Multiparty governance requires compromise and this compromise canlead to electoral losses. I argue that coalition members aremotivated to differentiate themselves from their cabinet partners tomitigate potential electoral losses resulting from voters perceivingthem as not rigorously pursuing their core policy positions or notpossessing strong policy stands. I test this argument with originaldata on the scrutiny of over 2,200 government bills gathered fromthree parliamentary democracies incorporating information on voterperceptions of partisan ideology and parties’ policy preferences asderived from their manifestos. I find that coalition partners thatare perceived as more similar will amend one another’s legislativeproposals more vigorously in an effort to differentiate in the eyesof the electorate—to protect their brand—and therefore provideevidence for “pure” vote-seeking behavior in the legislative reviewprocess. Furthermore, these original data provide answers to severalopen questions regarding the policy motivations of cabinet partiesin legislative review and the role of committee chairs and externalsupport parties on policy outcomes.