with the ruling and letter. The anomalous text of the MS also is buttressed by the entry on Yishmael b. Kimḥit in ‘Erke tanna'im ve-’amora'im.

23. See B. Ḥullin 78a–79b. According to the Babylonian Talmud, the sages are of the view that “we do not concern ourselves with the seed of the father,” so that the sole factor to be considered is the species of the mother. R. Yehudah, meanwhile, opines that the species of the father also is of consequence. The Babylonian Talmud thus associates the debate concerning mules with the question of whether the prohibition against slaughtering a domestic animal and its parent on a single day pertains to the father. See Tosafot, B. Ḥullin 79a, s.v. ’ayyel li. The rubric “mules” might alternately have been interpreted to imply a distinction between the law in the case of breeding mules and that pertaining to slaughtering both an animal and its offspring, limiting the endorsement of R. Yehudah's view to the topic of forbidden mixtures, as opposed to the concurrent slaughter of animals. (For examples of such rubrics, see below.) As much may be understood from the comments of Yaakov b. Meir Tam in the Tosafot, ibid. Such a hypothesis, however, is inadmissible, because the linkage between the two debates is a contrivance of the unattributed text of the Talmud in B. Ḥullin, with which the early Amoraim apparently were unfamiliar. cf. Y. Kila'im 8:1 (31c); Y. Shabbat 5:5 (7b): “R. Yiẓḥak b. Naḥman [said] in the name of R. Oshayah, “The law is in accordance with the student. According to the sages, there is [but] a single species of mules.” See the lengthy discussion in Moses Margolies, Pene Mosheh, Mare’ panim, on the relationship between the Palestinian and the Babylonian transmission.

24. The synthesis of aggadic and halakhic dicta in the letter is surprising. It is possible that the combination was coincidental: the first topic represents the purpose of the communication, while the latter two happened to be current at the time of its dispatch. However, there are those who attempted to find a logical link between these disparate matters. See Sefer yoḥasin, essay 2, “Sequence of Amoraim,” § Resh, s.v. Rabbah b. Naḥmani; Yaakob Reischer, ‘Iyyun Ya‘ akov (commentary to ‘Ein Ya‘ akov), B. Ketubbot; Moses Schreiber, Novellae, B. Ḥullin 80a, s.v. ve-hine shilḥe ketubbot.

25. Rav Naḥman b. Yiẓḥak was a fifth-generation Babylonian Amora. Rabbah's brothers, who were contemporaries of these scholars, may not have needed to specify and indeed did not even invoke a rabbinic title in referring to them, because all were peers in the study hall of R. Yoḥanan.

26. On letters from the Land of Israel to Babylonia, see above. Aside from such dispatches, there is ample documentation concerning scholars who migrated from the Land of Israel to Babylonia or vice versa and brought with them dicta and sources: “When Rav Hoshayah came from Nehardea, he came and brought a baraita in hand” (B. Shabbat 19b, et al.); “When Ravin and all those who descended [from the Land of Israel to Babylonia] came, they said it” (B. Ḥullin 101b).

27. Brandes, “Re'shitam shel kelale ha-pesikah,” 225–26.

28. In invoking the Talmud, I refer to unattributed comments (stam), which generally are regarded as a source that postdates the text of the amoraic or tannaitic statements as such that are quoted within it. This approach is based on the prevailing scholarship in recent generations, which regards unattributed talmudic matter as postamoraic: Weiss, Abraham, The Talmud in Its Development [in Hebrew] (New York: Feldheim, 1954)Google Scholar; Halivni, David Weiss, introductions to the various volumes of his series Mekorot u-mesorot: Mekorot u-mesorot: Bi'urim ba-talmud le-seder nashim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968)Google Scholar; Mekorot u-mesorot: Bi'urim ba-talmud le-seder mo‘ed, 3 vols. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975–82)Google Scholar; Mekorot u-mesorot: Bi'urim ba-talmud—masekhet Bava Kamma (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1993)Google Scholar; Mekorot u-mesorot: Bi'urim ba-talmud—masekhet Bava Kamma (Jersualem: Magnes, 2003)Google Scholar; Friedman, Shamma, “A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction” [in Hebrew], in Texts and Studies, Analecta Judaica, ed. Dimitrovsky, H. Z. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1977), 275–441Google Scholar; Friedman, introductory chapters of Talmud ‘arukh: BT Bava Meẓiʿa perek shishi (Jerusalem: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1996)Google Scholar.

29. B. Yevamot 91a; also B. Ketubbot 19a and B. Bava Batra 133a.

30. M. Avot 6:6; cf. B. Ta‘anit 24a; Rashi, s.v., ’amar leh Rav Ashi.

31. B. Avodah Zarah 7b–8a, which records a trilateral tannaitic debate concerning the appropriate point for inclusion of personal requests in the Amidah, records Shmuel's ruling with the words: “Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel, ‘The law is, one prays for his [personal] needs only in [the blessing of] “who hears prayer.”’” However, Aḥa of Sabḥa, She'iltot (Va-yakhel, §75; ed. Mirsky, 210–11), reads: “Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel, ‘The law is in accordance with the sages.’” In the view of Naphtali Berlin (Ha-‘emek she'alah, § 46), the reading given by R. Aḥa is a purposeful deviation from the Talmud. Notwithstanding, Jacob Nahum Epstein opines that Rav Aḥa had before him a different version of the Talmud, and the discrepancy thus represents two disparate means of expressing a ruling.

