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The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2004

JOSHUA CLINTON ,
SIMON JACKMAN  and
DOUGLAS RIVERS
JOSHUA CLINTON
Affiliation:
Princeton University
SIMON JACKMAN
Affiliation:
Stanford University
DOUGLAS RIVERS
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Abstract

We develop a Bayesian procedure for estimation and inference for spatial models of roll call voting. This approach is extremely flexible, applicable to any legislative setting, irrespective of size, the extremism of the legislators' voting histories, or the number of roll calls available for analysis. The model is easily extended to let other sources of information inform the analysis of roll call data, such as the number and nature of the underlying dimensions, the presence of party whipping, the determinants of legislator preferences, and the evolution of the legislative agenda; this is especially helpful since generally it is inappropriate to use estimates of extant methods (usually generated under assumptions of sincere voting) to test models embodying alternate assumptions (e.g., log-rolling, party discipline). A Bayesian approach also provides a coherent framework for estimation and inference with roll call data that eludes extant methods; moreover, via Bayesian simulation methods, it is straightforward to generate uncertainty assessments or hypothesis tests concerning any auxiliary quantity of interest or to formally compare models. In a series of examples we show how our method is easily extended to accommodate theoretically interesting models of legislative behavior. Our goal is to provide a statistical framework for combining the measurement of legislative preferences with tests of models of legislative behavior.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 98 , Issue 2 , May 2004 , pp. 355 - 370
Copyright
© 2004 by the American Political Science Association

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