Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-59b7f5684b-fmrbl Total loading time: 1.24 Render date: 2022-09-26T01:38:50.103Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "displayNetworkTab": true, "displayNetworkMapGraph": false, "useSa": true } hasContentIssue true
  • English
American Political Science Review American Political Science Review

Article contents

Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2016

EMILY HENCKEN RITTER  and
COURTENAY R. CONRAD
EMILY HENCKEN RITTER*
Affiliation:
University of California, Merced
COURTENAY R. CONRAD*
Affiliation:
University of California, Merced
*
Emily Hencken Ritter is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Merced (eritter@ucmerced.edu).
Courtenay R. Conrad is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Merced (cconrad2@ucmerced.edu).
Get access Rights & Permissions[Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Although scholarly consensus suggests that dissent causes repression, the behaviors are endogenous: governments and dissidents act in expectation of each other’s behavior. Empirical studies have not accounted well for this endogeneity. We argue that preventive aspects of repression meaningfully affect the relationship between observed dissent and repression. When governments use preventive repression, the best response to dissent that does occur is unclear; observed dissent does not meaningfully predict responsive repression. By contrast, governments that do not engage in ex ante repression will be more likely to do it ex post. We follow U.S. voting scholarship and propose a new instrument to model the endogeneity: rainfall. We couple rainfall data in African provinces and U.S. states with data on dissent and repression and find that dissent fails to have a significant effect on responsive repression in states that engage in preventive repression.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 110 , Issue 1 , February 2016 , pp. 85 - 99
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Abouharb, M. Rodwan, and Cingranelli, David L.. 2009. “IMF Programs and Human Rights, 1981–2003.” Review of International Organizations 4 (1): 47–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arena, Philip, and Hardt, Brian. 2014. “Incentives to Rebel, Bargaining, and Civil War.” International Interactions 40 (1): 127–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arena, Philip, and Joyce, Kyle A.. 2015. “Challenges to Inference in the Study of Crisis Bargaining.” Political Science Research and Methods 3 (3): 569–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bell, Sam R., Clay, K. Chad, and Murdie, Amanda. 2012. “Neighborhood Watch: Spatial Effects of Human Rights INGOs.” Journal of Politics 74 (2): 354–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolph, and Morrow, James D.. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Butler, Christopher K., Gluch, Tali, and Mitchell, Neil J.. 2007. “Security Forces and Sexual Violence: A Cross-National Analysis of a Principal-Agent Argument.” Journal of Peace Research 44 (6): 669–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carey, Sabine C. 2006. “The Dynamic Relationship Between Protest and Repression.” Political Research Quarterly 59 (1): 1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carey, Sabine C. 2010. “The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent.” Political Studies 58: 167–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collins, William J., and Margo, Robert A.. 2007. “The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in American Cities: Evidence from Property Values.” The Journal of Economic History 67 (4): 849–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conrad, Courtenay R., and Moore, Will H.. 2010. “What Stops the Torture?” American Journal of Political Science 54 (2): 459–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cragg, John G. 1971. “Some Statistical Models from Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods.” Econometrica 39 (5): 829–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Danneman, Nathan, and Ritter, Emily Hencken. 2014. “Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2): 254–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davenport, Christian. 1995. “Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions.” American Journal of Political Science 39: 683–713.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davenport, Christian. 1996. “The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression.” Political Research Quarterly 49 (2): 377–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davenport, Christian. 2000. Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Davenport, Christian. 2007a. “State Repression and Political Order.” Annual Review of Political Science 10: 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davenport, Christian. 2007b. State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davenport, Christian. 2015. How Social Movements Die: Repression and Demobilization of the Republic of New Africa. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
