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Dynamic Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

James A. Stimson ,
Michael B. Mackuen  and
Robert S. Erikson
James A. Stimson
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
Michael B. Mackuen
Affiliation:
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Robert S. Erikson
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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Abstract

If public opinion changes and then public policy responds, this is dynamic representation. Public opinion is the global policy preference of the American electorate. Policy is a diverse set of acts of elected and unelected officials. Two mechanisms of policy responsiveness are (1) elections change the government's political composition, which is then reflected in new policy and (2) policymakers calculate future (mainly electoral) implications of current public views and act accordingly (rational anticipation). We develop multiple indicators of policy activity for the House, Senate, presidency, and Supreme Court, then model policy liberalism as a joint function of the two mechanisms. For each institution separately, and also in a global analysis of “government as a whole,” we find that policy responds dynamically to public opinion change. This responsiveness varies by institution, both in level and in mechanism, as would be expected from constitutional design.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 89 , Issue 3 , September 1995 , pp. 543 - 565
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1995

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