32. B. Menaḥot 30b: “Then let the [contemporary] master say, ‘The law is as the [earlier] master,’ and the [other contemporary] master say, ‘The law is as the [other earlier] master!’ [It is not so] because some invert them [i.e., the names].” The Tosafot, s.v., ve-lema mar, note that this question is raised in certain cases, but left unasked in others, “and there is need to give a reason in those other places where it does not raise a challenge.” See also Tosafot, B. Shabbat 54a, s.v., Rav ’amar, where the halakhic ruling given ad loc. is questioned: “Let the master say, ‘The law follows the master,’ and explain, ‘Because there are those who invert [the names of] the Tannaim’!” In the view of the Tosafists, this answer is representative of the rule: wherever a ruling is given but the name of the particular sage who pronounced it omitted, there were discrepant versions of the given tradition that inverted the names of the scholars involved. See also the suggestion of the Tosafot, B. Bava Meẓiʿa 38b, s.v., ha-yored, aside from the problem of discrepant traditions, that “they had not heard the baraita,” i.e., they were entirely unaware that Tannaim had debated the issue.

33. B. Ketubbot 111b.

34. Concerning the formulation of amoraic traditions with reference to tannaitic sources, see Aminoah, Noah, “Signonot ha-shma‘ata’ be-talmudim ve-hashpa‘atam ‘al ḥilufe girsa'ot,” World Congress of Jewish Studies 3, no. 10, vol. 1 (1989): 77–84Google Scholar.

35. In B. Pesaḥim 100a the Talmud quotes R. Yoḥanan as stating that “the law is as R. Yehudah regarding Passover eve, and the law is as R. Yose regarding Sabbath eve.” This dictum may be construed as referring to either of two juxtaposed debates in the Tosefta, concerning the permissibility of eating on the eve of the Sabbath or a festival from Minḥah, and concerning whether individuals engaged in a meal must stop when the Sabbath commences (T. Berakhot 5:1–2; Y. Pesaḥim 10:1 [34d]). A discussion in B. Yevamot 91a, meanwhile, relates to two debates within a single mishnah: “And if you say, ‘If I said, “the law is as R. Shimon,” this would indicate [that it were so] even regarding the first [statement],’ then say, ‘The law is as R. Shimon regarding the latter [statement]’!”

36. E.g., B. Sukkah 11a: “Then let him say, ‘The law is as R. Yehudah!’ If he had said ‘The law is as R. Yehudah,’ I would have said [i.e., understood], this refers to a [regular] bed, as it is made for [the purpose of sleeping on] its back, but a canopied bed, which is made for its inside—I would say not. [Therefore] he informs us, R. Yehudah's reason is that a temporary tent cannot come and annul a permanent tent, no matter whether a [regular] bed or a canopied bed.” A similar dynamic is at play in B. Ketubbot 68a.

37. This style of adjudication, which forges a middle path between two polar opinions, is known as hakhra‘ah. Epstein, Jacob Nahum investigated the concept in Mevo'ot le-sifrut ha-tann'aim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957), 205–11Google Scholar.

38. Y. Bava Kamma 2:6 (3a): “Rav Yirmiyah [said] in the name of Rav, ‘The law is as R. Meir regarding an innocuous [animal] and as R. Yudah regarding deposition.’” B. Bava Kamma 24a cites two contradictory conciliatory rulings on this debate. A conciliation with relevance to a wider range of laws is offered to settle a debate between R. Yehudah and R. Yose concerning the status of the twilight hour: “Rabbah b. Bar Ḥannah said in the name of R. Yoḥanan, ‘The law is as R. Yehudah regarding the Sabbath, and the law is as R. Yose regarding terumah’” (B. Shabbat 35a).

39. B. Yevamot 64b.

40. Such a situation is described in Y. Kila'im 9 (32a): “Rav said, ‘It is forbidden, and the law is as he who forbids.’ Why then did he not say ‘as R. Eliezer’? There are Tannaim who recite inversely.” See Epstein, Jacob Nahum, Mavo’ le-nusaḥ ha-mishnah, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2000), 133Google Scholar. Thus in Y. Taʿanit 2 (66b), and widely elsewhere. At Y. Hor'ayot 3:4 (48b), concerning a tannaitic debate about the definition of “his master who taught him wisdom,” the Palestinian Talmud recounts that “R. Abbahu came [and said] in the name of R. Yoḥanan, ‘The law is as the one who says “Anyone from whom is the majority of his scholarship.”’ Why then did he not resolve it [by saying] ‘As R. Yudah’? There are Tannaim who recite and invert [it].” At B. Bava Meẓi‘a 33a and Y. Bava Meẓi‘a 2:13 (8d), however, the ruling is given in the accustomed, brief format: R. Yoḥanan rules according to R. Yehudah. The known parallel sources to this debate contain no indication that the names of the parties involved actually were ever inverted, suggesting that even in cases where inversion was not known to be an issue, it was logically induced that this was the reason for the change in formulation. On the inversion of sages’ names in tannaitic sources, see Epstein, Mavo’ le-nusaḥ ha-mishnah, 1:5–6, 123ff. At pp. 135–36, he discusses the subject of the present discussion, viz., transmission of a ruling by reference to its content rather than its originator due to habituated inversion. At p. 131, Epstein alludes to the possibility that there were times when inversion was used to make the names of the scholars in a debate conform to the jurisprudential rules. See Urbach, “Masoret ve-halakhah,” 136–37, and sources cited there. Occupation with inversions has brought several scholars to question the reliability of rabbinic traditions writ large. Yet the conclusion that follows from the texts cited here is quite the opposite: if it was found necessary in particular cases to indicate that an inversion may have taken place, then it stands to reason that the norm was to take pains to transmit the tradition faithfully, and inversions are but atypical exceptions to this rule.