DeMeritt, Jacqueline H. R. 2015. “Delegating Death: Military Intervention and Government Killing.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (3): 346–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Dunning, Thad. 2008. “Model Specification in Instrumental-Variables Regression.” Political Analysis 16: 290–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Earl, Jenifer, Soule, Sarah A., and McCarthy, John D.. 2003. “Protest Under Fire? Explaining the Policing of Protest.” American Sociological Review 68 (4): 581–606.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enders, Walter. 2004. Applied Econometric Time Series. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3): 379–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D.. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97 (1): 75–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Franklin, James C. 2009. “Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America.” Political Research Quarterly 62 (4): 700–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Galtung, Johan. 1969. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6 (3): 167–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Regan, Patrick. 1996. “Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 33 (3): 273–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ginkel, John, and Smith, Alastair. 1999. “So You Say You Want a Revolution: A Game Theoretic Explanation of Revolution in Repressive Regimes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (3): 291–316.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldstein, Robert J. 1978. Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to the Present. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Gomez, Brad T., Hansford, Thomas G., and Krause, George A.. 2007. “The Republicans Should Pray for Rain: Weather, Turnout, and Voting in US Presidential Elections.” Journal of Politics 69 (3): 647–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gupta, Dipak K., Singh, Harinder, and Sprague, Tom. 1993. “Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37: 301–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression.” International Organization 59: 593–629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansford, Thomas G., and Gomez, Brad T.. 2010. “Estimating the Electoral Effects of Voter Turnout.” American Political Science Review 104 (2): 268–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henderson, Conway W. 1991. “Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35: 120–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hendrix, Cullen S., and Salehyan, Idean. 2012. “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (1): 35–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hendrix, Cullen S., and Salehyan, Idean. 2013. “Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD).” (Accessed January 9, 2013 at www.scaddata.org.)Google Scholar
Hibbs, Douglas A. 1973. Mass Political Violence. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Hill, Daniel W., and Jones, Zachary M.. 2014. “An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression.” American Political Science Review 108 (3): 661–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hollyer, James R., and Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2011. “Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6 (3-4): 275–327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hughes, P. Y., Mason, E. H., Karl, T. R., and Brower, W. A.. 1992. United States Historical Climatology Network Daily Temperature and Precipitation Data. ORNL/CDIAC-50, NDP-042. Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge, TN: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center.Google Scholar
Imbens, Guido W., and Angrist, Joshua D.. 1994. “Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects.” Econometrica 62 (2): 467–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1999. “Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria.” Rationality and Society 11 (3): 243–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keele, Luke, and Morgan, Jason. 2015. “Stronger Instruments By Design.” Manuscript available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256049563_Stronger_Instruments_by_Design.Google Scholar
Kim, HeeMin, Whitten-Woodring, Jenifer, and James, Patrick. 2015. “The Role of Media in the Repression-Protest Nexus: A Game-theoretic Model.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (6): 1017–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, John C. 1998. “Repression, Domestic Threat, and Interactions in Argentina and Chile.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 26 (2): 191–211.Google Scholar
Leighley, Jan E. 1995. “Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation.” Political Research Quarterly 48 (1): 181–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1987. “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31: 266–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1998. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Lindquist, Stefanie A. 2007. “State Politics and the Judiciary Codebook.” Data Codebook. Data associated with National Science Foundation Grant SES #0550618, “Predictability and the Rule of Law: Overruling Decisions in State Supreme Courts.”Google Scholar
McPhail, Clark, and McCarthy, John D. 2005. “Protest Mobilization, Protest Repression, and their Interaction.” Repression and Mobilization, pp. 3–32.Google Scholar
Melander, Erik. 2005. “Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict.” International Studies Quarterly 49 (4): 695–714.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, Neil J. 2009. Agents of Atrocity: Leaders, Followers, and the Violation of Human Rights in Civil War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Moore, Barrington. 1978. Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt. White Plains, NY: ME Sharpe.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, Will H. 1995. “Action-Reaction or Rational Expectations? Reciprocity and the Domestic-International Conflict Nexus During the Rhodesia Problem.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (1): 129–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, Will H. 2000. “The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (1): 107–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrow, James D. 1989. “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining.” American Journal of Political Science 33 (4): 941–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Muller, Edward. 1985. “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence.” American Sociological Review 50 (1): 47–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neumayer, Eric. 2005. “Do International Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (6): 925–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nordås, Ragnhild, and Davenport, Christian. 2013. “Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression.” American Journal of Political Science 57 (4): 926–40.Google Scholar
