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The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

R. Harrison Wagner
R. Harrison Wagner*
Affiliation:
The University of Texasat Austin
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Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of anarchy at the global level rather than the aggressive intentions of governments. This article argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are usually inadequate models of the problem they have been used to illuminate, and that a security dilemma as commonly defined need not have the implications that are ascribed to it. It also argues that developing more adequate models of the general problem of enforcing agreements in a condition of anarchy will help us to understand better why international cooperation is more easily achieved in some areas than in others.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 77 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 330 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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