41. See B. Menaḥot 31b–32a, where a ruling recited, credited by Ḥananel to Rav (“the law is as R. Shimon b. Elazar”), concerning the proper manner of writing a mezuzah scroll is circumscribed by the Talmud to apply to only one of two views attributed to R. Shimon b. Elazar, in order to justify the conduct of Rav Huna. The pursuant discussion, however, suggests that his view might be otherwise explained and the full scope of Rav's ruling thus preserved. The application assigned to a ruling thus is not always a part of the original dictum, but may be a circumscription added after the fact, and potentially subject to debate. The meaning of such a circumscription also is not always a matter of consensus. The ruling that “the law is as R. Yehudah b. Lakish regarding a corpse” is interpreted by Isaac al-Fasi as limiting the license to carry an object from the side to a corpse, “since a person is anxious over his dead” (B. Shabbat 43b–44a). Those Rishonim who disagreed with al-Fasi found it necessary to give an alternate explanation of the circumscription. See supercommentaries to al-Fasi ad loc.: Zeraḥya Gerundi, Sefer ha-ma'or; Naḥmanides, Sefer milḥamot ha-shem; Nissim Gerundi.

42. Examples of conciliatory rulings used to ascertain the scope of a debate include B. Shabbat 57b, where sages of the late amoraic period debate the formulation of a ruling on whether hairs and strands of wool constitute a barrier in ritual immersion, with one scholar stating that the law is as R. Yehudah and the other that the sages assent to R. Yehudah; ibid. 143b, regarding the juicing of fruits; and B. Sanhedrin 30b, concerning combination of testimonies.

43. In B. Berakhot. 33b, a ruling by R. Yoḥanan is given in the form “The law is as R. Eliezer regarding a festival that falls after the Sabbath,” based on which R. Zeira and R. Ḥiya b. Avin deduce that the tannaitic debate on the appropriate point to recite Havdalah in the Amidah of the evening service following the Sabbath (M. Berakhot 5:2) pertains as well when a festival follows the Sabbath, as explained in Y. Berakhot 5:1 (8c). In B. Shabbat 135b–136a, the Talmud raises the question of whether the sages disagree with the view of Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel in the definition of a stillborn person or animal, and deduces that the matter was debated based on a ruling transmitted in a dictum recited by Rav Yehudah, quoting Shmuel: “The law is as R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. ‘The law’? This indicates that they disagree! [You indeed can thus] deduce from it.”

44. B. Berakhot 33b; B. Shabbat 106b; additional sources cited in Mesorat ha-shas, ad loc. See also Mesorat ha-shas ha-shalem, B. Yevamot 91a.

45. B. Sukkah 34a: “R. Yose said in the name of R. Yoḥanan [in parallel at 44a: “citing R. Neḥunyah of the valley of Bet Ḥavartan”], ‘[The laws of] the ten plants, the willow, and the libation of water are laws [given] to Moses from Sinai.’” Rashi ad loc. comments, “Concerning these three [matters], they were asked what their source in the Torah was, and they responded that they are laws [given] to Moses from Sinai, and he who heard them committed them to memory in the order he had heard them.” The Tosafists (B. Mo‘ed Katan 4a, s.v., ’amar Rav Ashi), meanwhile, argue that these three traditions were given together at Sinai, so that logical deductions may be made on the grounds of their juxtaposition as if they were adjacent verses! According to Rashi, three unrelated statements may come to form a unit even during study: “These three traditions, <Mar> {Rav} Zutra heard them from Rav at once and committed them to memory” (Rashi, B. Shabbat 75a, s.v., ve-ha-yode‘a).

46. Yom Tov b. Avraham Ishbili, Novellae, B. Ketubbot 107b. The compilation there is of three rulings: one endorsing Rav, one Rav Huna, and one Rav Zvid. The first two concern a husband's obligation to provide alimony, a topic central to the chapter and the tractate generally, while the third relates to the purging of utensils of leaven on Passover, or else of wine used as an idolatrous libation at any time during the year.

47. One example of a collection of dicta that took form under special circumstances: “Rav Kahana said, ‘When R. Yishmael son of R. Yose took ill, Rabbi [i.e., R. Yehudah ha-Nasi] sent to him, “Tell us two or three things that you have told us in the name of your father.” He sent to him, “Father said thus …”’” (B. Pesaḥim 118b); cf. B. Shabbat 15a; B. Avodah Zarah 8b. The statements in B. Shabbat and B. Avodah Zarah parallel each other, while in B. Pesaḥim R. Yishmael is described as sending different dicta. Shmuel b. Meir, in his comments to Pesaḥim, considers whether all the sources describe a single incident and the dicta were scattered in different places, or else R. Yishmael took ill on multiple occasions. Even if the framework of the text is simply a literary format that was transposed from one location to another, the existence of that framework demonstrates that those who told the stories were familiar with such a means of transmitting dicta passed on by the sages.

48. E.g., Y. Avodah Zarah 1:1 (39b): “R. Shimon b. Karsana [said] in the name of R. Aḥa, ‘Regarding the Sabbath, mourning, and paganism, the law is as R. Shimon b. Elazar.’” Also extant are compilations beginning with the phrase “and the law” (ve-hilkheta’) that summarize amoraic rulings given in the Babylonian Talmud, e.g., “and the law is as Rav Yosef regarding a field, the subject, and a half” (B. Bava Kamma 114b), and “the law is as Abbaye regarding YAL KGM [a mnemonic]” (B. Bava Kamma 73a and parallels), but these statements are likely to be final touches of quite late origin that were appended to a redacted passage, and as such are beyond the scope of the present discussion, as demonstrated by Zini, Rabanan savora'i.

49. “They say at the school of Rav in the name of Rav, ‘The law is as R. Yose regarding a hermaphrodite and grafting,’ and Shmuel said, ‘Regarding protracted labor and forfeiture’” (B. Yevamot 83a). The Talmud specifies what subjects are intended, and discusses how Rav ruled in cases where Shmuel had ruled, and vice versa. The impression given is not that the joint presentation of the various rulings bespeaks a disagreement regarding the content, but that the material simply is a collection of rulings endorsing R. Yose. There may also be a mnemotechnical device at work here that associates protracted labor (koshi) and forfeiture (kiddush) based on the kof–shin sound pattern, while a hermaphrodite and grafting, each of which entails a combination of different types, may appear concurrently due to this intrinsic similarity. Meanwhile, other compilations of rulings in debates to which R. Yose was a party are phrased negatively: “Rav Yosef said in the name of Rav Yehudah, citing Shmuel, ‘The law is as R. Yose neither regarding brine nor regarding posts’” (B. Eruvin 14b). These rulings were laid down by the first generation of Babylonian Amoraim, before the introduction of R. Yoḥanan's rule that “the law is as R. Yose rather than a colleague of his.” The passage in Eruvin, noting the contradiction between these rulings and the preference for R. Yose on the grounds that “his rationales are evident,” later proceeds to a discussion of the rulings. See Henshke, David, “Ha-'elokim 'amarah?,” Leshonenu 60 (1997): 171–73Google Scholar, who examines the structure of the passage, ascertains the period when the sages involved were active, and rejects the proposal by David Weiss Halivni that the passage originated in B. Megillah.

50. “Abbaye said, ‘The master did all things as Rav except these three, which he did as Shmuel: one may light one lamp from another, one may detach [fringes] from one garment [and transfer them] to another, and the law is as R. Shimon regarding dragging’” (B. Shabbat 22a; cf. additional sources cited there). Abbaye, describing the conduct of his teacher, attests that Rabbah b. Naḥmani ruled in accordance with Rav in all matters but three. This statement is not a juridical rule, but a tradition concerning his teacher's conduct as attested by the Talmud.

51. E.g., “Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel, ‘The law is as R. Eliezer in four [matters]’” (B. Niddah 7b–8a); “Rava said, ‘The law is as Reish Lakish in these three [matters]’” (B. Yevamot 36a).

52. Weiss, Moshe, “Mishnayot ‘sefurot’ be-ro'sh masekhet,” Sidra 1 (1985): 33–44Google Scholar.

53. For a comprehensive discussion of halakhic compilations in the Talmud, see Weiss, Avraham, ‘Al ha-yeẓirah ha-sifrutit shel ha-’amor'aim (New York: Horeb, 1962)Google Scholar. On the creation of mnemonics corresponding to such compilations, see Avishai, Yorav, “Masoret ha-talmud—‘ha-simanim,’” Sidra 16 (2000): 59–80Google Scholar, and 73–74 in particular, concerning mnemonics for jurisprudential lists and rules.

54. The existence of such lists in the Talmud has been noted previously by Weiss, ‘Al ha-yeẓirah ha-sifrutit; Halivni, David, “Safkei de-gavrei,” Divre ha-’akedemiyah ha-’amerikanit le-made‘i ha-yahadut 46–47 (1980): 67–83Google Scholar. Some scholars have posited the existence of many such lists in the geonic period, a distinct type of material for study that was not included in the Talmud. Relevant sources to this discussion are provided by Danzig, Neil, Mavo’ le-sefer halakhot pesukot: ‘Im tashlum halakhot pesukot (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1999)Google Scholar. See especially chap. 1, nn. 26 (p. 7), 34 (p. 9).