Novella, Nicholas S., and Thiaw, Wassila M.. 2012. “Africa Rainfall Climatology Version 2 for Famine Early Warning Systems.” Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 52: 588–606.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Palfrey, Thomas R., and Rosenthal, Howard. 1985. “Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty.” American Political Science Review 79 (1): 62–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pemstein, Daniel, Meserve, Stephen, and Melton, James. 2010. “Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type.” Political Analysis 18 (4): 426–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pierskalla, Jan Henryk. 2010. “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (1): 117–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Poe, Steven C. 2004. Understanding Human Rights Violations: New Systematic Studies. Aldershott: Ashgate, pp. 16–42.Google Scholar
Poe, Steven C., and Tate, C. Neal. 1994. “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis.” American Political Science Review 88 (4): 853–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Poe, Steven C., Tate, C. Neal, Keith, Linda Camp, and Lanier, Drew. 2000. Domestic Threats: The Abuse of Personal Integrity. In Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Regan, Patrick, and Henderson, Errol. 2002. “Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?” Third World Quarterly 23 (1): 119–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rejali, Darius. 2007. Torture and Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Riker, William H., and Ordeshook, Peter C.. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” American Political Science Review 62 (1): 25–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ritter, Emily Hencken. 2014. “Policy Disputes, Political Survival, and the Onset and Severity of State Repression.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (1): 143–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosenstone, Steven J., and Hansen, Mark. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York: MacMillan Publishing.Google Scholar
Salehyan, Idean. 2008. “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet.” Journal of Peace Research 45 (3): 315–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salehyan, Idean, Hendrix, Cullen S., Hamner, Jesse, Case, Christina, Linebarger, Christopher, Stull, Emily, and Williams, Jennifer. 2012. “Social Conflict in Africa: A New Database.” International Interactions 38 (4): 503–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sartori, Anne E. 2003. “An Estimator for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions.” Political Analysis 11: 111–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schnakenberg, Keith E., and Fariss, Christopher J.. 2014. “Dynamic Patterns of Human Rights Practices.” Political Science Research and Methods 2 (1): 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schneider, A., Friedl, M. A., and Potere, D.. 2009. “A New Map of Global Urban Extent from MODIS Data.” Environmental Research Letters 4 (044003).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schneider, A., Friedl, M. A., and Potere, D.. 2010. “Monitoring Urban Areas Globally using MODIS 500m Data: New Methods and Datasets Based on Urban Ecoregions.” Remote Sensing of Environment 114: 1733–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shachar, Ron, and Nalebuff, Barry. 1999. “Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation.” American Economic Review 89 (2): 525–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shellman, Stephen M. 2006. “Leaders’ Motivations and Actions: Explaining Government-Dissident Conflict-Cooperation Processes.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 23: 73–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, David A. 2011. “When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social Networks.” Journal of Politics 73 (4): 993–1010.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sovey, Allison J., and Green, Donald P.. 2011. “Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Readers’ Guide.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (1): 188–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Staiger, Douglas, and Stock, James H.. 1997. “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments.” Econometrica 65 (3): 557–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stohl, Michael, Carleton, David, Lopez, George A., and Samuels, Stephen. 1986. “State Violation of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of Measurement.” Human Rights Quarterly 8 (4): 592–606.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sullivan, Christopher, Loyle, Cyanne E., and Davenport, Christian. 2012. “The Coercive Weight of the Past: Temporal Dependence in the Conflict-Repression Nexus.” International Interactions 38 (4): 426–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sullivan, Christopher M. 2015. “Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, pp. 1–28. DOI: 10.1177/0022002714567951 Google Scholar
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
Valentino, Benjamin, Huth, Paul, and Balch-Lindsey, Dylan. 2004. “‘Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare.” International Organization 58: 375–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, C. N., Vose, R. S., Easterling, D. R., and Menne, M. J.. 2004. United States Historical Climatology Network Daily Temperature, Precipitation, and Snow Data. ORNL/CDIAC-118, NDP-070. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center.Google Scholar
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
107
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *