With friends like Edwin Meese and Robert Bork, "jurispru-dence of original intent" (p. 3) needs no enemies. Thesepolemicists have so corrupted originalism by associating itwith reactionary ideology and partisan politics that, in KeithWhittington's words, "the task now is to convince critics totake [it] seriously again" (p. xii). Constitutional Interpretationably performs this task. Whittington's rescue of originalistjurisprudence from its strangest bedfellows in itself is a majorcontribution to the study of constitutional law. But, althoughoriginalism has found a genuine friend, the book's powerfulargument against "dismissing originalism as an interpretivemethod" (p. 162) does not constitute an affirmative defense.Whittington's efforts to make this case are informative andprovocative, but they fail. This failure is traceable to seriousdefects in both the structure and content of the book.