55. “Rav Yosef was sitting behind R. Abba, and R. Abba was sitting before Rav Huna, and he [i.e., Rav Huna] sat and said, ‘The law is as R. Yehoshua b. Korḥa, and the law is as R. Yehudah’” (B. Avodah Zarah 6b–7a; B. Bava Kamma 102a). It is clear from the response of Rav Yosef that the two rulings were recited at once and he reacted to both at once, despite the lack of any common denominator. In each of the tractates, the Talmud finds it necessary to cite the source of the debate from the other tractate in order to explain what topic is under discussion there.

56. The Talmud sometimes seems to attempt to draw an artificial connection between rulings that have been compiled together in a list. In B. Gittin 3:8 (45b), the Palestinian Talmud transmits the following dual rulings: “R. Ila, R. Abba, and R. Elazar [said] in the name of all the rabbis attending the study hall, ‘Regarding wine [that has fermented] and a needle [that has rusted], the law is as R. Yehoshua b. Levi.’” The Talmud explains the relationship between the two debates—”and these competing views come as those competing views …”—by noting that both involve maintaining the status quo of a thing no longer in its right condition. In the parallel in Y. Bava Batra, the discussion is put differently, suggesting that it is the rabbis attending the study hall who conceived the link between the debates. Thus, the joinder of the ruling concerning wine and that concerning needles appears to reflect not only a halakhic ruling, but also a statement regarding a common feature of the two debates (Y. Bava Batra 6:1 [15c]). Participants in the discussion in the Babylonian Talmud neither were familiar with the joint ruling nor considered there to be any rationale common to the two discussions (B. Bava Batra 96a). This example may be related to the amoraic tendency to propose abstract concepts, such as retrospective assignment (bererah), to construct a link between disparate laws and debates. See De Vries, Benjamin, Toledot ha-halakhah ha-talmudit (Tel Aviv: Avraham Tsiyoni, 1962)Google Scholar; Urbach, “Masoret ve-halakhah,” 123ff; Moscovitz, Leib, Talmudic Reasoning: From Casuistics to Conceptualization (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002)Google Scholar, views this phenomenon as typical of the later strata of the Talmud (see pp. 350–57 for a summary).

57. Y. Terumot 3 (42a); B. Eruvin 46b.

58. B. Yevamot 42b–43a.

59. Even a rule attributed to R. Yoḥanan may number among the principles that originated as lists: “Rabbah b. Bar Ḥannah said in the name of R. Yoḥanan, ‘Wherever Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel taught in our Mishnah, the law is as him, except a guarantor, Sidon, and subsequent evidence’” (B. Ketubbot 77a and parallels). The Talmud notes that R. Yoḥanan himself issued a ruling that did not accord with this principle, then explains that the disparity resulted from a discrepancy between traditions transmitted by two of his disciples: “They are [statements by different] lecturers, citing R. Yoḥanan.” Some commentators explain that the difference of opinion between the students of R. Yoḥanan came about because some understood him as expressing an absolute rule, meaning that the law follows Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel in all other cases, while others understood the dictum of R. Yoḥanan as only summarizing three rulings and irrelevant to the remainder of the Mishnah (see Mal'akhi b. Yaakov ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi, “Principles of the Talmud,” §308; cf. Yosef ibn Aknin, Mevo’ ha-Talmud, chap. 3, §51). Elsewhere (forthcoming) I raise the possibility that discrepant traditions attributed to R. Yoḥanan emerged because in his youth he followed his teachers’ practice of issuing rulings on a case-by-case basis, having not yet formulated his rules. In the Palestinian Talmud the principle is introduced with the attribution “there they say,” and depicted as an absolute rule: “R. Ami b. Korḥa [said] in the name of Rav, ‘Why then did they say, “In all instances the law is as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel”? Because he would state decided rulings on the authority of his court’” (Y. Bava Batra 10:14 [17d]).

60. B. Yevamot 36a; the three cases are enumerated there. At B. Ḥullin 77a and B. Bava Batra 129b, the Talmud records only a brief ruling, omitting the list of topics.

61. Assuming that a femoral fracture does not render an animal unfit for consumption (viz., terefah) if the bone is covered with flesh, the question is asked, are tender sinews considered equivalent to flesh in that function?

62. He apparently relied in this argument on the rule that one is to err on the side of stringency in applying prohibitions imposed by the Torah (B. Avodah Zarah 7a).

63. Printed editions read “Rabbah.” The reading “Rava” is in accord with all MSS and conforms with both the local context and parallel passages.

64. This implies that in the remainder of their disagreements, the law does not follow Reish Lakish and his view is not to be taken into practical consideration.

