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Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals, and Punishment Dilemmas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2011

MEHDI SHADMEHR  and
DAN BERNHARDT
MEHDI SHADMEHR*
Affiliation:
University of Miami
DAN BERNHARDT*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois
*
Mehdi Shadmehr is Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami, 5250 University Drive, Coral Gables, FL 33146 (shad@miami.edu).
Dan Bernhardt is IBE Professor of Economics and Finance, Department of Economics, University of Illinois, David Kinley Hall, Urbana, IL 61801 (danber@illinois.edu).
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Abstract

How can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution? We model a “calculus of protest” of individuals who must either submit to the status quo or support revolt based only on personal information about their payoffs. In deciding whether to revolt, the citizen must infer both the benefit of successful revolution and the likely actions of other citizens. We characterize conditions under which payoff uncertainty overturns conventional wisdom: (a) when a citizen is too willing to revolt, he reduces the incentives of others to revolt; (b) less accurate information about the value of revolution can make revolt more likely; (c) public signals from other citizens can reduce the likelihood of revolt; (d) harsher punishment can increase the incidence of punishment; and (e) the incidence of protest can be positively correlated with that of repression.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 105 , Issue 4 , November 2011 , pp. 829 - 851
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2011

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