65. Rashi (B. Ḥullin 77a) interprets: “‘But why was he silent? Did Rava not say’ in B. Yevamot, in [the chapter] Ha-ḥoleẓ, ‘The law is as R. Shimon b. Lakish in these three [matters]’ alone: acquisition of usufruct, one who receives ḥaliẓah from a pregnant woman, and one who stipulates in the middle, all in Ha-ḥoleẓ? It follows that in this [matter], of tender sinews, the law is as R. Yoḥanan, because although they ultimately will toughen, at the moment they are like flesh.” Rashi observes that endorsement of Reish Lakish is limited to the laws discussed in the fourth chapter of Yevamot, giving further credence to the notion that the dictum was intended as a compilation of rulings on a specific subject, and not a talmudic principle. The Talmud, however, interprets the compendium as a rule, and this position was accepted by the Rishonim and further implemented in their rulings, notwithstanding a difference of opinion as to whether there are additional exceptions to the three noted above, such as instances where there is a tannaitic source to support Reish Lakish. Ha-Kohen (Yad Mal'akhi, §568) discusses this question at length, including the views put forward by the decisors among the Rishonim and in compendia of talmudic rules. Ishbili takes the narrowest approach in the rule's application: “And they already have explicated in B. Makkot that there are other [instances] in which the law is as Reish Lakish, because the passage is as him or a tradition has been taught that is as him, and the rules were stated only generally and typically, and therefore they said that we do not derive anything from them, even where it says except” (Novellae to B. Yevamot as in printed editions; MS is quoted by ha-Kohen). The Tosafists (B. Yevamot 36a, s.v., hilkheta’ ke-Reish Lakish) note an instance in B. Zevaḥim where Rava himself clearly rules in accordance with Reish Lakish on a different topic, and evidently have great difficulty attempting to resolve this problem. Based on the preceding discussion, however, the ruling is not problematic in the least: the other statement by Rava is not a rule, but a list of rulings pertaining solely to the fourth chapter of B. Yevamot, with no relevance to discussions in B. Ḥullin or B. Zevaḥim.

66. Yosef b. Yehudah ibn Aknin, Mevo’ ha-talmud, 8–11. The work was translated from the Arabic based on MS Paris and first published, with the addition of a preface, by Adolf Neubauer (Breslau: Krotoschin, 1872). A critical edition based on MSS was published by Itamar Metzger (Jerusalem: Mekhon Neve Asher, 1997). Regarding the identity of the author, see Baneth, David Hartwig, “Yosef ibn Shimon ha-talmid ha-ḥashuv shel ha-Rambam ve-Yosef ’ibn ‘Enkin,” Veẓar Yehude Sefarad 7 (1964): 11–20Google Scholar. See also further discussion in Perry, Hadar, “Demuto ha-refu'it shel Yosef ben Yehuda ’Ibn ‘Enkin,” Korot 19 (2009): 21–42Google Scholar, and the introduction to the Metzger edition, pp. 1–3. Metzger's inclination is to identify the author of the work as the famous disciple of Maimonides, rather than a different later scholar of a similar name, as argued by Baneth.

67. Aknin, Mevo’ (ed. Metzger), 34.

68. Accompanied by an inventory of atypical and exceptional cases.

69. Aknin, Mevo’ (ed. Metzger), 35.

70. This rule appears in B. Ketubbot 77a and parallels. The author gives a description of the three cases and is quoted by the compendia of rules. See Yosef ha-Levi, Yeshuah b., Halikhot ‘olam, section 5, chap. 1, §7 (ed. Portnoy, Shmaryahu [Jerusalem: Mekhon Sha‘ar Hamishpat, 1998], 237 and nn.)Google Scholar See also Halivni, Kelale pesak ha-halakhah ba-talmud, 27–32.

71. Quoted from B. Mo‘ed Katan 22a; B. Ḥullin 50a. See discussion below.

72. Quoted from passage at B. Niddah 7b–8a. The author enumerates the four topics and comments, “but the preceding pertains [only] to the order of Taharot, while in other orders there are many,” thus indicating his awareness of the ruling's limitations. Ruling in accord with R. Eliezer is a complicated matter, due to his excommunication and ties to the house of Shammai. See Gilat, Yitschak D., Mishnato shel Rabbi ’Eli‘ezer ben Horkanus (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968), 320–33Google Scholar.

73. The author enumerates the four topics. Discrepant counts of the exceptional cases among the debates between the schools of Shammai and Hillel appeared in compendia of talmudic rules beginning in the geonic period; see ha-Levi, Halikhot, 236, and nn.

74. See the source of this rule at B. Eruvin 81b.

75. The author lists the two cases; see source at B. Menaḥot 30b and parallels. The rule is subject to a debate among Amoraim: Ze‘eri cites the circumscribed version in the name of R. Ḥaninah, and the same version is attributed to R. Yoḥanan (R. Yonatan in other versions; see Tosafot, s.v., ha’ ’itamar). Ula, however, attributes to R. Ḥaninah the more generalized version: “Wherever R. Shimon of Shezor taught in our Mishnah, the law is as him.” R. Ḥaninah of Sura goes still further, stating that the rule applies even outside the confines of the Mishnah. The discussion in that passage may reflect an early attempt at turning specific rulings into rules, and the rejection of the attempt; see Halivni, Kelale pesak ha-halakhah ba-talmud, 57.

76. The source of these rulings and the next is in chapter 13 of B. Ketubbot, which contains a compilation of rulings issued by the judges Ḥanan and Admon. Their rulings are presented in Y. Ketubbot 13 (35d); Y. Bava Batra 9 (16d); B. Ketubbot 109a. The source in the Babylonian Talmud features an amoraic discussion of the meaning of this list of rulings and of the relationship between them and the instances in which Rabban Gamliel declared that “I approve the comments of Admon.”

77. The author enumerates the cases.

78. Y. Shabbat 1:8 (4a); Y. Avodah Zarah 1:1 (39b).

79. The author enumerates the categories of forbidden objects where the law does not follow R. Shimon and those in which R. Shimon agrees with the majority view.

80. The origin of the ruling is in comments by Rav Aḥa and Ravina at B. Shabbat 157a. Regarding the sources of the rulings in B. Shabbat, see nn. in Metzger ed.

81. The word “not” (אין) appears in the Neubauer ed., but is omitted by Metzger. If the author indeed was a disciple of Maimonides, then he certainly followed his teacher in ruling according to R. Yehudah.

82. The author proceeds to detail the difference between an inadvertence (davar she-’eno mitkaven) and an act of labor not required as such.

83. The author enumerates the relevant cases. The source of the ruling is B. Yevamot 64b; see below.

84. The author enumerates the relevant cases; his source is B. Eruvin 14b.

85. The author enumerates the relevant cases; his source is B. Eruvin 42b.

86. B. Ketubbot 57a; see discussion below.

87. B. Eruvin 46a.

88. See discussion below.

89. Metzger notes that he has not identified the source of this rule. The text apparently should state that “the law is as R. Meir regarding bills of divorce,” in accordance with Y. Gittin 1:2 (5a).

90. B. Eruvin 46a.

91. The view cited here belongs to a debate among the sages of Yavneh cited in M. Eruvin 4:1, concerning a person who arrives on the Sabbath from a place beyond the permitted travel limit and finds himself in a storehouse, enclosure, or ship. Rabban Gamliel and R. Elazar b. Azariah opine that he may move about the entirety of such a space, while according to R. Yehoshua and R. Akiva, he may move only within a range of four cubits. The Amoraim are divided regarding the halakhah. The Palestinian Talmud (Eruvin 4 [21d]) documents a conciliatory ruling: “Ḥananiah son of the brother of R. Yehoshua says, ‘All day they debated, these against those, until Father's brother came and conciliated them and established that the law would be as Rabban Gamliel and as R. Elazar b. Azariah regarding a ship, and as R. Yehoshua and as R. Akiva regarding a storehouse or enclosure.’” The Babylonian Talmud (B. Eruvin 42b) records a difference of jurisprudential opinion between early Amoraim: “Rav said, ‘The law is as Rabban Gamliel regarding a storehouse, enclosure, or ship,’ and Shmuel said, ‘The law is as Rabban Gamliel regarding a ship, but not regarding a storehouse or enclosure.’”

92. Thus in printed editions. MSS: “regarding torn animals.” One way or the other, the statement is intended to refer to a single specific law among those relating to torn animals, and not to all laws in that field. See Feldman, David, She'elot u-teshuvot lev David (Talne, Ukraine: 1884; Manchester, England: 1955; London: M. Feldman, 2000)Google Scholar, §25, who considers ruling according to this principle in the case of a cherry pit found in the body cavity of a chicken on the grounds that the term “regarding torn animals” refers to the entirety of the laws of torn animals.

93. B. Mo‘ed Katan 21a; a parallel modified to suit its context appears at B. Ḥullin 50a. In Y. Mo‘ed Katan 3 (81c), R. Yehoshua b. Levi rules in accordance with the view of R. Shimon.

94. The dictum is attributed to R. Yoḥanan, but the unidentified individual who migrated to the Land of Israel refers to R. Abba, but as the author of the dictum. As for the ruling that “the law is as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding a torn animal,” we may posit that he simply transmits what he learned from his teacher R. Yoḥanan. In the case of the second ruling, however, he states that “it is a [matter of] debate,” i.e., he affirms that according to R. Yoḥanan, the law follows the view of R. Shimon where mourning is concerned, but adds that R. Yoḥanan's position is contested, demonstrating a disparity between the views of R. Yose and the traditions that he transmitted from R. Yoḥanan. This story may have ramifications for our understanding of the creation and transmission of halakhic dicta, as previously discussed in the compositions on talmudic rules. For a thorough discussion, see ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi, §§74, 75.

95. The text of the rule as summarily given here is: “The law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals.” The same version appears in ha-Levi, Halikhot ‘olam, and is attested by MSS of Mevo’ ha-talmud (see Metzger, ed.). In the Neubauer ed., however, the rule is given as it first appears in the Talmud.

96. B. Mo‘ed Katan 22a; B. Ḥullin 50a.

97. The talmudic passage is thus understood by ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi, “Rules I,” §4, s.v., “the law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals.” See criticism, ibid., of ha-Levi, in Halikhot ‘olam, for citing the statement that “the law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals” as a general rule. Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel appears in several laws concerning torn animals and others discussed in conjunction with them (M. Ḥullin 2:6; 3:2; T. Ḥullin 3:7; 3:19), but it is not said explicitly there that the law follows his view.

98. The phrase “as Rabbi” appearing in the book most likely is a corruption resulting from the omission of a word, the correct reading being “as R. Meir regarding bills of divorce.” The statement that “the law is as R. Meir regarding bills of divorce” appears once in Palestinian Talmud (Y. Gittin 1:2 [43c]), as a circumscribed juridical dictum: the law follows R. Meir in that Acre is regarded as having the same legal status as the Land of Israel, but only in that one who delivers a writ of divorce need not declare that he witnessed its preparation and signature, because of the rule that rabbinic requirements are implemented leniently, but in general the law does not follow R. Meir's view that Acre has the same legal status as the Land of Israel (e.g., where such status is relevant to pentateuchal commandments found in Zera‘im that apply to the land). This ruling is cited as a rule by Moshe of Coucy, Sefer miẓvot gadol, affirmative commandment 50.

99. M. Gittin 3:2.

100. Mishnah, MS Kaufmann and MS Parma: “R. Lazar.” The interchange of Liezer and Lazar occurs in textual witnesses of the Mishnah, Tosefta, and Palestinian Talmud. The talmudic discussion appears to indicate that the scholar in question is R. Elazar (i.e., R. Elazar b. Shammuʿa, the individual normally intended by generic mishnaic references to R. Elazar). See Epstein, Mavo’ le-nusaḥ ha-mishnah, 1167.

101. Y. Gittin 3 (44d). See ibid. 9 (50b).

102. B. Gittin 86b; cf. B. Ketubbot 94a. See also Rashi, B. Gittin 71, s.v., hilkheta’ ke-R. Elazar, who specifies that the ruling applies “to this matter,” implying that it is not a rule. Ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi (“Rules of the Talmud,” §4), uses this example to prove the existence of specific rulings formulated as though they were rules: “and do not be surprised and wonder how, concerning a specific law, they used [the terminology] ‘the law is not as Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel regarding torn animals,’ in the plural, as we have seen such a thing at B. Gittin 86b, where it says ‘The law is as R. Elazar regarding bills of divorce’ regarding the specific law that witnesses to transmission give force.”

103. B. Ketubbot 57a; cf. additional sources cited there.

104. Halivni, Kelale pesak ha-halakhah ba-Talmud, 54–56.

105. B. Ketubbot 54b.

106. Ibid. 56b–57a.

107. Ibid. 60b. Rav Pappi there quotes the rule in arguing against Rav Pappa and Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua, who have ruled contrary to R. Meir. Their response, lav ’a-da‘atin, indicates that either they were unfamiliar with the rule or they rejected it.

108. E.g., Aḥa of Sabḥa, She'iltot; Shimon Kayyara, Sefer halakhot gedolot; summary of views in Yosef Karo, Bet Yosef, Ḥoshen mishpat 52:1.

109. Tosafot, B. Beẓah 27a; B. Bava Kamma 30b; B. Zevaḥim 104a; B. Bekhorot 28a; B. Yevamot 34b, s.v., natan lah, from which it seems that the ruling does not apply even to laws closely related to those decrees to which Shmuel referred, meaning that the law in those cases need not follow the view of R. Meir; B. Eruvin 89a, s.v., kol gaggot, where it is stated that the law does not accord with R. Meir although the matter under discussion is explicitly identified as a decree.

110. The word here may best be understood as in the phrase “two judges of decrees” (shene dayane gezerot), denoting acts and rulings of a court. The term appears at B. Mo‘ed Katan 83a and T. B. Bava Batra 9:1, and is extensively discussed by the Talmud at the beginning of chapter 13 of B. Ketubbot (105a), which opens with the above Hebrew phrase. (The Palestinian Talmud and the MSS of the Mishnah have the reading “two judges of thefts” [shene dayane gezelot], also considered in the discussion in the Babylonian Talmud.) See nn. in Chanoch Albeck, Commentary on the Mishnah, B. Ketubbot (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1952–58).

111. See Karo, Beit Yosef, ’even ha-‘ezer 142:1, who cites sources questioning the force of the rule.

112. Y. Yevamot 4 (6a) has the reading “R. Meir concerned himself with bills of divorce,” an expression that may correlate with the term his decrees in the Babylonian Talmud, the concern evinced by R. Meir being the reason for his decrees.

113. Notwithstanding, there are those who took the ruling as a rule: in the discussion of rules in B. Gittin 47a, the Talmud asks why in a particular instance the view of R. Yose was endorsed instead of the opposing opinion of R. Meir, given the rule that the law follows R. Yose, and answers that the ruling was intended to indicate that another rule, that endorsing the decrees of R. Meir, is not to be followed in the present instance. For decisors who implemented the rule in discussions of other laws, see, e.g., Karo, Bet Yosef, ’oraḥ ḥayim 15:1, citing Haggahot Maymun ha-ḥadashot; Yoreh de‘ah 310:1, citing Kayyara, Sefer halakhot gedolot; ’Even ha-‘ezer 142:10, citing Barukh b. Yiẓḥak of Worms, Sefer ha-terumah; Yoel Sirkes, Bayit ḥadash, ’oraḥ ḥayim 629:5; yoreh de‘ah 64:4.